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Agrarian Reforms and Hired Labour in Africa

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АГРАРНЫЕ ПРЕОБРАЗОВАНИЯ
И НАЕМНЫЙ ТРУД В СТРАНАХ
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Preface

The downfall of the colonial regimes in Africa and attainment of political independence by the vast majority of the African peoples has created the need for radical agrarian reforms and modernisation of agriculture, which plays a significant role in the economies of the young states.

About three-quarters of the working population on the African continent are still occupied in agriculture. In almost all African countries agriculture remains the main occupation and the most important source of finance for the national economy. At the same time, its archaic techniques, low efficiency, and the tenacity of pre-capitalist methods of exploitation of the peasants impede the advancement of agriculture and animal husbandry, hinder the development of the home market and industry, and constitute one of the major reasons for the tremendous relative overpopulation.

Agrarian problems have many aspects. These include the planning and growth of agricultural production, increasing labour productivity, mechanisation of agricultural processes, introduction of modern methods of farming, evolution of social relations in the village, and so on. Though these problems are closely related, each one requires separate study.

The author, naturally, does not offer the reader an analysis of all these problems in this one book. He confines himself to the much more modest aim of analysing the evolution of agrarian relations in Africa, determining the direction of this evolution, and tracing the major trends in the formation of the army of hired labour. It may appear that the object of our investigation is unjustified, because there is no organic link between the component parts: agrarian structure and the process of formation of the army of hired labour. In African conditions, however, this connection does exist. In the African countries even now the village exercises a tremendous influence on the economic, political and spiritual life of the urban society. The connection between agrarian relationships and the origin and development of

the hired labour market extends far beyond the formation of the agrarian proletariat. The system of migration as a basis for hired labour in large capitalist enterprises began to disintegrate only in the 60s and even today the majority of industrial workers and office employees have economic connections with the village. In this context, study of the formation of the hired-labour army becomes an essential component of the study of agrarian relations and interrelations.

This monograph does not consider agrarian relations in countries with racist colonial regimes and in the newly independent countries since the author's main intention is to follow the evolution of social and economic structures in the village after the elimination of colonialism and to elucidate some of the main trends in its future development. But this can only be done by analysing the conditions in countries where the historical laws of development in the framework of political independence have become more or less established. "A complicated process of class differentiation is under way in many liberated countries, with the class struggle gaining in intensity. It is taking different forms. New progressive changes have occurred in the economy and the political life of the socialist-oriented Arab, African and Asian countries. But there are also countries where development follows the capitalist way."[1]

The developing nations of Africa also follow different orientations in their social and economic development. Some of them have chosen the non-capitalist way of development, and others are following the capitalist way. This has necessitated a comparative analysis of agrarian reforms in each group of countries. In some countries, however, the orientation of social and economic development has changed (Ghana, Mali, Egypt). There we shall consider the agrarian reforms in the period of non-capitalist development; in Egypt's case the period is limited to the agrarian reforms of 1952 to 1969.

[1] *Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1976, p. 15.

Chapter I

THE AFRICAN VILLAGE UNDER COLONIAL EXPLOITATION

When Africa was converted into a colony of European imperialism its economic development was subordinated to the needs of international monopoly capital. In the system of foreign economic relationships conceived by the colonialists, Africa was part of the "world village", while the mother-countries played the role of "world city", shipping raw materials out of Africa and selling their manufactured goods there. Gold, diamonds, copper, cotton, coffee, cocoa, bananas and jute, drenched in the sweat and blood of Africans, were exported in ever increasing quantities to the developed capitalist countries for the purpose of enriching the monopolies.

Commodity production in the colonies was oriented mainly on export. Their home market grew only as a result of the expansion of the sources of raw materials vital for the developed capitalist world. With the overwhelming majority of the population tied to their subsistence economy, industrial capital[1] could function here only in forms which did not greatly influence local commodity-money relations.

Capital exported from the mother-countries was invested primarily in such areas as mining and farming, for which the main means of production (equipment, machines, tools) were all imported. Reproduction of constant capital, therefore, had no connection with the local division of labour. The reproduction of variable capital, however, was chiefly realised locally, though it was not completely of a commodity nature, since the labourer often retained his ties with the

[1] By industrial capital we mean capital employed in the sphere of capitalist production irrespective of whether it is invested in industry or agriculture.

village and its subsistence economy. Food occupied the dominant place in the reproduction of labour. Food was usually produced in the colonies themselves, whereas manufactured consumer goods were mostly shipped from the mother-countries.

On the whole, industrial capital in the African colonies was based on undeveloped employment relationships, and in the first place on heavy exploitation of migrant peasant labour. In addition, a major role in the exploitation of the African village was played by trading capital, which bought the produce of African peasants for next to nothing and exported it to the mother-countries.

Thus, during the colonial period, notwithstanding some regional differences (discussed later in this chapter), the exploitation of the African village was, in general, reduced to two basic forms: exploitation of migrant peasants, and of petty commodity producers growing mainly export crops. Though these forms existed in all African colonies, their correlation differed greatly. The first was typical of colonies with industrial capital (Belgian Congo, Northern Rhodesia, Algeria, Kenya), the second applied to regions where the colonialists preferred not to build their own enterprises, but to exploit the peasants, forcing them to grow such export crops as coffee, cocoa, cotton, and so on (most of the colonies of West Africa, Uganda, Egypt, etc.).

Such differences in methods of colonial exploitation are reflected in the distribution of the cash incomes of the population of individual colonies. Table 1 analyses the distribution of the cash incomes of the population of British East Africa at the beginning of the 1950s.

It follows from the table that the cash income of the African population was inversely proportional to the income of the foreigners, a correlation that reflects the degree of penetration of foreign capital into the production sphere. In Kenya the main source of cash incomes for Africans was wages (their share according to the table was about 74 per cent of total cash income), while in Uganda it was cotton- and coffee-growing (the share of cotton and coffee farms was 85 per cent of total income of the African population). These figures clearly show that in Kenya Africans were mainly exploited as hired labour, and in Uganda as commodity producers. In the economy of Tanganyika these differences, as may be seen in the table, were not so clearly visible. Here large planta-

Table 1

Income of the population of the countries of British East Africa (mln pounds sterling)

Indices	Kenya 1951	Tanganyika 1952	Uganda 1951
Net cash income	80.8	72.0	81.2
Net cash income of Africans	17.9	22.8	60.4
Net cash income of African households	4.7	10.0	51.0
Wages of Africans in foreign-owned enterprises (including food, housing, etc.)	13.2	12.8	9.3
Net cash income of foreigners	62.9	49.2	20.8

Source: Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies, ed. by I. Steward, Vol. I, Urbana, 1967, p. 128.

tions and farms belonging to foreigners existed alongside a rather large number of peasant farms growing crops for export.

On the whole, the share of incomes accounted for by native hired labour was in direct proportion to the degree of penetration of industrial capital. At the beginning of the 50s this share was 95 per cent in Northern Rhodesia, 80 per cent in Southern Rhodesia, 55 per cent in the Belgian Congo, 12 per cent in French West Africa and Ghana, and 8 per cent in Nigeria.[1]

At the same time, it would be incorrect to say that all countries with a low proportion of cash returns from hired labour in the total cash income of the local population were colonies where peasants were exploited mainly as commodity producers. The colonial system of exploitation in Tropical Africa (unlike in Northern Africa) gave rise to large-scale migration of peasants from one country to another in search of work. Specifically, in West Africa there were three main streams: the largest from Upper Volta, Mali, Guinea and Niger to Ghana and the Ivory Coast; then from the western

[1] *Agricultural Workers in Asian and African Countries*, Moscow, 1969, p. 116 (in Russian).

part of Mali and Northern Guinea to Senegal, Gambia and Sierra Leone, and the relatively weaker stream from Niger and the eastern part of Upper Volta to Nigeria, Dahomey and Togo. In East and Central Africa migrants came from the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, the Belgian colony Ruanda-Urundi, and the Eastern regions of the Congo to Uganda and Tanganyika, and from Nyasaland to Northern and Southern Rhodesia. This led to the appearance of one more type of colony where there was almost no industrial capital, and no developed African commercial agriculture. Take Upper Volta, which in the 50s had a population of 3.5 million, with about 650,000 people annually seeking work in the regions of commercial agriculture in Ghana, Mali and the Ivory Coast.[1] A great exodus of able-bodied people was also registered in Nyasaland, where the number of Africans working as hired labourers outside the country exceeded the number of those working at home. In 1957 Nyasaland had 155,400 people working in the country, while more than 157,000 went as migrant labourers to other colonies.[2] The main economic function of such colonies in the system of colonial exploitation in Africa south of the Sahara was to provide labour for the commodity production regions.

The Migrant Labour System

During the colonial period in Tropical Africa, the bulk of the hired labour at colonialist enterprises were migrant peasants who had left their villages temporarily. At the end of the 50s about 75 per cent of the Africans living in the urban regions of Northern Rhodesia had cultivated plots in the villages.[3] In Salisbury (Southern Rhodesia) 76 per cent of the hired labour worked less than 4.5 months annually, and 80 per cent changed their place of work every year.[4] In Tanganyika in 1956 there were officially 424,200 hired Africans, whereas the number of registered migrants in

[1] *Africa 1956-61*, Moscow, 1961, p. 88 (in Russian).
[2] M. I. Braginsky. *The Formation of the African Proletariat*, Moscow, 1974, p. 71 (in Russian).
[3] *Report of the UN/FCA/FAO. Economic Survey. Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia*, Ndola, 1964, p. 36.
[4] *The Working Class of Africa*, Moscow, 1966, p. 36 (in Russian).

transit centres and recruitment organisations alone amounted to 292,600.[1]

On the Ivory Coast plantations from 30,000 to 35,000 migrant peasants changed their place of work every two months.[2] In Duala (Cameroon) a construction firm with 150 jobs had to hire 1,250 persons every year, and a saw-mill with 30 work slots had to hire 844 persons annually due to the high labour turnover.[3]

Information published in a UN review of the economic situation in Africa since 1950 gives an idea of the extent of migration to the main centres with foreign-owned enterprises (see Table 2).

The data given in the table show that millions of Africans were compelled to leave their countries to seek work.

The migrant system in Africa south of the Sahara was created by colonial methods of extra-economic coercion and was not based on the disintegration of the peasantry and development of commodity-money relations in the village, as was the case in Europe. At the beginning of the twentieth century the peasants, their basic needs provided by the subsistence economy, did not want to work for the colonialists. For this reason European capital could not at first base itself on exploitation of hired labour. According to a report of the British Government Commission of 1903, the scarcity of native labour was due first and foremost to the fact that the African native tribes were, for the most part, primitive pastoral or agricultural communities with exceptional facilities for the regular and full supply of their ... needs.[4]

Therefore, in order to uproot the African peasant from the sphere of his subsistence economy and force him to work

[1] *The Transformation of East Africa. Studies in Political Anthropology*, ed. by S. Diamond and F. Burke, New York, 1966, p. 292.
Official statistics does not take into account hired labour on African farms and in small enterprises. Moreover, the real number of persons temporarily leaving the village to earn a living was greater because many migrant workers did not use the services of transit camps and recruitment organisations.
[2] *ILC. Thirty Seventh Session. Migrant Workers (Underdeveloped Countries)*, Geneva, 1955, p. 31.
[3] *The Working Class of Africa*, p. 37.
[4] Quoted in: D. Nokwe, "The National Liberation Movement in South Africa", *The African Communist*, London, 1968, No. 35, p. 31.
It should be noted that subsistence production, while satisfying the needs of the Africans, also accounted for the undeveloped nature of those needs.

Table 2

Migration of peasants to main centres with foreign-owned enterprises (1956-1957, in thousands of persons)

Place of origin	Place of work					
	Northern Rhodesia	Southern Rhodesia	Nyasaland	South African Union*	The Belgian Congo	Tanganyika**
Bechuanaland	—	—	—	11.5	—	—
Belgian Congo	—	—	—	—	1,121.3	—
Northern Rhodesia	217.8	42.3	0.4	—	—	4.0
Kenya	—	—	—	—	—	4.4
Basutholand	—	—	—	40.1	—	—
Mozambique and Angola	9.2	125.2	7.7	99.3	—	12.6
Nyasaland	20.7	132.6	155.4	—	—	3.8
Southern Rhodesia	2.2	300.2	0.1	61.0	—	—
Ruanda-Urundi	—	—	—	—	25.0	14.2
Swaziland	—	—	—	5.4	—	—
Tanganyika	—	—	—	—	—	290.6
Uganda	—	—	—	—	—	0.6
South African Union	—	—	—	108.1	—	—
Other countries	13.3	9.7	0.7	—	51.6	1.1
Total:	263.2	610.0	164.3	325.4	1,197.9	331.3

Source: *Etude sur la situation économique de l'Afrique depuis 1950*, Nations Unies, New York, 1959, p. 50.

* Males only.
** Africans only working in gold and coal mines.

for the Europeans, the colonialists often used methods of extra-economic coercion. This played a tremendously important role in the emergence of a wage force in Tropical Africa. This force was built by brutal colonialist methods and not through any immanent development of commodity production.

As Marx noted, "These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system."[1] Indeed, the colonialists established labour conscription for the African peasantry. At the beginning of the twentieth century the forced-labour system predominated all over Tropical Africa. Supported by the machinery of state, the colonialists compelled the Africans to work in roadbuilding, transportation of goods, construction of administrative buildings, on private plantations and in mines.

A great variety of methods of extra-economic coercion were used in the interests of enriching the European industrialists. In the words of M. Haily, "a complete history of this aspect of labour development would comprise ... slavery, direct statutory compulsion, pressure through the imposition of personal tax, the curtailment of native lands, assistance given by administrative officials to the efforts of private recruiters, and the use of chiefs to recruit their people as labourers."[2]

The essence of capital was not changed by the fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century the basis of colonial exploitation in Africa south of the Sahara was not hired but forced, sometimes slave, labour. Marx long ago drew attention to this feature when he wrote: "And if the plantation owners in America are capitalists not only in name but also in fact, it is because they exist as an anomaly of the world market, based on free labour."[3] Capital created by the work of the European proletariat and imported into Tropical Africa was intended to serve and actually did serve, through the mechanism of the world market, the capitalist production of the imperialist states, irrespective of whether it was based on hired or forced labour.

If we do not consider the overt and covert forms of slavery, which played an essentially subordinated role during the colonial period, the conscripted labour of African peasants for the colonialists was a form of corvée. This form existed in Tropical Africa long before the Europeans came to the continent, when tribal chiefs who controlled the land forced the peasants to work on their farms and carry out work for the

[1] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1977, p. 703.
[2] M. Haily, *An African Survey. A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara*, London, 1945, p. 636.
[3] K. Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857-1858*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1953, S. 412.

community. When the colonial regimes were established, the plots of land on which the peasants had based their subsistence economy became the property of the mother-countries or large private companies. These changes in land tenure relations greatly affected the peasants' obligations.

As before, these obligations represented relationships in which "...it was not considered that the feudal lord owned the peasants as chattels, but that he was only entitled to their labour, to the obligatory performance of certain services".[1]

According to Lenin, such relations are highly typical of a feudal state. In this case, however, it was not the feudalised tribal upper crust but the aggregate capital of the mother-country as represented by the colonial administration which was the owner of the land. Therefore feudal forms of exploitation associated with the peasants' subsistence production became an important factor in the accumulation of capital, this being one of the main reasons for the survival of these forms in the colonial period.

The above changes also greatly influenced the size of the services. Before the arrival of the colonialists the rent paid to the feudalised leadership was mainly of a consumer nature (its amount was chiefly limited to the needs of the landowner's family, his servants, etc.). After the colonial regime was established, the unrestrained pursuit of profit resulted in unlimited exploitation of peasants. For example, the labour tax imposed in the Belgian Congo "was in practice unlimited in duration."[2] This was true of many colonies, especially during the first years of colonial rule. The peasants' services prevented them from working on their own farms, leading to their ruin and preparing the way for the development of the migrant system.

Expropriation of land from Africans also played a big role in the emergence of the migrant system. It was widely practised in localities where intensive penetration of European capital into agriculture was observed.

In Kenya, for example, the colonialists seized more than 7.6 million acres of the most fertile land. Yet even close before the end of the colonial period only some 18 per cent of this land was cultivated. In Southern Rhodesia European

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 476.
[2] M. Haily, Op. cit., p. 593.

settlers seized more than half the land. Of the 44 million acres at the disposal of some 4 million Africans, 34 million are considered unsuitable for tillage; "meanwhile only some 3 per cent of the European farming areas in Southern Rhodesia is cultivated".[1] In Northern Rhodesia the colonialists expropriated 10.4 million acres from Africans, one half of this area being cultivated land.

One of the main reasons for the expropriation of land from Africans on such a huge scale was the creation of land shortage in the village with the aim of forcing the peasants to seek work in European-owned enterprises. Forcible alienation of huge tracts of land in favour of Europeans accelerated the conversion of tens of thousands of African peasants into migrants.

However, the expropriation of Africans' land was by no means a necessary condition for the emergence of migrant labour, though it expedited its growth. Naturally, this does not mean that the exploitation of peasants in the colonialists' enterprises would have been impossible without any land expropriation. In this instance the question is different: of whether the migrant system would have been possible without land expropriation, which created a land shortage in the African village. In West Africa, for example, the area of expropriated land was almost negligible, though the migrant system emerged here, too.

Actually, the massive migration of peasants in search of a living was caused not so much by the shortage of land as by the introduction of monetary taxes, primarily the poll-tax exacted from the male African population.

Historically, the introduction of monetary taxation of the African population reflects the already considerable degree of penetration of European private capital. "It is not without significance," writes J. A. Woddis, "that, generally speaking, it was at the beginning of the twentieth century—that is at the dawn of the imperialist epoch, when the export of European capital to Africa (and to other colonial regions) was stepped up and the exploitation of African labour became an important factor in the profit-making activities of the big European companies—that taxation of Africans on a capitation basis began to be introduced."[2]

[1] William Barber, *The Economy of British Central Africa*, London, 1961, p. 137.
[2] J. A. Woddis, *Africa. The Roots of Revolt*, London, 1960, p. 51.

The appearance of poll-taxes was traceable first of all to the fact that as capital took root in the African colonies, it experienced an ever increasing need for labour, shortages of which could not be made up by periodic forced mobilisations of the population. A system was needed to force Africans to seek work in European-owned enterprises. And such a system was finally created by means of monetary taxes which were first introduced in those countries where large investments had been made by European industrialists.

Monetary taxes, gradually replacing taxes-in-kind, opened a breach in the African peasant's subsistence farming and forced him to enter into the commodity relationships imposed by the colonialists. This was the chief form of indirect, extra-economic governmental coercion, forcing Africans either to work in European-owned enterprises or to produce the agricultural commodities needed by the colonialists.

The economic essence of the poll-tax was money rent, since the mother-countries acted as the actual owners of the land on which the African peasants laboured. In cases where the peasants paid their taxes by selling their produce, the tax represented a converted form of rent-in-kind. However, when the peasant went to work at European-owned enterprises, the tax represented a converted form of corvée.[1] At the same time the European industrialist considered this tax an indirect form of payment to the colonial administration which provided him with manpower. Otherwise the peasant might have remained in the village.

Thus, feudal and capitalist methods of exploitation were closely combined. And this was natural since, first of all, the indigenous population was tied as before to the subsistence economy and, secondly, colonial methods of exploitation were upheld by extra-economic coercion, which, with the help of capital, allowed exploitation of peasants engaged in their subsistence economies. And this, in turn, shows that the vitality of feudal relations in the colonial period was explained not only and not so much by colonialists being interested in winning over the local feudal nobility (though this was important) as by the fact that these relations were

[1] The fact that the source of this rent was capitalist exploitation does not change the essence of these relations, exactly as in Russia, where the landlord allowed the peasant who paid him métayage to move to the town so he could work at a capitalist factory. At the same time it betrays a certain underlying anachronism.

a part of the colonial economic order. A condition for providing labour for the European-owned industries was retention of the closed peasant subsistence economies, which precluded the growing of agricultural produce for sale and paying taxes out of the proceeds. Where the colonialists experienced an acute shortage of labour, they deliberately prevented the building of roads in rural localities and the cultivation of export crops. In such cases the African population was obliged to live on subsistence farming and their wages, out of which they paid taxes. As R. Buell emphasises, "The absence of railways and feeder roads ... makes it impossible for the natives to produce crops for export.... Inasmuch as they are unable to sell products of their toil, most of them must, in order to pay this tax, seek work from European employers."[1]

It is therefore not accidental that in those countries where the need for labour in capitalist enterprises was especially acute, the African natives' land was plundered more heavily, taxes were higher, and African commercial agriculture was least developed. This is confirmed by Table 3, which gives data for the 1920s.

Thus, at that time there existed an irreconcilable contradiction between the capitalist enterprise of European industrialists and African commercial agriculture. For the former to exist, the latter had to stagnate or disappear. This explains the seemingly paradoxical fact that the value of money orders from migrants to the village exceeded the value of produce marketed by the peasants. For example, in Northern Rhodesia in 1963 the value of agricultural produce sold by Africans in town markets, according to official data, amounted to a total of 2,704 thousand pounds sterling, whereas the remittances of migrants to the village were valued at 3.5 million pounds.

In the Belgian Congo in the 50s the average annual income of a peasant (including the products of subsistence farming) was 50 to 60 per cent less than that of an African wage worker.[2]

The colonialists learned from experience that with any increase in African commercial agriculture the number of

[1] Raymond Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, New York, 1928, Vol. I, p. 240.

[2] *Le revenue des populations indigènes du Congo-Léopoldville*, Bruxelles, 1963, pp. 90-92.

*Table 3**

Comparative data on the commercial level of African agriculture, monetary taxation and the amount of land seized by Europeans

Country	Land seized by Europeans (million acres)	Average poll-tax in shill.	Value of native commercial produce (mln pounds sterling)
Kenya	7.68	4	0.546
Tanganyika	1.8	3.45	1.7
Uganda	0.76	2.7	5.0

* R. Buell, Op. cit., pp. 303, 383, 392, 495, 600.

migrant workers dropped sharply. In the history of Uganda there are many cases when the introduction or expanded production of marketable crops led to a decrease in the number of persons seeking work for wages away from home. Thus, as a result of the rapid growth of cotton production in Buganda in 1924, there were very few peasants in that region who wanted to work for wages, though previously many of them had been migrants. A similar situation developed in the West Nile district, where a very modest introduction of cotton growing immediately brought about a reduction in the number of migrants. Hence, "the government was anxious to maintain the supply to Buganda and Eastern Province from other districts and refused to encourage a further extension of cotton growing in the West Nile".[1]

Commercial agriculture set up by the colonialists, normally export-oriented, was limited to relatively small enclaves. It was more like a breeding ground than a fully-fledged segment of the economy. Specifically, there was the White Plateau in Kenya, the Copper Belt in Northern Rhodesia, the cocoa-growing regions in Ghana, and the coffee and cocoa regions in the Ivory Coast, etc. At the same time the colonialists hindered the development of commercial agriculture in a greater part of Tropical Africa, having turned it into a reservoir of labour to serve the needs of commodity production. In order that dependence on subsistence farming would be complete, even in case of crop failures, the colonial authorities forcibly compelled the African peasant to store food as a famine reserve.[1]

The existence of regions where subsistence farming predominated and ensured a steady flow of cheap labour to colonialist enterprises was vital for the normal functioning of the migrant system. The influx of European capital into Tropical Africa was not accompanied by any decline of subsistence farming. On the contrary, it worked for its preservation. The emergence of a labour market preceded the emergence of African commodity production. This is in contrast to European countries, where capitalism developed on the basis of the disintegration of the feudal mode of production and where simple commodity production preceded capitalist production. In the countries of Tropical Africa wage labour was not the final result but rather a starting point for the development of commodity production, inasmuch as it served as the basis for the penetration of commodity relations into villages in regions of massive migration. At the same time, the existence of such ties and interrelationships was in turn possible only because, along with regions where subsistence farming predominated, there already existed imported and developed forms of capitalist production, which needed labour power.

It was a consequence of the colonial migrant system that the production of peasant farms dropped, causing their ruin. Thus, leaving the village to seek work increasingly became a vital condition of the peasant's existence.

The annual exodus of large numbers of men to work for wages left the African village without manpower. Clear-and-fallow agriculture could not be practised without men, because women and children could not replace them in some of the jobs, especially tree-felling or scrub-clearing.[2]

W. Allan, prominent student of agrarian relations in Tropical Africa, who conducted field studies in Northern Rhodesia, writes: "The absence of men from the villages also plays a part in bringing about over-cropping. Frequently the women are left behind to cultivate the garden and if

[1] W. Elkan, *Migrants and Proletarians. Urban Labour in the Economic Development of Uganda*, London, 1960, pp. 34-35.

[1] A. M. Kamarck, *The Economics of African Development*, New York, 1967, p. 102.

[2] Clear-and-fallow agriculture means that tilled plots are abandoned when their fertility declines; production is continued on scrub-cleared virgin lands until their fertility, too, is exhausted.

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there are no men to do the cutting of fresh gardens the old gardens are, of course, cropped for a longer period than they can stand, even if fresh land is available."[1]

The magnitude of male migration from the African village in regions of mass migration may be judged from data published in many works. For example, T. R. Batten noted that in the 1950s one-quarter of the able-bodied population was employed on plantations and in mines in East Africa. "This means," he writes, "that about one man in four is absent from his village and, incidentally, withdrawn from peasant farming."[2] Out of the 420,000 able-bodied tax-payers in Northern Rhodesia in 1950, only 128,000 farmed their own plots. At this time many villages in the northern regions of Nyasaland were completely without men.[3]

Studies in the Belgian Congo showed that in the late 1950s in the south-east regions of Kasai Province only 42 per cent of men aged over 20 lived in villages and out of these only 30 per cent lived there permanently, while 70 per cent regularly left for places where wage labour was used. Soviet historian Y. I. Komar observed: "Because of massive migration of primarily able-bodied males from Congolese villages in the 30s, 40s and 50s, the scarcity of males undermined their economy and caused the disintegration of their social organisation, which brought about a new wave of migration."[4]

Using the migrant system, the colonialists stripped the African village of its most efficient labour force, leaving mainly old men, women and children. Deprived of the male work force, families of the peasant migrants could not clear new plots when the cultivated plots became infertile. This inevitably led to a decrease of cropped areas, while migrant peasants, as village inhabitants, had the formal right to till unoccupied community land. The migrant system facilitated dispossession of land, regardless of whether land suitable for tilling was available. In Tropical Africa it often happened, therefore, that separation of the actual producer from the means of production did not precede, but was the direct result of, capitalist exploitation.

[1] W. Allan, *Studies in African Land Usage in Northern Rhodesia*, London, 1949, p. 36.

[2] T. R. Batten, *Problems of African Development*, London, 1960, p. 33.

[3] T. R. Batten, Op. cit., p. 94.

[4] Y. I. Komar, *The Working Class in the Republic of Zaire*, Moscow, 1974, p. 59 (in Russian).

The other side of this process was greater exploitation of peasants by tribal and community chiefs. As a rule, migrants gave part of their earnings to the community chiefs. One of the first to analyse the role and significance of these payments was Godfrey Wilson. He discovered, among other things, that the African labourers at Broken Hill (Northern Rhodesia) in the period 1938-40 sent to their relatives at home (not counting remittances to wives and children) a yearly average of 10.5 per cent of their wages, i.e. about five weeks' earnings.[1]

According to studies in Niger by French ethnographer I. Rouch, when the migrant returned to his village he had nothing save some clothes and a few minor belongings, because he had surrendered everything he had to his fellow-villagers.[2]

Naturally, in this case, the winners were the more influential members of the community. At the same time, while the migrants were away at work, their families became more dependent on the community chiefs, since they could not clear new land on their own, and obtain the help of fellow-villagers by treating them to beer, and the like.[3]

The migrant system contributed to the social and property stratification of the African village. Peculiarly, in regions of massive migration this stratification was based on the development of commodity production outside these regions and not on any increase in local commodity production.

As production rates on the migrants' land dropped, and wages became an essential element in the existence of their families, extra-economic methods of coercion became less important. These were replaced by stimuli inherent in commodity production. Many post-war investigations showed that the main reasons for peasant migration were economic. For example, interviews in Ghana with 9,581 migrants from Upper Volta showed that the main reason for their migration was not only to earn money for taxes, but also to buy clothes and other domestic articles.[4] A study of the

[1] Godfrey Wilson, *An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia*, Livingstone, 1941, Part 1, p. 53.

[2] I. Rouch, *Migration au Ghana (Gold Coast)*, Paris, 1956.

[3] E. Colson, *Social Organisation of the Gwembe Tonga*, Manchester, 1960, p. 92.

[4] *Social Change, the Colonial Situation*, New York, 1966, p. 142.

migration of Toucouleurs to Dakar (Senegal) yielded the same result. Investigator Abdoulaye Bara Diop came to the conclusion that the main reasons for the migration of Toucouleurs were economic.[1]

In regions of mass migration subsistence farming greatly reduced the growth of the African peasants' need for cash. For example, according to the observations of P. H. Gulliver in Tanganyika, the necessary cash minimum of an average family of four in the Ngoni tribe (a region of mass migration) was, at the beginning of the 1950s, from 70 to 80 shillings per annum.[2] Another investigation carried out at about the same time in Tanganyika among the Ngindo tribe found that the subsistence minimum of an average family was 112 shillings per annum.[3] Such a state of affairs was advantageous to the colonialists. The lower requirements of migrants as compared with those of the local population tended to depress wages to Africans in European-owned enterprises.

It is characteristic, however, that given subsistence farming, even these miserly sums were difficult to obtain from selling peasant produce or through chance employment. P. H. Gulliver came to the conclusion that about 75 per cent of the men had lower cash incomes than the peasants' meager subsistence and that this was one of the chief reasons for migration.

The predominant subsistence farming prevented the development of commodity-money relations, and therefore also of wage labour in these regions, and was one of the main reasons why wages remained lower than in regions employing migrants. According to the aforesaid investigation, in the region inhabited by the Ngoni tribe, the monthly wage was only 22.5 shillings, whereas at the European-owned sisal hemp plantations it reached 65 shillings including the cost of food. This is generally characteristic of the migrant system. "In the area of departure," wrote Lenin, "agricultural workers' wages are *particularly low*, while in the area of attraction, the area of capitalism, wages are far higher."[4]

[1] Abdoulaye B. Diop, *Société Toucouleur et Migration*, Dakar, 1965, p. 90.

[2] P. H. Gulliver, *Labour Migration in a Rural Economy*, Kampala, 1955, p. 18.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 238-39.

Therefore uneven economic development (predominance of subsistence farming in some areas and a relatively high level of commodity-money relations in others) was the main condition for the migration of peasant labour and, therefore, for the normal functioning of the migrant labour system.

As a rule, the migrants were males who left their families in the village. Before World War II, women did not often leave together with their husbands. Even at the beginning of the 1950s, when men began to migrate with their wives, their number was not great.

A 1959 study carried out by the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa showed that south of the Sahara 52 per cent of the 100,000 migrants going to Ghana and the Ivory Coast were single, and 85 per cent of the married men had left their wives at home. In East Africa only 5-10 per cent of the migrants in the 50s left home together with their wives.[1] Also characteristic was the fact that the migrants' age rarely exceeded 45 years. European capital exploited the most able-bodied and most productive age groups of the African rural male population.

Heading for regions of hire, migrants walked large distances, sometimes hundreds of miles, for many weeks and sometimes months. "When one realises what this migration of labour means in terms of human endurance, hardships and suffering, bitter indeed must be the lot of the Africans," writes J. Woddis, "and desperate the plight which drives them in such quantities and so relentlessly to abandon wife, children and home to set out from their accustomed plains and hills, to travel hundreds of miles over tiring barren lands, to slave from dawn to dusk for a foreign farmer or enter the darkness of mines to dig gold, tin or copper for the European master".[2] Lacking money, the migrants had to earn their livelihood along the way on rich African plantations, where, as a rule, they were not paid cash, but merely given food. The long search for work caused enormous waste for society as a whole.

However, with the migrant's arrival in centres of wage labour, his hardships were not over. Working at a foreign-owned enterprise, he was subjected to brutal exploitation.

[1] Guy Hunter, *The New Societies of Tropical Africa*, London, 1962, p. 202.

[2] J. Woddis, Op. cit., p. 95.

Among the systematically underfed African workers the mortality rate was extremely high, which showed that their living standard did not ensure normal reproduction of labour. One might say that the African towns of today were built on the bones of Africans. For example, until 1941 the population of Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone, grew only because migrants made up for the natural loss of population. Over a period of 70 years the mortality in Freetown considerably exceeded the birth-rate. Investigations there in February 1941 among families with the lowest incomes showed that more than 75 per cent were underfed, 50 per cent of the children were physically retarded, being forced to begin work at too early an age, and 90 per cent barely made ends meet. In this connection one must agree with Y. I. Komar, who wrote the following: "The widespread use of the most brutal forms of exploitation, inherent in colonial capitalism in general and especially its early stages, was connected mainly with the production of absolute surplus value, combined with the poor training of local labourers, who lacked practical skills and were not accustomed to regular industrial labour; this led to a very rapid exhaustion and deterioration of labour, making employers continually renew the labour force."[1]

Another important effect of the migrant system was the almost complete absence of skilled labour among the Africans, which greatly narrowed the development possibilities of the economy of the African peoples. Returning to his village the migrant rapidly lost the skills he had learnt as a wage worker. Besides, if he decided to remigrate he often had to work at some new enterprise where he would learn other operations. R. and S. Sofer, who studied the migrant system in Uganda, noted that "the instability of the African labour force militates against the development of skills. There is a considerable loss of acquired skill through workers leaving the town after a relatively short period. Even if the worker returns to the town he has forgotten much of what he has learned".[2]

In the colonial period, one of the most important features of the labour structure at foreign-owned enterprises was that, as a rule, Africans did the unskilled work requiring minimum production training, while the small number of skilled specialists were of European or Asian origin. Given the almost complete absence of skilled local labour, the demand was met by specialists from other continents with extraordinarily high wages—much higher than the corresponding wage in developed capitalist countries. While the wage of the unskilled migrant peasant could not ensure normal reproduction of labour, the wage of the skilled specialist considerably exceeded the cost connected with its reproduction, and this, in many cases, enabled the specialist to accumulate private capital.

It is clear that in the conditions described above this gap in wages had a racial pattern, and in most countries the racial differences were legalised. In several countries (the South African Union, Southern and Northern Rhodesia) they became law, the Europeans being allotted skilled jobs; in other countries (West Africa) barriers were erected for the Africans, which prevented them from attaining higher posts. In the case of the small number of African specialists who reached higher positions, salaries were lower than those of specialists from other continents.

The exploitation of mainly unskilled labour has inhibited technological progress in Africa. Nevertheless, for the individual European employer in colonial times employment of migrants was more profitable than regular labour. The reason why migrant labourers were paid much less than skilled workers was that the former earned their own living only, while their families in the village depended on subsistence farming. Migrants did not receive any unemployment, sick, or disability benefits. In effect, all these expenses fell to the African village, which assured the reproduction of labour power.

In the words of M. Forrester, Europeans "used African subsistence agriculture in the traditional sector to subsidise wages of the labour force in the exchange sector... On the one hand, Africans subsidising their own wages is one of the prime reasons for the rapidity of capital formation in the exchange sector.... The paucity of African consumers limited the size of the market and thus in turn limited the inducement to invest".[1]

[1] Y. I. Komar, Op. cit., p. 44.

[2] S. and R. Sofer, *Jinja Transformed. A Social Survey of Multiracial Township*, Kampala, 1955, p. 41.

[1] Marion W. Forrester, *Kenya Today. Social Prerequisites for Economic Development*, Hague, 1962, p. 66.

This contradiction between rapid capital accumulation and the limited home market resulted in the orientation of the commodity exchange economy on export and the transfer of surplus capital abroad. Without this there could have been no rapid accumulation of capital, since it was based on the exploitation of migrants depending on subsistence agriculture, and since there was no chance of selling marketable output on the home market. Thus the migrant system was not simply an important form of exploitation of the indigenous population, but also suited the needs of the colonial economy imposed on the peoples of Tropical Africa by the imperialists.

The cheap, chiefly manual labour of the migrants kept costs of production below what they would have been in the case of large-scale use of machines. This idea was best defined by the former Governor-General of the Congo, P. Ryckmans. "Why use costly equipment, increasing the efficiency of a worker ten-fold," he asked, "when it is so simple to hire nine more who produce the same and cost less than a machine."[1] This lays bare the quintessence of colonial economic policy.

At the same time, lower labour costs as compared with the cost of machines and equipment were the essential condition for normal functioning of the migrant labour system.

To retain the system of exploitation of African peasants as migrant workers it was necessary not only that they should seek industrial jobs but also that they should return to their village. The first condition was ensured by ruining the African peasant, the second, by the appalling methods of colonial exploitation, by the low wages that were insufficient to maintain a family, and also by the employers' letting dwellings chiefly to single workers, prohibiting unemployed Africans to live in towns and letting peasants retain their right to land in their native community.

Some Western researchers say that their earnings in factories enabled the migrant peasants to increase the output of their farms and that this was why they migrated. According to W. Elkan, "their purpose, or target, in seeking employment is not to enjoy an immediate increase in their standard of life but rather to save as much money as possible

[1] P. Ryckmans, *Etapes et jalons*, Bruxelles, 1946, p. 52.

in a more or less given time with which to increase the productivity of their farms."[1]

Of course, it is difficult to estimate the number of migrants who set themselves such a task. However, many investigations show that most migrants could not even hope to raise production on their farms, because the low wages they received at European-owned enterprises were at best enough only to pay taxes and debts, and buy a few personal belongings. "The profits of labor," writes Philip H. Gulliver, "are so low (by the standards of the men themselves) that there is relatively little effect upon the economic conditions of the home area."[2]

This is also confirmed by the studies in Nairobi of M. Forrester. According to data she obtained concerning the low-income group (34.1 per cent of persons investigated) the share of the annual cash income spent on farming was only 1.66 per cent. However, it should be noted that 5.91 per cent of the cash income of this group was made up of receipts from selling property in the village—land, animals and implements. These migrants were, in fact, ruined peasants. At the same time, in the group with a somewhat higher income (38.6 per cent of the sampling) the investment in farming exceeded the receipts from sales of property in the village by a mere 0.62 per cent if taken as a share of their cash wage per annum. In other words, for 72.7 per cent of the cases, the wage income from migrant employment was not sufficient for maintaining production on the farms at a subsistence level. As a result, migrant peasants were forced to sell part of their village property.[3] The migrant system accelerated the ruin of the peasantry and was, therefore, reproduced on a wider basis.

[1] *The Study of Africa*, ed. by P. McEwan and R. Sutcliffe, London, 1965, p. 281.

This is correct not for the entire mass of migrants, but mainly for a small group of persons who in the past carried out more or less skilled work (usually in the employ of the colonial administration) and therefore had, as a rule, a permanent job outside farming. Such persons did invest in farming part of the money obtained as wages or illegal extortions, but, strictly speaking, they cannot be regarded as migrants.

[2] Philip H. Gulliver, "Incentives in Labor Migration" in: *Africa. Social Problems of Change and Conflicts*, ed. by Pierre L. van den Berghe, San Francisco, 1965, p. 428.

[3] M. W. Forrester, Op. cit., pp. 72, 76.

Migration caused a large fluctuation of labour and required the involvement in wage labour of a considerably greater number of people than would be necessary in the case of skilled labour; in other words, the number of migrants forced to seek work every year was necessarily considerably greater than the number of available jobs. How important this was for the colonialists may be seen from their constant complaints that wage increases are accompanied by increases in the labour turnover and decreases in the supply of labour.

The fact that migrants tended to return to their villages when wages were increased, was due not to the Africans' predilection for rural life or reluctance to improve their living standard, but rather to the fact that the wage increases were not large enough to encourage migrants[1] to part with their families. "A small rise in wage rates," notes Philip H. Gulliver, "does not offer the labor migrant the possibility of a distinctly higher standard of living in contrast with the prevailing low tribal and rural standards ... and generally he prefers his home life except in young manhood."[1] Therefore the colonialists required that the number of migrant labourers be inversely proportional to the average period of their employment.

The low wages, poor living quarters, absence of pensions and of unemployment benefits compelled the migrant to return to his village. This, facilitated by the system of traditional land tenure—where each villager had the right to cultivate land but could neither buy nor sell it—helped to sustain ownership of village plots for family subsistence farming. From this point of view, the traditional system of land tenure benefitted the colonialists. It was not accident, therefore, that for a long time they hindered the legislative registration of private ownership in villages in a large part of Tropical Africa. Even in Kenya, where towards the end

[1] Philip H. Gulliver, "Incentives in Labor Migration", p. 434. Young men preferred to work away from their native environment because this lessened their dependence on richer relatives, whereas for married men it was less important, because their families remained in the village. As Southhall noted, "All have, in fact, left Alurland [Uganda] partly in order to escape from those kinship obligations which tend to disperse wealth as soon as accumulated." (See *Economic Development and Tribal Change. A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, ed. by A. Richards, Cambridge, 1952, p. 150.) This, incidentally, shows how harsh these obligations were, for peasants preferred to wander in strange lands than live with their relatives.

of the colonial period a policy of "giving over" land into private ownership was being cautiously introduced, the Ministry of Colonies stated in a confidential report in March 1945 that the main task in that country was maintaining communal ownership of the land, and avoiding the harmful consequences of private landownership.[1] The "harmful consequences" referred to the growing number of landless peasants who could not become migrant labourers since the rural consumer economy was one of the conditions for the latter's existence. And because colonial exploitation preserved subsistence relations and maintained the peasants' ties with the land, the village could subsidise the reproduction of labour hired at European-owned enterprises. This was one of the main reasons for so strikingly long a survival of the migrant system in Tropical Africa.

The migrant, connected with subsistence farming and hired on a temporary basis by a European employer, was not yet a worker in the real sense of the word. And this not only because of his ties with the village, though they were important. Even when he worked in the European-owned enterprises his wage was so low that notwithstanding all his efforts, he could not live on it and save any money. Therefore, he was forced to find some work on the side, engage in trade when the occasion presented itself or sometimes receive food for labouring on farms of richer peasants. "One need not deny," wrote W. Elkan, "that a good deal of absence may be caused by hangovers of the occasional overpowering reluctance to go to work, but it is very doubtful whether these are the most important causes today. Far more important are the opportunities to earn casual money outside regular employment and at rates well above the loss in wages which a day off from work entails."[2]

Such casual earnings were absolutely essential to peasant migrants, since they were constantly in debt. The main form of debt was money loaned by the employer just before payday and goods or money loaned by shopkeepers. In Nigeria, for example, researchers noted the growing debt of the workers and pointed out that the relatively large sums borrowed (often at a high interest) were usually not repaid to

[1] M. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country*, Nairobi, 1967, p. 56.

[2] W. Elkan, Op. cit., p. 108.

creditors.[1] This revealed the permanent bondage in which the peasant migrant found himself in relation to his employer, shopkeeper, etc.

The weak ties of wage labour were reinforced by the ties of being in debt, which became stronger still when migrants resorted to the services of recruitment organisations.

Even when employed in a factory, the migrant did not become a worker in the full sense of the word, because in many cases his wage was not the only source of livelihood, and was supplemented by loans; besides, his family subsisted from farming and often supplied him with food. The exploitation of Africans by monopoly capital in Tropical Africa was based on an undeveloped hiring relationship. In the colonial period it was not accompanied by the formation of a local proletariat. The transitional forms, mainly migration, were only creating the conditions for the ultimate emergence of a modern working class.

The emergence of a wage labour army in regions of African commercial agriculture, to which a considerable section of migrants gravitated, was an even slower process. For example, in the 50s, there was an annual flow of 150,000 to 200,000 migrants to the African cocoa-bean farms in Ghana. About 50 thousand migrants from Northern Guinea and Mali worked on African farms in Senegal, hundreds of thousands of migrants from neighbouring countries were hired in villages on the Ivory Coast, etc.[2]

The migrant system was profitable not only for European employers, but also for the rich African farmers in areas of commodity farming, for whom it was a source of cheap labour. The reason was that the living and cultural levels of the population in regions of predominant subsistence farming were lower than in areas of developed commercial agriculture. Therefore, migrants agreed to work for much less than local peasants. Employment of migrants, therefore, greatly lowered the cost of production, and at the

[1] *C.S.A. Family Budget Surveys*, Vol. 1, East Africa, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana. Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa (Publication No. 95), S.L., 1964, p. 81.

[2] A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa*, New York, 1973, p. 224; *Modern Africa*, Edited, with Notes and Commentaries, by P. J. M. McEwan and R. B. Sutcliffe, New York 1965, p. 295; *La Côte d'Ivoire, Chances et risques*, Session d'etude 20.7-11.8 1966, Bruxelles, 1967, p. 53.

same time tended to intensify the exploitation of the local population.

In contrast to exploitation at European-owned plants, migrant labourers in regions of African commercial farming were in most cases exploited by pre-capitalist methods. Here, migrant labourers usually paid for their upkeep (food) by working; besides, there was a métayage system under which migrants paid either a fixed rent or, more often, with part of their crops.

Many of them rented land for one or two years, paying for it with a share of the crop, whereupon they returned to their villages. Others, who sought escape from the periodic wanderings, bought plots outright and severed their economic ties with the native country. As a rule the newcomers were in a more dependent situation. Migrants often agreed to cultivate the less fertile land that local peasants refused to till, and their plots were often smaller. They also fulfilled heavier duties for the landowner and paid more money for the right to live in the village.

Thus, not only colonialists, but also tribal leaders in regions of commodity farming had a stake in the migrant system. At the same time, since migrants paid taxes out of their wages, used in the main for the upkeep of leaders and their staffs and also for payments to elders according to traditional family obligations, local authorities and the community leaders were also interested in the preservation of migration. The collisions which often arose on these grounds were aptly described by E. Colson: "Older men complain that too many young men now take no thought of their home obligations. They prefer to spend their wages upon beer, sweets and bread or to clothe themselves in the style of the towns whence they return with neither money nor goods to gladden the home people. Older people therefore are entirely in favour of the government regulation which requires a portion of any wages earned in Southern Rhodesia by African residents of Northern Rhodesia to be remitted to the home district to be obtained only upon the migrant's return."[1] In such cases, having obtained part of his wages in the village, the migrant would hardly avoid the solicitations of community leaders.

In general, it would be no exaggeration to say that the migrant system in Tropical Africa was one of the most im-

[1] E. Colson, Op. cit., p. 53.

portant factors that united the exploiting leadership of the African village with the colonialists.

Many features of the migrant system in Tropical Africa are also typical of the northern region of the continent. At the same time the formation and development of the mass exodus of peasants in search of a living in this region had specific features. In North Africa, even before it became a colony, there existed mature forms of feudalism, represented by large landed estates; private landownership was considerably developed; comparatively large towns existed; national markets were being formed. All this could not but have had a direct bearing on the establishment of the migrant labour system.

While in countries of Tropical Africa colonial extra-economic coercion was prevalent in the early part of the twentieth century as the main means of recruiting the local population for colonialist enterprises, in North Africa this method was already outdated toward the end of the nineteenth century, and was replaced by methods of economic compulsion conditioned by the ruin of peasants and artisans.

Already at the beginning of the twentieth century colonial exploitation combined with land expropriation,[1] higher taxation, decline of crafts in face of European industrial competition, etc., caused the ruin and pauperisation of peasants and artisans, for whom wage labour became an economic necessity. Also, a considerable mass of small producers had to various degrees lost their means of production. They became the basic source for the formation of the army of wage labour. So, in contrast to Tropical Africa, the separation of the direct producers from the means of production here was, to a great extent, not the consequence of wage labour, but preceded it.

In connection with this, the number of persons who completely lost their land was growing much more quickly, the land becoming the property of colonialists and feudal lords. The landless peasants came to town having largely lost their economic connection with the village.

[1] For example, in Tunisia by the beginning of World War I, Europeans owned more than one million hectares, almost 36 per cent of the more fertile arable land. See *New History of Africa*, Moscow, 1968, p. 226 (in Russian). Even greater was the expropriation of land in Algeria, where in 1910 Europeans controlled 1,847,000 hectares. See R. G. Landa, "Problems of the European Minority in Algeria" in *Arab Countries. History*, Moscow, 1963, p. 25 (in Russian).

The village here had fewer possibilities of subsidising the reproduction of labour than in Tropical Africa. This, of course, did not prevent hundreds of thousands of peasants in the north of the continent, where subsistence farming prevailed, periodically to leave in search of wages. In other words, in Northern African colonies the migrant system functioned from the very beginning on a limited basis and did not become widespread because of the rapid growth here of the number of persons without any means of production. Moreover, as the process of complete separation of the peasants from the land took place and as they moved to towns and to colonialist plantations, the basis became more and more narrow. This is what prepared the objective conditions for the appearance of a native proletariat, a process which was hitherto restrained by the fact that in North Africa exploitation by monopoly capital was primarily of underdeveloped forms of local wage labour. The work performed was mainly unskilled (almost without use of machinery) and, for the greater part, seasonal. Wherever skills were required (with the possible exception of Egypt) European workers were hired.

In general, the prevalence of peasant migrant labour in regions of commodity production is the most characteristic feature of the exploitation of Africans by international monopoly capital in the colonial period.

Commercial Agriculture

Commercial agriculture in Africa originated and developed in the colonial period and was based on export of industrial crops: cotton, coffee, cocoa, tea, peanuts, and the like. The connections on the home market mainly served the production needs of the export-oriented branches of the economy and depended on them. Therefore, in general, the development and specialisation of commercial agriculture were governed not by the internal needs of the African countries, but rather by the needs of the world capitalist market.

This is characteristic of the majority of African countries.[1] However, the forms in which commercial agriculture

[1] This statement does not mean that there are no exceptions. For example, in Northern and Southern Rhodesia commerical agriculture historically originated as a branch of production oriented on the

developed differed from country to country. In Kenya an Algeria, for example, export production was concentrate chiefly on the large capitalist farms owned by Europeans in Uganda and West Africa it concerned the semi-subsis tence farming of African peasants. This difference was deter mined by the economic processes created by colonial exploi tation.

Thus, according to the British conquerors' initial plan for Uganda, similar to the plan for Kenya, it was suppose to become a country of European settlers. With this aim in view the land was expropriated from Africans, the devel opment of plantations was greatly encouraged, and many measures were used to stimulate inflow of cheap labour to European-owned enterprises. These steps proved insuf ficient, however. When agricultural prices went down afte World War I, the plantations in Uganda fell into decay This was due to the fact that as a result of low labour ef ficiency, the production costs stemming from capitalist meth ods of management almost equalled or even exceeded th profits gained from export crops, and this notwithstandin low wages.

"Sufficient reasons have been given to account for th planters' failure," wrote W. Elkan. "But fundamental t them all was the fact that their costs were too high in rela tion to crops that they were seeking to grow. The coffe which was grown was of the inferior robusta variety and th rainfall of Uganda was insufficient to make rubber more tha a marginal crop, profitable only when conditions were ab normally favourable."[1] Therefore the plantation economy i Uganda could flourish only during a boom on the world market, as was the case during World War I.

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home market. Here is what A. Hanna writes on this problem: "p (the gold-mining industry in Southern Rhodesia at the beginning o the twentieth century—*Y.I.*) was the basis of the whole economy It was the only export.... The gold miners and their African labourer provided the only reasonably accessible market for agricultural pro duce, so that European agriculture (as well as African commercia agriculture—*Y.I.*) developed as a subsidiary of mining, and therefor only in the mining areas." (A. F. Hanna, *The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland*, London, 1960, p. 151.) Here commercial agriculture wa an appendage to export branches. This exception, however, does no negate the general trend.

[1] W. Elkan, *The Economic Development of Uganda*, Nairobi, 1961 p. 21.

Uganda was by no means an exception. Almost all of the few plantations created by Europeans in West Africa lacked vitality.[1] Thus, the attempt of the Compagnie Générale des Oleagineux Tropicaux to organise plantation production of peanuts in West Africa ended in complete failure; similar plans in Tanganyika and Kenya also failed; the attempts of the Mission for the Exploitation of Senegal to organise large-scale mechanised rice production were also unsuccessful: its cost proved higher than that of imported rice. The Mission's experiments in growing cotton, sugar and tomatoes showed that the peasant farms had grown these crops better than the plantations.[2]

In many cases the small African peasant farms were more competitive than the large plantations. Though the latter had much higher labour efficiency, they claimed such high outlays that the profits of the Europeans were lower than if they bought up such produce from the African peasants. The cash outlays on peasant farms were considerably lower than on European-owned farms, since the small peasants, especially those connected with subsistence farming, differed from hired labourers for their "lower level of requirements, greater ability to starve and greater exertion while at work".[3]

The lower production costs of peasant commercial farming have been noted by Western researchers too. "The peasant cultivator," writes E. Clayton, "is, in certain circumstances, a low-cost producer of cash-crop products. At least three conditions need to be present for this to apply. That only food crops are production alternatives to a cash crop. That little or no hired labour is used—implying a small cash outlay. That the production and processing of cash crops on a small scale are relatively simple."[4]

The use of the cheap labour of peasant migrants prevented wide introduction of machines and use of modern agricultural techniques. In the colonial period this made it even more difficult to develop large-scale production. As a result large-scale production made considerable progress only in a few

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[1] A. G. Hopkins, Op. cit., p. 213.

[2] H. P. White and M. B. Gleave, *An Economic Geography of West Africa*, London, 1971, p. 135.

[3] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 153.

[4] E. Clayton, *Agrarian Development in Peasant Economies. Some Lessons from Kenya*, New York, 1964, p. 75.

colonies, where conditions were favourable for cultivatin cash crops like tea, sisal, arabica coffee (Kenya), Virgini tobacco (Northern and Southern Rhodesia), grapes and frui in Algeria, olives in Tunisia, etc. The cultivation of thes crops stimulated intensive investment in plantation farm ing. This was the main reason for the stagnation of peasan commodity production, which, in turn, ensured a mass flo of cheap labour to European-owned enterprises.

To develop the plantation economy, the colonial adminis tration created an extremely favourable "climate". Its de scription by the Polish researcher Cz. Bobrowski, who studie Algeria, correctly reflects the situation in those Africa colonies where European-owned plantations flourished. H emphasises several characteristic features: the Europea were granted the most fertile lands and a developed infra structure for their plantations; the tax burden was mitigate through widespread financing on favourable terms by mar keting firms which sold their produce at higher than worl market prices; the traditional sector was stagnating, thu becoming a supplier of cheap labour.[1]

But, even in such artificially favourable conditions for th European-owned farms, the semi-feudal methods of exploita tion were often able to compete with capitalist methods For example, in Algeria local peasants rented tens of thou sands of hectares of land from the Compagnie Algérienn (owning 65 thousand hectares) and the Compagnie Génévois de Setif (owning 15 thousand hectares).[2] The renting of lan on fettering terms was widely practised in Tunisia. In Kenya agricultural workers were extensively provided with plots which permitted paying a few shillings a week for their labou and that of their families. In Southern Rhodesia a consid erable portion of the maize crop was cultivated speciall for feeding agricultural labourers. "In the 1930s, roughl one-third of the maize grown by European producers i Southern Rhodesia was not marketed. Since the war, thi proportion—although fluctuating with the season—had ende to be closer to one-half. Ration requirements for African em ployees have claimed the major share of this retained pro

[1] See Cz. Bobrowski, "Traditional Algerian Agriculture", *Econom and Political Problems of Africa* (Articles by Polish investigator Moscow, 1969, p. 91 (in Russian).

[2] N. M. Frolkin, *Peasants and the Algerian Revolution (1954-62* Kiev, 1967, p. 17 (in Russian).

duction—generally about 75 per cent, in the post-war years—with livestock feed and seed accounting for the remainder."[1] Such rent-in-kind along with cash payment shows that hired labour here was interwoven with corvée (more detail in Chapter 3).

Thus, though the policy carried out by the colonial administration in African countries was concentrated on the development of European-owned capitalist economies, these did not always prove to be paying concerns. The chances for applying foreign capital in African agriculture were rather limited. Because of this the colonialists, trying to attain an increase in exportable produce, had to turn to African commercial agriculture, which had lower production costs compared with the large capitalist enterprises. In African countries such export crops as cotton, cocoa, peanuts, low-grade coffee, etc., could only be grown on peasant farms, this being the reason why the colonialists intensified the exploitation of African peasants as petty commodity producers.

The lower production costs of the peasant farms were due to the fact that, besides cropping market produce, they carried on with their subsistence farming. The peasant provided himself with practically everything he needed: food, some clothes, elementary implements, etc. Given a tropical or subtropical climate and very primitive needs, cash was necessary to him mainly for paying taxes and buying the few household items he could not get from his own farm. The reproduction of labour came mainly from subsistence farming. And this required less cash compared with the upkeep of a wage labourer (not mentioning the costs of implements).

For example, in Kiamba District (Kenya) the average cash income of a peasant family at the end of the 50s was 300 shillings per annum, whereas the annual wage of a hired labourer on a tea plantation was about 840 shillings. At the beginning of the 50s in Tanganyika, according to data compiled by P. H. Gulliver, the average minimum cash needs of a family of four in the Ngoni tribe (husband, wife and two children living on a subsistence farm) were between 70 and 80 shillings per annum. These cash needs consisted of: tax—20 shillings, clothing—45 shillings, salt, tools, utensils, medicine, etc.—10 shillings. At the same time the upkeep of

[1] W. Barber, Op. cit., p. 134.

a migrant labourer on sisal estates, taking into account the cost of food he received in 30 work days, was 54 shillings. Thus the maintenance of a hired plantation worker cost 64 shillings a year, i.e. eight times the minimum cash needs of a peasant family of four. The general level of these costs applied to only the worker without the family, which remained in the village. The difference would have been much greater if Europeans had exploited a regular worker, not a migrant.

In low-income branches it was more profitable to exploit peasants than hired workers employed in large enterprises. This the colonialists understood perfectly well and strove to retain the bond between African commercial agriculture and peasant subsistence farming. "Every farm," writes A. Kamarck, "tries to grow its own basic food supply. Over much of Africa, this quite natural tendency was reinforced by requirements laid down by the colonial regimes: that every farmer grow a famine reserve.... This desire for security, in addition to the government policies that reinforce it, has several adverse results. First, it tends to ensure that crops grown for market sale are and will remain grafted to subsistence production, slowing down the transition to a market economy. Second, cash crops tend to remain, as they began, mainly for export, since the development of a local market for food crops is discouraged, restricted to the still very small urban centers."[2]

A. Kamarck would have us believe that the colonialists' policy of limiting marketable food production accorded with the natural wish of the African peasants. In fact, however, this "natural wish" was wholly determined by economic factors stemming from colonial exploitation. This is borne out by the fact, for example, that the government imposed restrictions on peasant farms raising cash crops when their owners wanted to abandon subsistence farming. "The administration says," writes R. A. Manners who investigated the Kipsigis tribe in Kenya, "that they employ these restrictions because they fear the Kipsigis may become monocrop cash crop producers if they were allowed to plant as much tea or coffee as they like. This would place them completely at the mercy of cash for survival and satisfaction of basic food re-

[1] P. H. Gulliver, *Labor Migration in a Rural Economy*, pp. 18, 2[...]
[2] A. M. Kamarck, Op. cit., p. 102.

quirements. It would open the door to severe hardship in the event of crop failure or a sharp decline in prices."[1] In reality such restrictions were not due to paternal concern for the African peasants' needs; they were meant to keep down prices on their produce. And this was only possible in conditions of subsistence farming.

Therefore in the colonial period, African commercial agriculture developed mainly as an appendage to the subsistence economy. With the exception of a comparatively small number of farms, incomes from subsistence farming still played a big role in the economics of the African village even in places where commodity production was well developed. This is proved by indicators characterising the role of subsistence farming in regions of the most developed native commercial agriculture on the continent. For example, in Eastern Nigeria at the beginning of the 1960s the peasants consumed more than 70 per cent of the food they produced. In Western Nigeria a mere 10 per cent of the farms grew nothing but cocoa.[2] Even in this more developed commodity crop region subsistence farming accounted for more than 40 per cent,[3] of the consumed food, while in 1961-1962 in the Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana the share was 60 per cent,[4] and in the Ashanti, Eastern and Volta regions—about 44 per cent. Even on farms with high cash incomes, subsistence farming is still important, especially in food production (Table 4).

On the large African farms in the Central Province of Kenya, the share of incomes in kind was considerably below the average indicator for the province as a whole, which was 60 per cent.

Nevertheless, the share of food production in the total food balance of the farms remained big, as a rule more than one-half. However, these data do not give a complete pic-

[1] *Markets in Africa*, ed. by P. Bohannan and G. Dalton, Evanston, 1962, p. 508.
[2] That the economic conditions for normal commercial farming here have not yet matured can be seen from the fact that labourers are fed much worse than those working farms with elements of subsistence farming (i.e. simultaneously cropping cocoa and food produce).
[3] William O. Jones, *Marketing Staple Food Crops in Tropical Africa*, Ithaca and London, 1972, p. 64.
[4] John C. Caldwell, *African Rural-Urban Migration. The Movement to Ghana's Towns*, Canberra, 1969, p. 217.

Table 4

Role of incomes in kind (in cash terms) on the largest farms in the Central Province of Kenya, 1963-1964

Indices	Districts			
	Meru	Nyeri	Fort Hall	Kiambu
Cash incomes, shill.	3,203	3,107	1,666	2,411
Incomes in kind	1,117	1,870	1,268	1,393
Total	4,320	4,977	2,934	3,804
Percentage of incomes in kind	26	37	43	37
Percentage of food production in total food balance	51	66	52	43

Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64, Nairobi, 1968, pp. 34, 35.

ture. Subsistence farming here accounted for the main food consumed on the farms—cereals, beans, tuberiforms, frui and vegetables. The farms bought only 15 per cent of th foods in the market in the Meru district, in the Fort Hal district—13 per cent and in the Kiambu district—18 per cen whereas cash was spent mainly on meat, milk and fish prod ucts. Thus, even on the most profitable peasant farms i the regions of commercial agriculture the bond between com modity and subsistence farming was maintained. In genera in the Central Province of Kenya, where African commercia farming is best developed, the peasants' cash expenditur on the main food items (cereals, beans, vegetables, and fruit is very small—only 14 per cent of all cash spending by th inhabitants of the province. This is because peasants grov these foods on their own farms.

Classifying African farms by the percentage of commodit production, some economists deal mainly with quantit indicators and lose sight of quality indicators. Thus, fo example, Hans Ruthenberg, a prominent West Germa agriculturalist uses quantity indicators to suggest singlin out four types of African farms: subsistence farms, wher the degree of commercialisation of the gross product i less than 25 per cent; partially commercial farms with

corresponding indicator of 25 to 50 per cent, semi-commercial farms (50 to 75 per cent) and commercial farms (over 75 per cent).[1] It is quite clear, however, that though quantity indicators are important, they cannot show the profound difference between African farms as regards their ties with the market.

In terms of quality indicators, we may consider separately the following three types of farming, which define the degree of development of commodity production in the African village: subsistence farms that produce no cash crops, semi-subsistence farms that combine subsistence and commodity production, and, finally, commercial farms where food production for the farmer's own use plays an insignificant role.[2] One may say that at the beginning of the 1970s semi-subsistence farming predominated.

Even now food crops play a big role in indigenous cash crop farming. According to John C. de Wilde, "a prominent characteristic of African agriculture is its continued emphasis on subsistence farming. It is probable that as much as 70 per cent of the land and 60 per cent of the labor are devoted to subsistence production."[3]

Eckhard Baum, who studied peasant farms in the Kilombero Valley (Tanzania), notes that the competition between commodity and subsistence production gravitates in favour of the latter, and emphasises that the main reason why cash cotton failed in this region was that "the cotton must be weeded at the same time as the food crop, rice".[4]

Subsistence production often hinders the introduction of marketable crops. But where these crops are grown, the agrotechnical methods depend on food production for consumption. "Unfortunately a large proportion of the cotton crop of the area under consideration is sown after other crops have been harvested," writes J. D. Tothill, "and is thus retarded until July or August .... experience indicates

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[1] *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, ed. by H. Ruthenberg, München, 1968, p. 359.

[2] Sometimes students of Africa single out one more type of farming—namely that which is entirely alienated from the market. However, such farms are no longer typical of African countries. They are only to be found in the least accessible regions.

[3] John de Wilde, *Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa*, Vol. 1, Maryland, 1967, pp. 21-22.

[4] *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania...*, p. 42.

that early sowing is best, but owing to the complication that food crops occupy the land until June or July the only advice, which can be given to the native cultivator is to plant his cotton as early as he can possibly manage"[1] rather than use new seeds and chemical fertilisers. Nevertheless, when a peasant is forced to choose between growing enough food crops and earning more from cash crops, he usually chooses the former.

There is a close interrelationship between subsistence and commercial farming. While it does not eliminate subsistence farming, commercial farming often affects it, forcing the peasant to grow less valuable food crops for consumption. Gordon Wrigley notes that in the cotton regions of East Africa, "the preceding crop may delay planting..., may aggravate the situation, as in the case of maize replacing finger millet in East Africa, as a food crop preceding cotton. The maize harvest is about 6 weeks later than the *Eleusine* harvest".[2] This explains why Uganda's colonial administration tended to restrict maize cultivation in the cotton regions.

It was often the case that the introduction of cash crops on peasant farms considerably worsened the peasants' diet. "In Ubangi-Shari, now the Central African Republic," writes B. F. Johnston, "the newly introduced cotton crop conflicted with the seasonal peaks in labour requirements for the traditional millet and sorghum crops. This was the chief factor underlying the expansion of manioc production at the expense of those cereal crops, a shift which represented deterioration in the quality of the diet from a nutritional and economic point of view."[3]

A similar situation also developed in Upper Volta. Here it is difficult to sow cotton early, since specialists have not yet discovered methods for combining its cultivation with that of food crops most vital to the peasant. "Where each farmer is obliged to grow a certain acreage of cotton," writes Wilde, "sorghum and millet have been replaced, to some extent, by cassava which can be planted later and

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[1] J. D. Tothill, *Agriculture in Uganda*, London, 1940, p. 196.
[2] Gordon Wrigley, *Tropical Agriculture. The Development of Production*, London, 1961, p. 95.
[3] *Economic Transition in Africa*, ed. by M. J. Herskovits and M. Harvitz, London, 1964, p. 154.

produces more calories per unit of labor and unit of area but has notable nutritional deficiences."[1]

Thus, even where the conditions of subsistence cropping have deteriorated because of the introduction of commercial production, the peasants cling to it as one of their main sources of livelihood. The income per unit of labour from growing cash crops is always higher than from growing subsistence crops. For example, in Egypt in 1945-48, the net income from a feddan of cotton was 27 Egyptian pounds, of rice—15, millet—5, and maize—4. In 1957, according to Africa scholar A. A. Onokhov, an Ivory Coast peasant could produce in one hour cocoa worth 50 African francs, or coffee worth 40 to 50 African francs. From one hectare of peanuts, an export crop, the peasant received a profit of 16,000-20,000 African francs, and from one hectare of millet, a profit of 7,500-10,000 African francs.[2] A survey in 1962 in the Usmao Sukumaland district (Tanganyika) showed that the gross returns per working day (8 hours) was 5.38 shillings for cotton, 3.54 for maize and 3.36 shillings for rice.[3]

Notwithstanding differences in cash returns, African peasants were anxious to continue their subsistence farming, and not because of any fidelity to tradition, but for purely economic reasons. Since villages were, as a rule, isolated from the market, only subsistence farming could provide the peasant with the requisite supply of food. Of course, it would be incorrect to conclude from this that there was no food trading in villages, especially in regions of commercial agriculture. But the bulk of the food on sale was locally produced and subject to abrupt price fluctuations. During the harvesting season, when the poorer peasants sold their food to pay their debts, prices were extremely low. But before the harvesting, when the demand was highest, prices rose steeply, putting market food out of the reach of the average peasant. Such price fluctuations gave scope for usury. Buying up cheap food immediately after harvesting, rich farmers resold it at exorbitant prices or lent it before the next harvest came round (this is considered in more

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[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 37.
[2] *An Economic History of Africa*, Moscow, 1966, p. 156 (in Russian).
[3] Hans Ruthenberg, *Agricultural Development in Tanganyika*, Berlin (West), 1964, p. 25.

detail later). Under these conditions the subsistence farming was economically necessary[1] and any sale of food crops was mainly of a forced nature. It is no accident that in many regions of Tropical Africa sales of food produced on their own farms is only the lot of the poorest peasants. This is confirmed, in particular, by the fact that Hausa farmers in Nigeria consider it a disgrace to sell their own grain produce.[1]

In general, the undeveloped nature of the home market, consolidated by the colonialists, made retention of subsistence farming an economic necessity. This condition was characteristic of most of the regions specialising in export crops. At the same time subsistence farming was also retained in those localities where commercial agriculture had been developing as food crop production, this being due to the great difference between farm and consumer prices. This difference was especially great where the colonial administration established a monopoly on food purchasing. For example, in Northern Rhodesia in 1960, the government paid the European farmer 35 shillings 6 pence for a sack of maize, and only 24 sh. and 2 pence to the African peasant. In Southern Rhodesia in 1961 the prices were 31 shillings 6 pence and 20 shillings respectively.[2] By manipulating prices, colonialists gained large sums from African peasants selling their produce to state-run procurement agencies. As a result of artificially increased prices, European farmers gained considerable additional cash for their produce. In these conditions the African peasants found it more profitable to retain subsistence production of food rather than pay high prices on the market.[3]

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[1] Polly Hill, *The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry: A Northern Nigerian Case Study*. Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research. Ibadan, July, 1968, p. 246.

[2] I. A. Svanidze. *Agriculture in Northern Rhodesia*, Moscow, 1963, p. 236 (in Russian): *Southern Rhodesia*. Report of the Advisory Committee on the Development of the Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia with Particular Reference to the Role of African Agriculture. Salisbury. 1962, p. 190.

[3] It is characteristic that on the basis of low prices on produce sold by Africans in such countries as Northern and Southern Rhodesia, a black market originated there. The peasants found it profitable to avoid marketing boards when selling grain. "Instead of selling to the government produce marketing boards, as required by law, some enterprising Africans sell their crops to Europeans, who market them

One of the most important features of African commercial agriculture was that its development was tied to the requirements of foreign monopoly capital and not to spontaneous, immanent growth of private commodity relations. In connection with this, the African agricultural market took shape not on the basis of spontaneous private competition, with its sphere limited to small-scale sporadic trading, but on the basis of monopoly of foreign capital, closely interlocked with the colonial administration, and rural usurers and traders. In its most developed form this symbiosis of the lower forms of capital monopoly and modern forms inherent in the imperialist stage of capitalist development, is found in the activity of "marketing boards" set up by the British colonialists after World War II. However, in its less developed form, this symbiosis can be traced back to much earlier periods.

The history of cotton purchasing in Uganda, which reflects the main stages in the establishment of the colonial state monopoly on marketing of farm produce, is a typical example.

The emergence of cash cotton production in Uganda at the beginning of the twentieth century is traceable to the demands of Lancashire textile manufacturers, who were short of crude cotton. Up to 1907 the Uganda Company was the only buyer of cotton. But when cotton began to be produced on a large scale this company could not cope with the buying. It did not have the technical facilities at that time to maintain its monopoly. Porters were the only means of transport to the railway. This enabled the small tradesman, usually of Indian, and sometimes of African origin, to supersede the company in buying peasant cotton and to thrive on money-lending operations. However, to restrict competition, which brought about an increase in farm prices and thus injured the interests of larger companies, the colonial administration began to restrict the number of traders by issuing licences. However, this did not decrease the number of trader-buyers, which continued to grow, as also did the competition between them, even when the

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as their own, thereby escaping the discriminatory taxation. The Europeans generally keep half the saving thereby effected." (T. Frank, *Race and Nationalism: The Struggle for Power in Rhodesia-Nyasaland*, New York, 1960, p. 299.)

colonial administration itself established lower prices on cotton bought from peasants.

At the beginning of the 1920s, however, when motor trucks were put to use for transporting cotton, the traders also began to buy up cotton in neighbouring districts, which made competition sharper and led to an increase in buying prices. This in turn caused profits of large cotton-exporting companies to decline. Finally, the British Cotton Growing Association demanded that a monopoly system be introduced for cotton buying with the objective of lowering farm prices.

In 1933 the colonial administration introduced legislation which gave the owners of ginneries a monopoly on buying cotton from African peasants. In accordance with this legislation the cotton-growing regions were divided into zones where cotton could be sold and processed, with transportation between zones being prohibited. This enabled the owners of small ginneries, who *sold* their produce to private British firms, to form zonal associations and dictate their terms to buyers of cotton, who were reduced to the role of agents. By 1935, in Uganda only 44 trader-buyers remained who carried out separate operations. Their share of the cotton crop was less than 3 per cent. Due to the establishment of a cotton-buying monopoly, farm prices were considerably reduced.

In the years of World War II, when tighter state controls were established over the marketing of African peasants' produce, this monopoly was strengthened even more. The colonial administration began to fix prices for export produce and to control its sales, regulating the profits of processing-plant owners and export firms. This allowed the colonial administration to exact huge sums as export taxes. Thus, private forms of monopoly began to take the shape of a state monopoly. These changes immediately affected the position of the African peasants. The share of Uganda's actual producers in cotton export earnings was reduced from 60 per cent in the 1930s to 23-33 per cent in 1942-43 and 1944-45.

In the years following World War II state controls over sales became official through the establishment of *marketing boards*, which assumed the functions of government regulation. These boards monopolised the buying of produce from African peasants and its sale to export firms. The purchasing prices included large deductions in the form of marketing board profits, export taxes and returns to a special fund for stabilising prices. Officially this fund was to help preserve fixed incomes for the peasants when the market situation deteriorated. In reality, tremendous sums were withdrawn from the fund to serve the needs of the colonial administration and to create an infrastructure that would attract foreign private capital.

The profits of the colonial administration through these boards in the form of various deductions represented gains for its monopoly on sales and purchases of the produce of African peasants and were one of the main forms of robbing African villages.[1] During the period from 1950 to 1953 alone the net profit of Uganda's colonial treasury from the sale of peasant produce, including export taxes, totalled 14.9 million pounds sterling, while African cotton and coffee producers earned only 13.8 million pounds. But these figures do not reveal the scale of the robbing of the African peasant by the state. Besides the sums mentioned, if we also consider the poll-tax, the tax on produce sold by peasants in local markets, and indirect taxes on manufactured goods bought by peasants, the scale of this plunder will be much greater. Thus, according to E. H. Winter, who polled the coffee producers of the Bwamba tribe at the beginning of the 1950s "out of every three shillings income generated in Bwamba the Government takes two"[2] from the African peasants.

The peasants of other British colonies were in the same distressing straits. In Nigeria, for example, in 1947-1948 four marketing boards were created which monopolised the buying of cocoa, peanuts, palm oil and cotton. Between 1947 and 1954 alone these organisations appropriated about 120 million pounds sterling by robbing the African peasants.[3]

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[1] In relation to the African producers the marketing boards acted as agencies for drawing off the surplus product to the benefit of the colonial administration, in relation to European owners they were a source of subsidies. "Historically the formation of several commodity boards is not unconnected with European agriculture," states an unpublished report of 1963. "High cost production by European farmers of products such as cereals and dairy products needed not only tariff protection from imports, but also subsidising by consumers." Quoted in: *Studies in Production and Trade in East Africa*, ed. by P. Zajadas, München, 1970, p. 228. A similar situation also arose in Northern and Southern Rhodesia.

[2] E. H. Winter, *Bwamba Economy. The Development of a Primitive Subsistence Economy in Uganda*, Kampala, 1955, p. 35.

[3] L. K. Tumanova, *Formation of the African Bourgeoisie*, Moscow, 1969, p. 9 (in Russian).

In Ghana during the period from 1947/48 to 1956/57 the profit of the Konow Marketing Board was 558.3 million pounds sterling, whereas the Ghana cocoa producers got only 288.3 million pounds during this period.[1] As A. G. Hopkins pointed out, "the main beneficiaries of the statutory monopolies were the large expatriate firms. Official patronage confirmed and extended the private pooling arrangements which they had operated previously. These firms not only supported state intervention, they even helped to plan it."[2]

The colossal plundering of the peasants became possible first of all because it was confined to the sphere of commodity production and did not affect subsistence farming which was the African producers' main source of livelihood.[3] At the same time this possibility could only be realised under a monopoly on buying and selling African peasant produce.

The peculiar feature was that the monopoly was based on small private capital. The colonial administration itself bought nothing from the peasants. The peasant produce was usually bought by traders, agents of companies operating processing plants. In this way the peasant produce passed through the hands of many middlemen. In Nigeria peasants usually sold cocoa to itinerant traders, not by weight but by a kind of yardstick; these sold it to buyers in the market, and thereupon the cocoa went to other, bigger traders. The artificially low prices, which enabled the colonialists to obtain high profits, could only exist if there was a monopoly of the small buyer secured by the system of licencing, and dependence on credits, and also because most peasants had no means of transport and were therefore forced to deal with

[1] P. I. Kupriyanov, *Agriculture in Ghana 1950-65*, Moscow, 1972, p. 107 (in Russian).

[2] A. G. Hopkins, Op. cit., p. 266.

[3] Compared with the European-owned enterprises the African farms were better adapted to lower prices. This fact has been pointed out in many studies. H. Fearn writes the following on this question: "The fall in price for maize was not so disastrous for the African producer, as his standard of living was low and he had not been involved in the same capital expenditure and labour costs as had the European farmer of the White Highlands (i.e. Kenya—*Y.I.*)".—H. Fearn, *An African Economy*. A Study of the Economic Development of the Nyanza Province of Kenya 1903-1953, Oxford, 1961, p. 83. From the point of view of evaluating the possibilities of survival for farms in low price conditions this approach is correct. However, nothing is said, perhaps deliberately, of the fact that this state of affairs is due to the impoverishment and backwardness of African peasant farms.

local middlemen, to whom they usually owed money. In other words, to maintain low prices there had to be a monopoly for middlemen at all stages. The colonial administration itself provided the bond between the small buyers (who were often also usurers) and the large companies, and pocketed huge profits through the marketing boards.

This system of buying peasant produce existed in the British colonies. In former French Africa statutory control over exports was less developed. It was as late as 1955 that price stabilisation offices were set up to subsidise private firms exporting agricultural raw materials. In the French colonies, peasant produce was bought by middlemen for large private firms, not for statutory organisations. Here is what G. Y. Skorov, a Soviet scholar on Africa, writes about the French monopolies plundering African producers: "In exchange for credits traders supply the companies with certain export produce, say, peanuts. Similar relationships exist between all links of the commodity chain right down to the actual producer, who, in fact, sells his produce long before the harvest by taking loans in cash or, more often, in commodities from the traders.... Tied down by the credits received, the peasant has no right to sell his harvest to anybody but his creditor. The latter takes advantage of his monopoly to impose on the peasant purchase prices that are tantamount to robbery."[1] The scale of this plunder is evident from the figures given in Skorov's book. In 1951 the colonial monopolies were selling peanuts at the price of 135 francs per kilo, whereas their agents had bought them from the peasants at 17-35 francs per kilo. According to the official data of the Ministry for Overseas Territories, the share of the actual producer in 1950 was less than 25 per cent of the cotton selling prices in Black Africa and about 15 per cent of the prices paid by the mother-countries' industries.[2]

The monopoly position of the middlemen at all stages of sale[3] was the most characteristic feature of the colonial

[1] G. Y. Skorov, *French Imperialism in West Africa*, Moscow, 1956, p. 77 (in Russian).

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

[3] According to a book by the Soviet agriculturalist L. A. Fridman, 15 forms of payment were made in pre-revolutionary Egypt along the route travelled by cotton from the field to Alexandria and another 16 payments before it reached the port of destination. See L. A. Fridman, *Egypt 1882-1952. Social and Economic Structure of the Village*, Moscow, 1973, p. 276 (in Russian).

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exploitation of the peasants as petty-commodity producers. However, the nature of the capital represented by the middlemen varied. At its lowest stage—the stage of direct contact with the producer—it had merchant and usury features characteristic of the Middle Ages, whereas at its highest stage it had the features of modern monopoly capital. However, the merchant's and usurer's capital of the lowest stage was not independent capital, but served through trade and credit as an agent and middleman for modern monopoly capital.[1]

This shows that the exploitation of the village by international monopoly took place mainly in such forms which, while involving it in production relationships, did not entail capitalist-oriented transformations. Theoretically, this situation, traceable to the nature of usury, was explained long ago by Karl Marx. "Usurer's capital," he emphasised, "as the characteristic form of interest-bearing capital corresponds to the predominance of small-scale production of the self-employed peasant and small master craftsman. When the labourer is confronted by the conditions of labour and by the product of labour in the shape of capital, as under the developed capitalist mode of production, he has no occasion to borrow any money as a producer. When he does any money borrowing, he does so, for instance, at the pawnshop to secure personal necessities. But wherever the labourer is the owner, whether actual or nominal, of his conditions of labour and his product, he stands as a producer in relation to the money-lender's capital, which confronts him as usurer's capital."[2]

The international monopolies bought the peasant produce intended for export themselves or through trade boards. In the few cases where a relatively developed home market for agricultural products appeared, it also came under the control of international monopolies. This was the case in Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, for example, where trade

[1] Underlining the fact that local merchant's and usurer's capital in reality became the agent and middleman of monopoly capital, we do not, of course, rule out antagonisms between them, expressed in the African traders' struggle to increase their profits and shake off their dependence on the monopolies. It is known, for example, that traders played a big role in the creation of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) (Democratic Union of Africa) party in former French Africa, in the appearance of an action group in Nigeria, etc.

[2] K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1975, p. 594.

boards bought up peasant maize, and in Egypt where 5 per cent of the commercial and financial enterprises controlled up to 98 per cent of the capitals and determined the system of purchase and price for grain, sugar, vegetables, fruit, meat and fish. Supported by foreign commercial banks, some 300 to 350 enterprises maintained a large network of operators, including up to 20,000-25,000 hired operators, and tens of thousands of formally independent traders buying rural produce sold both in external and domestic markets.[1]

When the home market was limited to small-scale purchases and sales of food (this being characteristic of most countries in Tropical Africa) and when foreign monopolies found it difficult to directly subordinate the market, it was controlled by African tradesmen. However, the monopoly trend appeared here as well. One of the publications of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) pointed out that in the wholesale market in West African countries "the purchasing and distribution of specific staple food crops such as plantain are under the control of one person, normally a woman, and entry into these markets is often very difficult. There is also a complicated system of granting credit to the wholesalers and retailers so that the group is even more tightly closed to competition."[2] This trend to monopolise the sale of food in African markets and the limited competition between traders compelled the peasant to sell his products for next to nothing. As many observers note, farm prices are directly proportional to the number of buyers in the district, and where there are fewer buyers it is easier for them to agree upon the purchasing price. The colonial administration encouraged this to a considerable degree by a system of limited licensing, eliminating free competition among traders. Thus, even where foreign monopoly capital could not gain a direct foothold, there existed monopolistic forms of buying and selling agricultural produce. However, it should be taken into account that African commercial agriculture was oriented mainly on export, and the home market continued to develop only as collateral to the raw-material basis necessary for the industries of the parent state. Therefore African agricultural production

[1] For more details see L. A. Fridman, Op. cit., pp. 275-319.

[2] Quoted in: W. O. Jones, Op. cit., p. 15.

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for the market was completely subordinated to the needs of international monopoly capital.

One effect of this subordination was the system of state control of production processes on peasant farms, especially widely developed in the Tropical Belt of the continent where African rural cash-cropping historically originated, as a rule, on the basis of extra-economic coercion. For example, in Uganda, during the early decades of the twentieth century cotton was allowed to be grown only from seeds obtained from the state plant nurseries. The peasants had to destroy the plants after the harvesting and, according to government circulars, were allowed only one crop a year, though climatic conditions allowed for two crops. Such restrictions were of course established for agrotechnical reasons, but their enforcement was an act of undisguised bureaucratic tyranny and increased the peasants' dependence on the colonial functionaries.

It is worth noting that even after cash market production became a necessity for the peasant, the system of state-bureaucratic control of African commercial agriculture continued to thrive. And this was not accidental. As stressed by F. Burke, "the significance of major dependence upon export taxes is two-fold. The dependence of government upon this source of income has encouraged, if not required, government involvement and control of marketing of export commodities. This in turn has frequently required administrative control at the earlier stages of planting and harvesting. It is only a short step from regulating the planting, harvesting and marketing of crops to the formation of a comprehensive and powerful marketing board."[1]

Another important feature of the agrarian policy of the colonialists is their shaping the commodity production of peasant farms into a single-crop system, often entailing a distinct specialisation of the economies of African countries in the world market. This was done to ensure that under the subsistence economy the growing of the cash crop needed by monopoly would be the only source of cash for the peasant, and this in turn presupposed the absence (or at least an embryonic state) of the local market for other types of commodity produce and, above all, food.

The single-crop system not only guaranteed specialisation of commodity production in line with the colonialists'

[1] F. Burke, *Tanganyika. Preplanning*, Syracuse, 1965, p. 22.

needs, but also ensured its growth in the setting of declining farm prices, since the peasants had practically no other way to earn cash. In this connection we cannot but agree with E. Clayton who emphasises the fact that the peasants' "unresponsiveness to a price fall measures the extent to which export crops ... exceed in profitability the alternative crops open to the farmer".[1] The peasant was the less "responsive" to falling prices the smaller his chances of going over to producing new kinds of cash crops, or, in other words, the more stable was the single-crop character of his commodity production. And this worked in the interests of the colonialists, who benefited by buying raw materials at low prices. In fact, the African peasant could grow only one cash crop under the conditions created by the colonialists. This was attained by measures restricting the growth of local markets, statutory distribution of planting and seed material, organisation of the system of sales and processing of peasant produce, etc.

In contrast to the farms and plantations owned by Europeans, the African small-commodity farms did not require the colonialists to invest capital directly in the sphere of production, though they could invest in research or development of the best sort of export crop for African conditions, building of plants for primary processing of agricultural produce, road-building, etc. However, in the former case private capital accounted for the bulk of investment into farms and plantations while in the latter case it came from the colonial administration.

As already noted, the bonds that tied commercial and subsistence agriculture allowed the colonialists to buy up African peasant produce at absurdly low prices. The cash spent by the peasant went mainly into taxes and consumer goods. The cash spent on production needs was negligible. For example, in Northern Nigeria the peasant commodity producer used 80 to 90 per cent of his annual income for personal needs, while the share of production outlays varied from 1 to 2 per cent in the lower groups (30 per cent of the families) and up to 6 to 15 per cent in the higher groups (12 per cent of the families).[2] The cash production expenses

[1] E. Clayton, Op. cit., p. 102.

[2] M. G. Smith, *The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria. A Report to the Colonial Social Science Research Council*, London, 1955, pp. 196-97.

of an average family in the Mbeya District (Tanganyika) at the beginning of the fifties, according to an estimate by F. Wright, were limited to the cost of two hoes, and these accounted for merely 2 to 3 per cent of the year's cash spending. It should be mentioned that this district had comparatively developed commodity relations.[1] This index of extremely low production expenditure is confirmed by the results of other studies. The data which follow, published in the collection *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, characterise mainly the large commodity economies in regions of developed commercial agriculture (see Table 5).

Table 5

Share of cash outlays in gross returns of peasant economies (beginning of the 1960s)

Average farm indices, shillings \ Districts	Shinyanga	Kwimba*	Ukerewe*	Lushoto**	Bukoba***
Farm gross return	1,460	664	429	1,140	2,000
Costs of means of production	107	55	34	94	49
Costs of hired labour	110	32	9	96	27
Total costs of production	217	87	43	190	76
Share of costs in gross returns	15	13	10	17	14
Degree of commercialisation****	60	45	46	60	52

Source: *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, pp. 55, 168, 206.

* The Shinyanga, Kwimba and Ukerewe are cotton-growing districts. In Shinyanga farmers use ploughing, in Kwimba and Ukerewe, hoeing.

** The study embraced the vegetable-growing commodity economies of Soni County.

*** These data refer to the seven most prosperous coffee-producing economies.

**** By degree of commercialisation we mean the part of the value of the gross product sold in the market.

[1] See F. Wright, *African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika. An Enquiry into the Distribution and Consumption of Commodities among Africans Carried Out in 1952-1953*, London, 1955, p. 13.

In general, in the regions of commercial farming in the continental part of Tanzania, in the mid-sixties the share of production expenditure in the peasants' gross cash income averaged 10-15 per cent, if we leave out the coffee-producing regions, where the share is considerably lower, and the wheat regions where the share may be bigger due to use of tractors.

The same applies to Kenya. For example, according to surveys in the Nyeri District in 1962 and 1963/1964 and quoted by H. Ruthenberg,[1] production costs per acre of five-year coffee plants were 301 shillings (49 shillings for means of production and 252 shillings for hired labour). At the same time the per acre costs of planting coffee came up to 605 shillings (391 shillings for buying coffee plants and 214 shillings for hired labour).[2]

If we take into consideration that coffee trees bear fruit for more than 30 years, the per annum depreciation would be about 20 shillings. Thus the annual production costs per acre of five-year coffee plants were about 320 shillings, whereas the gross income from coffee sales per acre was 4,297 shillings, i.e. the share of production expenditure came up to roughly 7 per cent.[3]

It stands to reason that average indicators may sometimes conceal large differences in the production costs of various social groups. However, in many regions of commercial agriculture these differences were not very great. From this point of view it would be interesting to consider the data obtained in the mid-50s concerning cocoa-producing farms in Ghana and given in Table 6.

It can be seen from this table that the share of outlays for means of production in the case of all farms is extremely low (in the lower groups the share is even larger than in the higher groups), which indicates the roughly equal technical level of cocoa-growing on the poorer and richer peasant

[1] See H. Ruthenberg, *African Agricultural Production Development Policy in Kenya 1952-1965*, Berlin (West), 1966.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[3] These small outlays in marketable production can serve as a sort of indicator of the degree of commercialisation of the African farms as a whole. However, it should be noted that in the African village these expenses are restricted almost completely to the commodity branches and are negligible in the case of food crops. Therefore, when we use data that characterise market production, they turn out to be somewhat inflated.

Table

Selected data on cocoa-producing farms in Ghana in relation to their gross incomes for 1955-1956

Average indicators	Total gross earned income—in shillings										
	1,360	2,040	2,850	3,640	4,340	4,970	5,540	7,080	9,730	19,400	Average 4,25[illegible]
Cost of agricultural production, shillings, including:	100	250	380	490	680	810	820	1,320	2,240	4,420	71[illegible]
payments to labourers	70	190	280	350	540	670	620	1,170	1,970	4,190	58[illegible]
payments to seasonal workers	20	40	80	110	110	110	150	150	230	180	10[illegible]
Percentage of agricultural production cost in gross income	7.3	12.3	13.4	13.5	15.7	16.7	14.8	19.1	23.0	22.8	16.[illegible]
Percentage of labour payments, including seasonal labour, in total cost of agricultural production	90	92	95	94	95	96	94	97	99	99	9[illegible]
Percentage of wages of seasonal labour in total cost of agricultural production	20	16	21	22.5	16.2	13.6	18.3	11.0	1.0	0.4	1[illegible]

Source: *Ghana: Office of the Government Statistician. Survey of Population and Budgets of Cocoa-Producing Families in the Oda Swedru-Asamankese Area 1955-56*, Accra, 1958, p. 105.

farms. The main outlays were connected with the exploitation of labour—not so much hired labour (the share of costs of seasonal labour in the higher groups of the economies is smaller than in the lower) as métayage labour. Thus, the level of production costs and their structure both prove that even on large African farms the outlays were primarily not for capitalist production (i.e. for means of production and wages) but for objects of personal consumption. Therefore, in general, the farms in the regions of commercial agriculture and also where subsistence cropping was predominant, remained food-producing farms.

The low prices set by the colonialists affected not so much the reproduction process as the consumption of peasants, compelling them to do more work to satisfy their needs in goods and services paid for in cash. This retarded the development of the home market, on the one hand, and held down the growth of peasants' needs, on the other.

On the whole, commodity-money relations were incidental to the process of reproduction of cash crops, not to mention food crops. The land as a means of production, many implements, often the seeds, as well as a large section of labour and cattle, were directly reproduced on peasant farms. Therefore their semi-subsistence character was expressed not only in the fact that the development of commercial agriculture was based on retaining subsistence farming, but also (and this is probably much more important) in the fact that the reproduction process in commercial agriculture was due first and foremost to relationships inherent in subsistence farming. Market ties influenced the reproduction process on the peasant farms only to a small degree. Therefore, to subordinate this process to the needs of commodity production, it was necessary to resort to extra-economic coercion, one variety of which was bureaucratic regulation of production processes for growing commodity crops.

Such farms, exploited by the colonialists, could only exist given a primitive material and technical basis. "Over much the greater part of Tropical Africa," writes John C. de Wilde, "the hoe and the machete are still the only agricultural tools. While ox-plowing has made tremendous progress in certain areas it has failed to catch on in many other areas even where the keeping of livestock is not prevented by the prevalence of the tsetse fly. The use of ox-carts or other animal-drawn carts, which are considerably more expensive than plows,

is as yet very limited. The number of tractors in use is much smaller."[1]

A similar situation obtained in North Africa where archaic methods of land irrigation and cultivation persisted. Wooden ploughs without mouldboards, primitive sickles and flails were the main agricultural tools. Imperialism emphasised extortion of raw materials based on the use of traditional implements and techniques.

Low labour productivity due to the primitive tools and falling purchase prices often made wide use of hired labour unprofitable as a basis for creating surplus value. "African farm incomes," write A. Pees and R. Howard, who made surveys in Northern Rhodesia, "are however arrived at as a direct result of the bulk of the labour input consisting of unpaid family labour (by family Pees and Howard mean all persons working on the farm for food—*Y. I.*). If the value of input represented by unpaid family labour were to be replaced by cash payments, then the farmers' rewards would be considerably diminished and in many cases would be of a minus value.

"The form of organisation of African farming, even of commercial African farming," Pees and Howard note, "is such that the cash reward to the farmer would be negligible without the availability of an unpaid labour force."[2]

This general conclusion is confirmed by contrasting a hired labourer's wages with the gross incomes of the farmer. For example, according to the 1963-1964 agricultural census in the Kiambu District in the Central Province of Kenya, the daily wage of a hired male worker on African farms was 2.35 shillings, and the gross daily income on rich farms 2 shillings; in the Fort Hall District the figures were 2.35 and 1.02 shillings respectively, in the Embu District—2.37 and 1.71 shillings, in the Nyeri District—2.05 and 2.31 shillings and in the Meru District—1.95 and 2.01 shillings.[3]

A survey made in the Bukoba District (Tanzania) in 1964-1965 showed that the wages of a hired labourer on

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[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 23.

[2] A. Pees and R. Howard, *An Economic Survey of Commercial African Farming among the Sala of the Mumbwa District of Northern Rhodesia*, Lusaka, 1955, p. 57.

[3] *Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64.*

African farms amounted to 0.31 shillings per hour and the gross income of a farmer growing annual crops was 0.23 to 0.24 shillings per hour.[1]

In cotton growing in Uganda the unprofitability of systematic use of hired labour has been noted by many investigators. A collection of articles, *Economic Development and Tribal Change*, contains a statement by a tribal chief that the price of cotton was so low "it did not pay a man to grow it with porters".[2] This is also indicated by Mrs. E. Huxley, who studied the problem in the cotton-growing regions of Uganda; she emphasises that the cost of hiring labour was higher than the returns from cotton growing.[3]

Hiring labour has proved unprofitable in Nigeria, too, in the case of many crops. If farmers in the cocoa-growing regions of Western Nigeria used only hired labour in growing food products, then, according to studies by the Galletti group, the net profit on the largest farms (considering cost of labour and seed) would be only 4 pounds sterling per acre, while farms using more intensive methods would incur nothing but a loss.[4]

That the possibilities for using hired labour on African farms in Nigeria are limited is confirmed by V. Uchendu. "The seasonal labor problem in the forest region (the region where cocoa is grown—*Y.I.*)," he writes, "turns out to be a limitation of cash to hire labor rather than labor availability. In some cases the use of more labor may not be economic ... My field experience leads me to believe that commercial farmers are able to get all the labor they require if they can afford to pay for it."[5]

The relatively high cost of hired labour often makes it impossible for it to compete with pre-capitalist relationships, particularly métayage. Facts given in a book by the Africa scholar P. I. Kupriyanov show that landowners in Ghana made higher profits if they leased out the land for

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[1] *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, pp. 184, 203.

[2] *Economic Development and Tribal Change*, p. 240.

[3] Quoted in: C. C. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, Kampala, 1959, p. 67.

[4] See R. Galletti, *Nigerian Cocoa Farmers. An Economic Survey of Yoruba Cocoa Farming Families*, Oxford, 1956, p. 333.

[5] *Africa in the Seventies and Eighties. Issues in Development*, ed. by G. S. Arkhurst, New York, 1970, p. 236.

growing cocoa (13.8 pence per day) than if they hired permanent labourers (9.1 pence per day).[1]

Though the low profits of rich African farms often did not cover the cost of hired labour, hired labour was used due to the acute need for labour during the period of field operations, but it was normally of a seasonal nature. However, such use of hired labour cannot be recognised as capitalistic in the strict sense of the word, because it created no surplus value (or, at best, almost no surplus value) but ensured creation of the surplus product by pre-capitalist methods. Colonial exploitation, which subordinated the peoples of Tropical Africa to international monopoly capital, was based on undeveloped hire relationships. Exploitation of African workers by large capitalist enterprises was not accompanied by the formation of a hard-core proletariat, while in the African village the hiring was often not of a capitalist nature.

The unprofitability of widely using hired labour on the richer African farms ensured the survival of traditional pre-capitalist relationships in extended families, patrilineal associations, the institution of tribal chiefs, etc. The more common types of exploited village poor were not wage labourers, but peasants who had land allotted to them for corvée, métayer labourers, people working for food and clothing and the like, who were often related to owners of richer farms. This shows that the African peasant did not belong to the petty bourgeoisie. Soviet researcher V. L. Tyagunenko was one of the first scholars to draw attention to this fact; he also noted that in colonies and semi-colonies the bulk of the population comprised a communal, semi-feudal or feudal peasantry which had not yet become petty-bourgeois.[2]

It would not be right to say, however, that during the colonial period no African farms exploited hired labour on a large scale. Such farms did exist, but were relatively few as compared with the total number of richer farms, and were concentrated mainly in suburban districts, where cash food was grown, or in regions producing coffee, tobacco, etc., these crops being considerably more profitable.

However, even where hired labour was economically profitable, pre-capitalist methods of exploitation survived. As

[1] P. I. Kupriyanov, Op. cit., p. 77.

[2] V. L. Tyagunenko, *Problems of Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions*, Moscow, 1969, p. 28 (in Russian).

a result of the restricted food market, subsistence farming and attendant pre-capitalist production relations existed alongside commercial farming. These relations influenced the production of commodities even where this production was relatively profitable, since the cost of labour exploited by pre-capitalist methods was lower than that of wage labour. In a rural economy, where seasonal labour was often used and periods of field operations in commercial and subsistence farming did not coincide, the chances for using permanent hired labourers were limited. This led to the spread of seasonal hiring on the one hand, while it was profitable, with subsistence farming, to use a permanent labourer exploited by pre-capitalist methods in the production of highly profitable commodities.

On the whole, with low labour productivity and low farm prices, those farms where reproduction was only slightly commercialised proved more profitable. By greatly restricting the possibility of accumulation on African farms, the system of colonial exploitation hindered the commercialisation of the reproduction process. Even with a favourable world market, as during the first decade after World War II, the growing indigenous commercial agriculture was unable to go over from semi-subsistence methods to commodity farming, because the colonialists deliberately kept down prices. Small wonder that the influential London *Times* wrote that "statutory marketing policy has helped to control the rise of a kulak class among Nigerian peasant farmers".[1]

The growth of African commercial agriculture impelled the economic stratification of the peasantry. This process largely developed on a pre-capitalist basis. The colonial administration and private companies established standard prices throughout for the basic peasant commodity produce and bought all of it. In this manner the production costs were only slightly affected by market relationships, as they were of a predominantly subsistence nature. This, in particular, explains the relative independence of reproduction on peasant farms from market prices. Any drop in prices affected production less than the producers' livelihood.

Given the old methods of agriculture, the transition to cash crop production required larger areas of land and there-

[1] Quoted in: G. Hunter, Op. cit., p. 152.

fore more labour, since subsistence farming as such was not abolished, but kept alongside commodity production. This transition created a new stimulus for enlarging the tilled acreage on the few rich farms, on the one hand, and worsened the conditions of reproduction on the common peasant farms that had only limited possibilities for increasing labour expenditure, on the other.

In Tropical Africa, the separation of the actual producer from the means of production took place very slowly. After becoming a pauper in the absence of private ownership of land, the peasant normally managed to keep a small plot due to the available free land, and mainly grew food products for personal use. This explains how, for decades, a landless peasant was an exception rather than the rule. Landless peasants became widespread later, when no man's land began to disappear in regions of commercial agriculture due to expanded tilled areas, growth of the rural population, and the development of private landownership relations. As for North Africa, a relatively well-developed institution of private ownership with large landowners' plantations existed there even before the arrival of the colonialists. Colonialisation was accompanied by wholesale expropriation of land by Europeans. This accelerated the destruction of the rural community. Therefore, landless peasants became typical in the first few decades of the twentieth century. The separation of the rural producer from the means of production in this region developed more quickly than in the Tropical Belt.

Chapter II

THE CRISIS OF COLONIAL FORMS OF EXPLOITATION

Destruction of the Migrant Labour System and Formation of a Hard-Core Native Proletariat

The postwar years in Africa were marked by a crisis of the traditional forms of colonial exploitation. Among other things, this meant destruction of the migrant system and emergence of a hard-core native working class as the basis for hired labour in large enterprises. In North Africa this process began earlier than elsewhere on the continent. Here it was caused above all by the mass expropriation of land by Europeans and local feudal chiefs. In Algeria, for example, the colonialists had seized 2.7 million hectares by the 1950s; almost 1.7 million hectares belonged to 8,500 large Algerian landowners (with over 100 hectares), whereas more than half a million peasants owned only about 4.5 million hectares. In 1913-1950, 20 per cent of cultivated land (one million hectares) in Morocco was taken from peasants by 6,000 European colonists. In Tunisia, 4,700 Europeans owned 600,000 hectares; the same amount was owned by 5,000 rich local landowners, while 450,000 peasants owned 3.5 million hectares.

As a result of the mass expropriation of land by Europeans and a handful of local feudal rulers, hundreds of thousands of peasants became landless and became wage labourers. They were completely deprived of means of production and broke off economic ties with the village. The fact that peasants lost their ties with the village to become workers in large enterprises accelerated the emergence of a hard-core proletariat. For example, just before independence, Algeria's working class numbered about 600,000, including regular agricultural labourers employed on the large plantations; in Tunisia in the 1950s, factory workers accounted for almost 60 per cent of the urban proletariat.[1]

[1] B. A. Shabayev, "The Formation of the Working Class in the Maghrib Countries", *The Working Class and the Workers' Movement*

In North Africa the formation of a hard-core proletariat (its first contingents appeared between the two world wars) was retarded not so much by the direct producers' being connected with the means of production as by the domination of international monopoly capital, this delaying the development of industry and restricting it chiefly to mining and the processing of industrial crops. This contradiction resulted in a huge army of unemployed on a scale unseen in developed capitalist countries. Soviet historian B. A. Shabayev wrote: "Out of every three able-bodied Arab males in the Maghrib countries, one could not find work. Sometimes unemployment figures rose even higher, but hardly ever did they drop below this level."[1]

The break-up of the migrant system and the emergence of a hard-core proletariat were different in Tropical Africa, where new land suitable for cultivation still remained in many regions. The first signs of this process appeared in the early 50s, but it was not until the second half of the 50s that it became universal.

In Tropical Africa the massive growth of the proletariat during the first postwar decade was initially observed only in the Belgian Congo, in the enterprises of Union minière du Haut Katanga, where the administration sought to increase productivity by means of stabilising labour. In 1941 only 13.8 per cent of the workers at these plants had a work record of more than 10 years, whereas in 1952 this percentage increased to 50.4. The increased proportion of regular workers in the Congo is evident from the following data on the decline in the number of newly recruited Africans per 100 workmen[2]:

Years	Recruited labour
1921-25	96
1926-30	63
1936-40	11
1941-45	10
1946-50	3

in *Countries of Asia and Africa*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 179, 183 (in Russian).

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[2] *The Working Class of Africa*, pp. 41-42.

A similar situation was also later observed in other countries. According to R. Ray, who studied labour resources in Tanzania, an urban working class emerged there despite migratory traditions. The Ray report "showed that only slightly over 1/5 of the employed urban workers had made one or more moves between 1961 and 1965, a much lower proportion than among rural workers".[1] It was no accident that by the beginning of the 60s Tanzania witnessed a sharp decline in migrants accommodated in government transit centres as well as in the number of recruited Africans (see Table 7).

Table 7

Number of migrants accommodated in government transit centres and enlisted through recruitment centres, in thousands

Year	Africans in employ[1]	Africans accommodated in government transit centres[2]	Africans recruited through recruitment organisations[2]
1956	424.2	265.9	26.4
1957	430.4	199.1	23.9
1958	430.5	173.6	32.8
1959	428.2	177.7	22.7
1960	387.4	135.2	11.6
1961	442.0	76.7	3.9
1962	398.8	45.3	5.6

Source: *The Transformation of East Africa. Studies in Political Anthropology*, ed. by S. Diamond and F. Burke, New York, 1966, p. 292.

[1] Only those employed at registered enterprises.

[2] Not all migrants went through transit or recruitment centres.

In 1942 the average working record of Africans in Northern Rhodesian mines was 25 months, in 1963 it was 6.7 years, and 8.2 years in 1967. Labour fluidity decreased: in 1947 it

[1] International Institute for Labour Studies. East African Seminar on Labour Problems in Economic Development. Working Paper No. 5, *Labour Problems in the Economic and Social Development of Tanzania*, 1967, p. 14.

was 74 per cent and only 10 per cent in 1963.[1] Much the same occurred in Kenya, where, according to Ministry of Labour estimates, labour fluidity at private non-agricultural enterprises was only 14 per cent in 1971.

According to data gathered in a sociological study of industrial plants in Somalia in 1971 by a group of Soviet specialists headed by N. D. Kosukhin, 88 per cent of the workers were born in towns, 74 per cent of those polled had been wage-earners for over 3 years, and 55 per cent for over 6 years.[2]

Previously, most of the migrants were men who left their families in the village. Later, women also began to migrate in large numbers, and migration of entire families became a common occurrence. A 1962 census in Kenya by S. H. Ominde revealed that in many cases an almost equal number of men and women migrated. Table 8 presents S. H. Ominde's findings related to ethnic groups with the greater part of the population leaving their native places.

Table 8

Kenya: emigration rates of the principal ethnic groups by provinces

Percentages

Ethnic group	Migrants	Males	Females
Kikuyu	40.0	42.3	37.8
Nandi	37.2	38.0	36.3
Pokot	30.4	32.8	28.1
Pokomo/Riverine	33.0	35.0	31.0
Swahili/Shirazi	21.4	21.4	21.4

Source: *The Population of Tropical Africa*, ed. by J. Caldwell and Ch. Okonjo, New York, 1968, p. 268.

Not workers who left their families in the village, but family men are becoming more typical in the towns of Tropical Africa. According to Soviet historian S. I. Kuznetsova,

[1] S. I. Kuznetsova, *The Social Structure of African Towns*, Moscow, 1972, p. 258 (in Russian).
[2] See M. I. Braginsky, Op. cit., pp. 83-84.

about two-thirds of the African workers lived with their families in the Zambian townships in the latter half of the 60s.[1] In Kampala (Uganda), a survey of incomes and expenses of unskilled workers showed that those living with their families increased from 27 per cent in 1957 to 43 per cent in 1964. The vast majority of migrants were, indeed, unskilled workers, whereas skilled and semi-skilled workers formed the hard core of the proletariat. Therefore, the increase of unskilled labour living with their families in Kampala is an important indicator of the decline of the migrant labour system in Uganda. This is also true of Nigeria, where many studies at the beginning of the 60s showed that the most poorly paid segment of workers usually had families, a fact that should be taken into account in compiling minimal budgets.

Today Africa specialists use different indicators to show the stabilisation of urban workers. These include, for example, the duration of residence in the town after the age of 15, duration of permanent residence in one town, presence in town of the worker's wife, level of education, attitude to city life, etc. Though these may be relevant in research, in many cases they are only arbitrarily comparable. Besides, some of these criteria (for example, duration of permanent residence in one town) are hardly usable now, since the destruction of the migrant system is a comparatively new thing, while others (e.g. attitude to city life) are of a subjective nature and cannot be used as objective criteria.

To our mind, of the many factors characteristic of the destruction of the migrant system, the migration of whole families and the increase of family workers are most important, since they show the destruction of the actual foundation of this system (the migrant's family remaining in the village to grow food crops) and the resultant discontinuation of the maintenance by the village of the reproduction of the hired migrant's labour.

It would be appropriate to discuss what determines the trend, which began in the early 60s, towards rapid growth of the working class in Tropical Africa, what was behind the destruction of the migrant system, and why this did not begin earlier. Some investigators try to answer these questions by referring to changes in population density and

[1] See *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1970, p. 41.

land fertility. Thus, according to W. Elkan and L. Fallers, "where land is fairly plentiful and fertile, as in some parts of East Africa, farm income provides a substantial proportion of the whole even for persons whose wages are above the minimum. In areas like Kikuyuland and parts of Tanganyika where farms have become very small and the land yields little, farm incomes are a less significant proportion of the wage earner's total income. This explains why the populations have been more stable in some towns of Kenya and Tanganyika than in Uganda."[1]

Historically, however, the bulk of migrants in Tropical Africa came from rural districts with low-cash-income inhabitants, whereas most of the permanent workers came from areas where the population had comparatively large incomes from farming. This, in particular, is evident from studies carried out in the mid-50s by W. Elkan, who discovered that wage workers with the longer work record came chiefly from the Buganda ethnic group, which had the highest rural cash income among the African population of Uganda.[2]

Actually the end of migration and establishment of a hard-core working class resulted not from demographic or geographic changes (increase in population or change in soil fertility), but from social and economic factors inherent in postwar development. Among the more important factors were the increasing numbers of landless peasants and development of the processing industry, which was in need of trained workers. Besides (and this is even more important) in the 50s Tropical Africa witnessed a considerable increase in wages, which enabled many workers to maintain their families.

Even in the heyday of the migrant system many scholars and political figures noted the important role of increased wages as the prerequisite for the appearance of a real working class. Thus, the well-known report of the Carpenter Committee, which studied the position of African workers in Kenya, showed that in addition to regular employment, improved living conditions and pensions, a stabilisation of the labour force required wages which would satisfy the basic needs of the worker and his family. Experience showed

[1] *Labour Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas*, ed. by W. Moore and A. Feldman, New York, 1960, p. 245.

[2] See W. Elkan, *An African Labour Force. Two Case Studies in East African Factory Employment*, Kampala, 1956.

the colonialists that as wages increase, the fluidity of labour decreases.

It was in the 50s that there was a substantial wage increase in most countries of Tropical Africa. "The average annual rate of increase in African wages," writes G. Arrighi about the Tropical Belt, "during the 1950s, for example, appears to have been in order of 7-8 per cent. In general, wages are not chasing prices but are running ahead of them, the rise often implying an increase in real wages considerably faster than that in real national product."[1] As a result, there was a dramatic increase in the share of wage workers in the national incomes of many countries.

The main method of increasing wages in this period was the statutory change in minimum wages of registered unskilled labour, which was accompanied by wage increases for other categories of hired labour. From the late 40s to the beginning of the 60s, in towns of West Africa real wages increased by 30 to 50 per cent; in the Belgian Congo wages doubled between 1950 and 1958, and in Southern Rhodesia they increased by almost 70 per cent from 1949 to 1958, in Senegal by 48 per cent, in Nigeria by 26 per cent from 1949 to 1960, and in Ghana by 33 per cent. Some estimates show that since Tanzania gained independence real wages doubled by the mid-60s. In Kenya, according to official data, average real wages for Africans increased 75 per cent from 1958 to 1965.

In general, the increase in wages was primarily due to an upswing in the workers' struggle. This fact is recognised by many scholars. Thus, for example, R. Green notes in East Africa a "breakdown of the low wage syndrome and a movement toward firm optimum wage, training and employment policies in terms of labour cost per unit of output". He goes on to say that "these changes have, by and large, been initiated and stimulated by political pressures more than by firms realizing their economic rationality".[2]

Naturally the strength and effectiveness of the workers' struggle for improving their conditions vary in different

[1] Giovanni Arrighi, *International Corporations, Labour Aristocracies and Economic Development in Tropical Africa*, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 12.

[2] *Education, Employment and Rural Development*. Report of the Kerecho (Kenya) Conference 25th Sept.-1st October, 1966, ed. by J. Sheffield, Nairobi. 1967, p. 219.

countries. And this could not but affect the rate of wage increases. In particular, the highest wage increases in Senegal in the 50s compared with other West African colonies may be explained, first and foremost, by the fact that in those days this country had the most powerful trade unions in West Africa. According to E. Berg, "before 1949 the trade union seems to have been a significant factor only in Senegal.... They grew rapidly in Senegal, particularly among civil servants and clerks, but also among industrial workers. After 1945 they exerted steady pressure on the administration and private employers to force increases in wages that were in line with rising prices. Senegal was the scene of more well-organized strikes during this period than any other area in West Africa, something relevant to the fact that the postwar rate of increase in Senegal was greater than in neighboring territories where labor was much more weakly organized."[1]

The success of the workers' movement was in many respects predetermined by the general upswing of the national liberation movement. Politically and organisationally, African workers were not yet ready for assuming leadership in the struggle against the colonialists. Their strength lay not only in their independent actions, but also in that their actions were widely supported by the population, as was the case, for example, during the long strikes in French West Africa in 1953, when peasants supplied food to the families of strikers in the towns. It was this sympathy and help that often forced the colonialists to make concessions in their bid to block the rise in the national liberation struggle.[2]

The increase in wages influenced the structure of the working class and other sections of the army of hired labour. The comparatively high costs of training migrant workers, caused by the fluidity of labour, were compensated by low wages.

[1] *Economic Transition in Africa*, p. 215.

[2] Characteristically, there was no increase in real wages in countries with racist-colonial regimes, where, at the end of the 50s and beginning of the 60s, the conditions for the class struggle of the proletariat and the national liberation movement were unfavourable. In the Republic of South Africa an African miner's nominal wage in the gold-mining industry increased from 35.5 to 89.9 pounds sterling between 1938 and 1965. However, its real value remained the same, and in some years even dropped. Due to the increased cost of living in the Republic of South Africa real wages were 90 per cent of the 1938 level in 1953, 81 per cent in 1959, and 101 per cent in 1965.—See M. I. Braginsky, Op. cit., p. 147.

Then the situation changed. The industrialists began to employ not peasant migrants but regular workers on a large scale, and at the same time reduced labour costs by mechanising the industrial processes. As J. Hunter writes, "it seems clear that since the 1950s ... there has been a growing tendency to economise especially on the employment of unskilled labour, by increasing mechanisation in manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, ancillary processes, and by organisational changes".[1]

Migrant labourers began to be replaced by semi-skilled workers, who were trained to perform specific operations. G. Arrighi wrote: "Capital intensive techniques ... make possible the division of complex operations, which would need skilled labour, into simple operations that can be performed by semi-skilled labour."[2] This in turn accelerated the destruction of the traditional structure of hired labour at the European-owned plants, where along with migrants who carried out non-skilled operations a small group of skilled labour (mechanics, carpenters, foremen, etc.), mainly Europeans, played a considerable role. With an increase in African semi-skilled labour "the importation of skilled labour becomes impracticable and indeed unnecessary as complex operations are broken down into simpler operations that can be performed by semi-skilled labour".[3] At the same time the role and numbers of technical and engineering personnel sharply increased.

After independence was won, racial criteria were no longer applied to the workers' wages. Nevertheless, the real, wide gap between the wages of unskilled labour and specialists still exists, and is wider than in the developed capitalist countries. "In the US, for example," writes Ross, "the ratio between the typical starting rate for a new university graduate and the national minimum wage (in the 1960s—*Y. I.*) is in few cases much more than 2 : 1.... In African countries this ratio ranges from 6 : 1 to 11 : 1...."[4] This was due to the colonial legacy and also to the gap between the demand and the inadequate supply of skilled labour.

[1] *Economic Development and Structural Change*, ed. by J. Stewart, Edinburgh, 1969, p. 125.

[2] G. Arrighi, Op. cit., p. 9.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[4] *Industrial Relations and Economic Development*, ed. by A. M. Ross, London, 1966, p. 206.

One of the most important consequences of the dissolution of migrant system and the establishment of a hard-core proletariat was that in many countries of Tropical Africa the number of registered wage workers barely changed in the first half of the 1960s, notwithstanding the increase of industry; sometimes it even decreased. In this respect some of the calculations made by G. Arrighi are of particular interest (see Table 9).

Table 9

Dynamics of some economic indicators of countries of Tropical Africa (early 1950s-mid 1960s), average annual rate in per cent

Period	1952-1965	1954-1964			1953-196[illegible]
Indicators / Country	Uganda	Kenya	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania (mainland)
Number of registered wage workers	1.2	0.9	0.3	0.4	—2.1
Population	2.5	3.0	2.4	2.8	1.8
Aggregate real social product	3.5	4.8	2.5	2.5	3.5

Source: G. Arrighi, Op. cit., p. 12.

The dissolution of migration reduces the chances for increasing employment among Africans. As already noted, the migrant system caused a large turnover of labour, and involved in wage labour considerably larger numbers of workmen than the number of available jobs. Therefore the increase in the organic structure of capital during the dissolution of this system is accompanied by a decrease in the number of persons involved in hire relationships, this being due not only to fewer jobs, but also to a decrease in labour turnover. This caused an accelerated increase in unemployment, accompanied by an increase in the size of the déclassé elements. By some estimates, 10 to 20 per cent of the urban population in Tropical Africa, in towns such as Lagos, Kinshasa, Nairobi, etc., are completely unemployed or exist on chance earnings.

Able-bodied people, who have for many months and even years been trying to get work, are forced to lead a hand-to-

mouth existence and then beg or commit minor offences. This mode of life results in a waste of labour skills. As noted by P. Gutkind, a manager of a large transport company said that those who have been out of work for 18 months or more lose "the ability for sustained work. They will work very well for possibly a week or two and then the effort of maintaining standards or even maintaining time keeping, is too much for them."[1] Therefore company managers often refuse to hire persons who have been out of work for a long period. The growing unemployment and partial employment in towns lead to a growth of the lumpenproletariat, who are no longer tied to the land and rural labour and have lost the conservatism inherent in the peasantry. Moreover, retaining many of their traditional and religious prejudices and reduced to despair by constant want, lumpenproletarians are ready to accept any slogan—from patriotic to chauvinist and extremist. Their actions aggravate social and political tensions, so that they cannot be relied upon by any political regime.

The increase in urban unemployment is facilitated by growing migration from villages. A growing number of peasants prefer unemployment in towns to hidden unemployment in villages, where a job is mainly of a casual or seasonal nature. As some observers note, working a day or two per week in town a worker earns more than he can in the village. This is the result of the widening gap between income levels in town and country, this being a typical feature of economic development in African countries. In this connection the estimates for Uganda of J. B. Knight are of considerable interest (see Table 10).

As seen from the table, the rural annual returns on peasant farms in the late 50s to the early 60s went down due to a drop in coffee and cotton prices, while wages increased and their percentage per member of family, even the family of a non-skilled worker, became roughly equal to the income per family member on a farm. However, since average data are given for peasant farms, it may be safely assumed that the corresponding figures for the poorer peasants are much lower.

[1] P. Gutkind, *The Energy of Despair: Social Organization of the Unemployment in Two African Cities, Lagos and Nairobi*, Toronto, 1967, p. 33.

Table 10

Incomes of peasants and urban workers in Uganda (pounds sterling)

	Gross product of a peasant farm*		Average annual income from hire (only registered persons)			
	per one labourer	per one member of family	hired labourer	member of family	non-skilled labour in Kampala	member of family
1957	36.6	18.6	55.6	11.8	48.0	10.2
1960	34.2	17.4	68.4	14.6	—	—
1962	32.6	16.4	88.2	18.8	—	—
1964	37.4	18.9	116.2	24.9	86.8	18.4

Source: Bulletin. Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, No. 3, Oxford, 1967, p. 241.

* An average farm of the indigenous population. Both cash incomes and incomes in kind are taken into account. Since costs not connected with living labour are negligible it is possible in a rough estimate to equate the gross product to the annual income.

Similar conditions took shape in other African countries. Thus, according to the estimates of G. Helleiner, in Tanzania "the real per worker after-tax income was ... growing at 5 per cent annually in 1962-64, the real wage rate was growing at 11-12 per cent annually in 1962-65".[1] In Zambia the peasants' real income grew by only 3 per cent between 1964 and 1968, whereas the workers' income grew 35 to 52 per cent.

The origin and continuing widening of this gap in income levels is largely due to the dissolution of the migrant labour system. Characteristically, the direct producer's living standards are higher under the developed forms of capitalist hire than under the pre-capitalist modes of exploitation. When the migrant system predominated this difference was not yet striking, since there were no mature forms of capitalist hiring (the migrant system was based on the exploitation of the worker without his family which remained in the village, where pre-capitalist modes of exploitation were prevalent).

[1] G. Helleiner, *Agricultural Export Pricing Strategy in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 1966, pp. 7-8.

As migrant peasants began to be replaced by regular workers, this difference sharply increased. One of its consequences was the increase of migration from village to town.

In view of the growing gap between urban and rural income levels, some researchers and government officials came to the conclusion that the African workers essentially represent a labour aristocracy. This is not so. Previously the vast majority of urban workers could not provide for their families; but given higher wages today, they often manage to do so, even though living on the verge of pauperism. According to E. Berg, the prominent specialist on incomes: "In practice, wages of unskilled workers in most of the continent are not adequate to support a family on a minimum standard."[1] This is confirmed by a number of budget surveys. For example, in 1964 the Consultative Council on Minimal Wages in Uganda came to the conclusion that the minimum income of a family of four living in Kampala should be 267 shillings a month, whereas the actual expenditure of an unskilled family worker was no more than 175 shillings. A study in 1963-64 in Onitsha (Nigeria) showed that workers with the lowest incomes received 181 shillings and spent 186.2 shillings, despite loans and sale of property.[2] At the same time the Morgan Commission on the Review of Wages and Salaries found in the same year that the minimal expenditure of a worker's family in Onitsha should be in excess of 260 shillings, the proposed budget not including expenditure for bedclothes, children's clothes, etc.[3]

It should be noted that the incomes of many workers are considerably lower than the officially compiled minimal budgets, which cover only the bare necessities. The following characteristic given by Professor Batson some time ago still applies to such budgets in many African countries: "Such a standard is perhaps more remarkable for what it omits than for what it includes. It does not allow a penny for amusement, for sport, for medicine, for education, for saving, for hire purchase, for holidays, for odd bus rides,

[1] *Industrial Relations and Economic Development*, p. 187.

[2] *Federal Republic of Nigeria. Urban Consumer Surveys in Nigeria. Report on Enquiries into the Income and Expenditure Patterns of Lower and Middle Income Households at Onitsha, 1963-64*, Lagos, 1967, pp. 25-26.

[3] *Report of the Commission on the Review of Wages, Salary and Conditions of Service of the Junior Employees of the Governments of the Federation and in Private Establishments 1963-64*, Lagos, 1964, p. 21.

for newspapers, stationery, tobacco, sweets, hobbies, gifts, pocket money or comforts or luxuries of any kind. It does not allow a penny for replacements of blankets, furniture or crockery. It is not a 'humane' standard of living. It thus admirably fulfils its purpose of stating the barest minimum upon which subsistence and health can theoretically be achieved."[1] The fact that the real wages of many groups of workers are actually much lower than these budgets shows that labour is sold on conditions that do not ensure its reproduction. It is no accident that the incidence of diseases and the mortality rate are so high among African workers. Life expectancy among Africans is the shortest in the world; in many countries it does not even come to 40 years.[2]

Most African workers live in appalling poverty, barely managing to make ends meet.[3] In these conditions the appeal to equate their incomes with those of peasants means a decline in their already miserable standard, a return to migrants' wages. It is interesting that such appeals are not new. For instance, the Miller Committee on Wages in Nigeria reported almost 30 years ago that "it would be incorrect to provide them (unskilled workers—*Y. I.*) with a local purchasing power greatly in excess of that of non-wage-earners".[4]

Previously such statements were intended to disguise the desire to perpetuate the migrant labour system, under which the low-paid labourer could not support his family

[1] *Report of the Commission on the Review of Wages...*, p. 12.

[2] V. A. Martynov, G. A. Usov, "The Conditions of Labour and Life of the African Proletariat", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1972, p. 16.

[3] The small stratum of skilled workers, occupying a special place in the structure of the African proletariat, has a comparatively high standard of living. While the bulk of the urban population in Tropical Africa lives in poverty, skilled workers often use their savings for trading, letting houses, and the like. But this is nothing new. It was observed by many researchers in the colonial period, when there was no question of describing the African urban proletariat as the labour aristocracy. Skilled workers (stonemasons, carpenters, house-painters, etc.) receive an average wage of 127 shillings, write A. Southall and P. Gutkind, who in 1956 studied the conditions of Africans in Kampala. "In this group we find those people who having a relatively settled home life and looking upon their residence in Kampala as permanent, keep a shop, or sell charcoal or matoke."—A. Southall and P. Gutkind, *Townsmen in the Making*, Kampala, 1966, p. 55.

[4] *Report of the Commission on the Review of Wages...*, p. 9.

in town; today such statements reflect the reactionary and vain hope of returning to the old wage level in a situation where the regular worker is becoming the main labour force in the urban capitalist enterprises.

This, of course, does not deny the contradictions created by the dissolution of the migrant system and particularly the widening gap between the income levels in town and country, adding to the general social strains in the countries of Tropical Africa. These, however, can be resolved only through radical agrarian reforms, the elimination of the patriarchal and feudal backwardness, and the improvement of the life of villagers, but certainly not through reactionary and vain attempts at reducing the workers' living standard to the level of that of peasants, exploited primarily by patriarchal, feudal and commercial methods, and usury.

The dissolution of the migrant labour system and the emergence of a hard-core proletariat affected mainly the large and average enterprises, which employ the bulk of the registered wage-earners. To a smaller degree this process has affected small enterprises, which mainly employ married labourers, day-workers and seasonal labourers. Here migrant labour continues to play a prominent role.

The emergence of a hard-core native proletariat as the basis of hired labour is of tremendous historical importance. It reflects not only the elimination of the archaic social structure inherited by the young African states from the colonial past, but also the steady growth on the African continent of the working class—the most revolutionary class of our time, capable of consistent and decisive struggle for the political, social and economic liberation of the peoples. And this strengthens the potential of those forces in the developing countries which stand for the non-capitalist way of development.

Crisis of Colonial Forms of Commercial Agriculture. Present-Day Development Trends in Farming

The late 50s and early 60s in Africa were marked not only by a dissolution of ties between large-scale capitalist production and the subsistence economy, reflected in the decline of the migrant system, but also by a crisis of the colonial

forms of commercial agriculture. One of its manifestations was a crisis of the production of export crops.

Previously we noted that during the colonial period commercial agriculture in Africa was mainly export-oriented. The fluctuation of world prices for agricultural raw materials always influenced (and continues to influence) the rate of development of farming. The first postwar decade saw an increase in world prices, whereas the second decade saw a decrease. This was not of a temporary nature, and represented a steady trend. This is evident, in particular, from the prices of tropical agricultural produce on the US market in the 60s and early 70s (see Table 11).

Table 11

Prices of tropical agricultural produce on US markets (US cents per pound)

Type of products / Years	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	Late 60s—early 70s
Cotton (Texas)	28.1	27.9	27.1	25.1	26.6	23.6 (1969)
Rubber (New York State)	41.5	28.0	23.5	24.5	17.3	18.4 (1971)
Cocoa (New York State)	30.7	20.6	24.0	16.1	26.0	24.2 (1972)
Jute (New York State)	18.3	17.6	15.8	19.2	16.3	17.8 (1969)

Source: N. I. Gavrilov, *Problems of Agricultural Planning and Development in African Countries*, Moscow, 1973, p. 205 (in Russian).

The drop in prices is due to basic trends in the world capitalist economy—the increased share of industry in the productive sphere, the changing proportion between extractive and manufacturing industries, the constant tendency to decrease the amount of material per unit product and corresponding reduction of the share of raw and other materials, the increased use of synthetic raw materials, etc.

According to many experts and international organisations, such as FAO, the prospects for increasing the export of agricultural raw materials from developing countries in the coming decades are fairly vague. "The long-term trend in the world trade," writes T. Ekström, head of a Swedish research centre, "seems now to be against primary products. Until the Second World War exports of manufactured goods and of primary products increased at about the same rate. But owing to a fundamental shift in the import demand of the industrial countries, exports of primary products have expanded since then only at one-half of the rate of growth of exports of manufactures."[1]

During the coming decades this gap is likely to increase and make it even more difficult to expand the world capitalist market of raw materials.

The situation is also aggravated by the fact that the prices of tropical agricultural produce tend to drop while those of manufactured products are going up on the world capitalist market. In 1957 for one ton of coffee sold the Ivory Coast could buy 24 tons of cement, whereas in 1965 it could buy only 18 tons. In 1958 a ton of Ivory Coast cocoa was equivalent to 20 tons of cement on the world market, and in 1965 to a mere 14 tons. In Cameroon, one ton of cocoa in 1960 was equivalent to 2,700 metres of printed cottons; in 1965 the figure was 800 metres. Only in 1962 the price gap between tropical agricultural and manufactured products led, in the developing countries, to losses totalling 11,000 million dollars, which is 30 per cent more than the financial aid obtained that year. This factor is fraught with disastrous consequences for the economies of African states as can be seen, for example, from the financial losses sustained by the Ivory Coast due to deteriorating conditions of international trade in raw materials. From 1960 to 1965 the Ivory Coast lost 120 million dollars on sales of coffee, 73 million on cocoa and 12 million dollars on bananas.[2]

In combating exploitation by international monopolies, the African countries and the developing countries of other

[1] T. Ekström, "Lectures on Possible Ways of Speeding Up Economic and Social Development in East Africa", *International Institute for Labour Studies. East African Seminar on Labour Problems in Economic Development*, 1967, p. 57.

[2] G. de Lusignan, *French-Speaking Africa Since Independence*, London, 1969, p. 342.

continents are working for a restructuring of world economic relations. They want to end discrimination and artificial obstacles in international trade, and oppose every sign of inequality, dictation and exploitation. In this they are greatly helped by the states of the socialist community.

Endeavouring to halt the drop in export prices, which sometimes reaches alarming proportions, African governments sign trade agreements on a system of quotas limiting the sale of agricultural goods to capitalist countries. However, such agreements are often torpedoed by imperialist countries. Thus in October 1964, Ghana, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Togo and Brazil, which account for 80 per cent of the world production of cocoa-beans, drew up an agreement on coordinated policy in the export of cocoa which provided for approximate prices and quotas for each country. Because of the low world prices on cocoa-beans in the mid-60s, the cocoa-producing countries agreed to stop sales of their produce on the world market. However, this agreement was wrecked by the Western countries, which had large stocks and could afford to refuse to buy cocoa-beans.[1]

The capitalist states either evade talks with developing countries on problems connected with the organisation of world commodity markets and the stabilisation of prices for tropical agricultural produce, or resort to a policy of obstruction, trying to impose disadvantageous agreements. The quotas allowed under these agreements are often lower than the production volume. Thus, according to some estimates the 1968 quota for Tanzanian coffee was only 70 per cent of total output, for sisal 85 per cent, and pyrethrum 70 per cent. "Many countries," writes the Soviet specialist on Africa N. I. Gavrilov, "are faced by the dilemma: either to destroy the surplus coffee or sell it at any price above the quota established for them."[2] Kenya's quota under the agreement was 44,000 tons of coffee in the mid-60s, while its production was 56,900 tons in 1966, and 48,000 tons in 1967. To sell its total harvest Kenya was compelled to violate the agreement.

The overproduction of agricultural raw materials enables international monopolies to dictate terms to developing countries. The mounting competition between imperialist states on the world market also has a negative effect on

[1] See P. I. Kupriyanov, Op. cit., p. 46.
[2] N. I. Gavrilov, Op. cit., p. 213.

African exports. Thus, US competition in cotton of average-staple grades was the immediate reason for the drop in the price of African-grown cotton. This was also the case with prices on East African sisal hemp, when the British Imperial Chemical Industries began producing a synthetic substitute. The initial production cost of this substitute exceeded the cost of the natural product by a mere 5 per cent, but the former has a much wider range of use. Some specialists think the substitute will oust natural sisal hemp completely.

The drop in export prices on tropical agricultural products was accompanied by a drop in farm prices. Thus, in 1954 the purchase prices in French-speaking countries of West Africa amounted to 150 African francs per 1 kg of coffee and 160 African francs per 1 kg of cocoa-beans. By 1968 the prices dropped to 60 and 80 African francs respectively. In 1962 peasants in Niger received 52.5 African francs per kilo of peanuts, and in 1968, only 38.76 francs. It should also be taken into account that the purchasing power of the African franc between 1958 and 1968 fell by not less than 25 per cent.[1] In Uganda the farm price of a pound of cotton was 56.3 cents in 1956-1958 and 52 cents in 1965-1967; in Tanzania the corresponding figures were 56.6 and 46.6 cents.

During the colonial period, the difference between export and farm prices was pocketed by the colonialists in the form of an export tax or as profit for the trade boards and firms purchasing and selling African peasant produce on foreign markets. With the drop in export prices, their profit decreased. The reduced returns from taxes on peasant produce showed the decline in the traditional forms of exploitation of African commodity producers, involving taxation pressure by the colonialists.

Then this pressure was successfully replaced by the world capitalist market which secured a steady supply of agricultural raw materials at low prices. Therefore the extra-economic pressure of the colonial administration had ceased to be the essential requisite for exploitation of the African peasantry by international monopoly capital.

Simultaneously, the purchasing of peasant produce by private monopolies lost its former importance. With the drop in export prices the profits of monopolies were reduced. Because of this, United Africa Co. Ltd. (UAC) and other

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

major colonial companies, which had accumulated huge capital by buying up peasant produce, hastened to wind up their purchasing operations at the beginning of the 60s. For example, the purchasing of agricultural raw materials by the UAC alone, on behalf of the marketing boards in West Africa, dropped from 44 million pounds sterling in 1955 to 3 million in 1963.[1]

The premises and equipment of the many purchasing centres previously run by firms were sold, leased or granted free of charge to former intermediaries and employees of the companies in question. In the 60s the large colonial trading companies practically stopped purchasing peasant produce in Africa. This was primarily due to economic factors and not to any sympathy with African entrepreneurs lauded in the Western press.[2]

Thus, the drop in prices of agricultural raw materials was accompanied by changes in the organisation of their sale. On the one hand, there emerged a large and more efficient system of governmental control through the trade boards that had been set up after liberation in most countries, and on the other, cooperatives began to grow which acted as agents for these organisations purchasing produce from the peasants.

The increased amount of peasant produce sold through cooperatives is not a chance development. As farm prices and revenues go down, cooperatives prove to be more profitable in organising the purchasing of products from small producers. Cooperatives have lower overhead expenses than the boards when dealing with private buyers, since the latter deliver their produce in smaller lots. Besides, the cooperatives lessen the peasants' dependence on usurers and traders, thus to a certain extent offsetting the drop in prices.

The conversion of cooperatives into purchasing agents, which began at the end of the 50s, was a sign of the break-

[1] See B. B. Runov, "The Neo-colonialist Policies of Trade Monopolies in Africa", *The Economy of Africa*, Moscow, 1965, p. 143 (in Russian).

[2] This, of course, does not mean that the former colonial trading companies had completely ceased operations in Africa. After winding up purchasing operations and curtailing retail trade due to the drop in prices and tougher competition from local government-supported traders, these companies switched to machines and equipment, department stores, and specialised shops in big towns, and invested in the manufacturing industry.

down of the colonial system of purchasing agricultural raw products from the Africans on the basis of a trade and usury monopoly of small private capital. At the same time, this breakdown could not yet lead to a complete elimination of usury, though it did considerably restrict its sphere, because usury by wealthy peasants, who, into the bargain, used cooperative credits, continued in the framework of the cooperatives themselves.

The drop in farm prices, primarily due to marketing difficulties, is a controversial factor in the development of commercial agriculture. In the colonial period the low cash incomes of peasants held up the processes of accumulation and commercialisation and slowed down the growth of capitalist production in the village. Likewise, the drop in farm prices on export crops reduces the possibility of capitalist development in those branches which were relatively more commercialised in the past (and largely remain so even now). For example, a survey carried out in 1966 in the coffee-growing regions of Buganda (Uganda) showed a decline of production on both large and small farms because of a drop in farm prices. "A large coffee acreage," said a survey, "was likely to be a sign of past success rather than present wealth, and few commercial farmers were obtaining large incomes from coffee alone."[1] The authors of the survey noted cases in which the owners of coffee plantations did not gather all of their harvest and even cut down some coffee trees. Half the owners of dairy farms and 25 per cent of the farmers growing sugar cane and tea had abandoned their coffee plantations or decreased their area.[2]

Thus, the drop in farm prices, though blocking the development of capitalism, facilitates the conservation of subsistence and semi-subsistence forms of cropping and retards the progress of agricultural production in the African village. At the same time the experience of the last decade has shown that the possibilities of adaptation of the semi-subsistence economies to the low prices continue to diminish, which calls for a transition to contemporary commodity production based on a much greater productivity and the latest achievements in science and technology.

[1] *Subsistence to Commercial Farming in Present-Day Buganda. An Economic and Anthropological Survey*, ed. by A. I. Richards, F. Sturrock and J. M. Fortt, Cambridge, 1973, p. 43.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

Though peasant economies still receive low incomes, considerable changes are taking place: in the colonial period the low incomes were a direct result of extra-economic coercion by the colonial administration which expropriated, with the help of the purchasing companies, a considerable (often lion's) share of the surplus product in the form of taxes. But now low profits are, above all, the result of the pressure of the world capitalist market securing big profits for the monopolies.

Today, international monopoly capital exploits peasants by means of the mechanism of world prices. This mechanism and other factors have facilitated the transition from extra-economic methods of exploitation, which prevailed in the colonial period and were associated with imperialist political rule, to economic methods or, in other words, from colonial to neo-colonial exploitation. Its main lever is "economic penetration and economic control",[1] says the eminent Soviet expert on Africa V. G. Solodovnikov. This economic control is imposed through the export of capital from imperialist countries, inequitable terms of trade, manipulation of prices and foreign exchange rates, loans and various forms of so-called aid. All this does not mean, of course, that the imperialists have lost interest in retaining direct political control over the African countries. It took many years of persistent struggle for the majority of African peoples to do away with colonial oppression. International monopoly capital continues to give all possible help to the racist-colonial regimes of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia. The imperialist states continue to bend every effort to limit the national sovereignty of the young African states.

The crisis in the production of export crops affects not only African peasant farms, but also European-owned enterprises. Their share in export production is gradually falling. This is due not only to the new "political climate" that originated in African countries after their liberation, but also to the diminished profits of European-owned farms, this restricting the influx of foreign private capital into agriculture.

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[1] V. G. Solodovnikov, ***Neo-colonialism: Theory and Practice***, Moscow, 1966, p. 11 (in Russian).

The profitability of the European-owned farms was greatly affected not only by the deteriorating market conditions, but also by the increased wages of both urban and rural wage-earners, who were covered by minimum-wage legislation. The biggest reduction in profitability was registered on small plantations, whose owners did not have enough capital to modernise production. In the colonial period such farms (and also small commercial and industrial enterprises) were able to exist thanks to privileges, preferential duties, credits, and subsidies that protected them against competition from African peasants, and thanks to the low cost of African labour.

The liquidation of colonial regimes, the deteriorating market situation, and wage increases spelled ruin for these enterprises. Therefore their owners were especially stubborn in upholding the colonial regimes. This may be seen, in particular, from the activities of the terrorist underground of European colonialists in Tunisia, the ultras in Algeria, the political intrigues of the European colonists in Kenya, the manoeuvres of the colonial-racist regime in Rhodesia, etc. Unlike the monopolies, these social strata could not retain their positions after the African peoples achieved independence. Therefore, before and after the collapse of colonial oppression the owners of small enterprises and farms strove to transfer their capital abroad. This was one of the main reasons for the decrease in British private investment in the sterling zone of Tropical Africa. Whereas in 1961 the inflow of capital was 33.4 million pounds sterling, it was 8.8 million pounds in 1962, 2.5 million in 1963; in 1964 the figure was minus 9 million, i.e. the outflow of capital exceeded the influx by 9 million pounds sterling.[1] A similar situation arose in former French Africa.

Simultaneously there was a reduction in the number of small plantations and farms owned by Europeans. According to a contemporary study, "the post-war period has seen an over-all reduction in the area devoted to plantation agriculture in Tropical Africa. In many cases plantations have been divided into small-holdings."[2] This reduction was especially characteristic of such countries as Tunisia and Algeria, where foreign-owned land had been nationalised.

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[1] G. Arrighi. Op. cit., p. 5.

[2] *Environment and Land Use in Africa*, ed. by M. Thomas and G. Whittington, London, 1969, p. 241.

The reduced number of European colonist-owned farms is often attributed exclusively to government policies of redeeming or confiscating European-owned farms and plantations, though mention should also be made of a number of economic factors, for these, too, played an important role. For example, in Algeria the colonists abandoned their farms even before they were taken over by the government. Of course, the European settlers' behaviour was also dictated by political motives. However, the main reason was their inability to run a profitable farm in the new conditions of independence and to adjust themselves to these new conditions.

The crisis of export crop production affected both large and small plantations, as was the case in Tanzania, where a sharp drop in prices was accompanied by a relatively large increase in the wages of agricultural labourers. As a result, many sisal plantations became unprofitable, which was one of the reasons why they were nationalised.

Though in a number of countries the production of export crops on foreign-owned plantations continues, the economic possibilities for its growth are becoming much more limited, not to mention the unfavourable effects of the post-independence political climate. Then there is also competition from peasants, who have increased production of such traditional plantation crops as tea, sugar cane, pyrethrum, etc. In Kenya, for example, tea was not produced on peasant farms until the mid-50s. In 1960, tea-producing peasant acreage was less than 2,500 acres or 6 per cent of the tea-cropping area, while in 1967 as many as 35,000 African farms grew tea on more than 20,000 acres or over 30 per cent of the tea-producing acreage. Other countries, too, have witnessed a similar transition to tea-growing on small peasant farms (though not always on such a scale).

Technologically, the shift to the cultivation of traditional crops on peasant farms was largely prepared by the fact that many Africans working on plantations had acquired the necessary skills for their cultivation. Also, during the initial period, the plantation-owners usually supplied peasants with planting stock and seeds, and even carried out the primary processing of peasant produce at their enterprises. This was especially characteristic of tea and sugar cane. Such "help" from the plantation-owners was not altogether disinterested. It was quite profitable for them to buy

African peasant produce at low prices instead of making large investments in development and paying wages to hired workers.

Primary processing of peasant produce at foreign-owned plantations, and foreigners supplying planting stock and fertilisers are characteristic of the initial stages of the transition to peasant cultivation of traditional plantation crops. As production is becoming more massive, these functions are passing to cooperatives and state agencies.

The drop in prices on the world market, the increase in production costs caused by wage increases at European-owned enterprises, the lifting of colonial restrictions forbidding Africans to produce certain commodity crops, and other factors, facilitated peasant production of plantation crops. Peasant farms proved to be better adapted to low prices than European plantations, since the use of pre-capitalist methods of exploitation, undeveloped forms of hiring, and negligible cash expenditure on obtaining agricultural implements resulted in smaller production costs compared to those at European-owned capitalist enterprises. According to A. Roe, "the explanation of these successful peasant developments is, of course, the simple one that, where wages and other costs are rising, the peasant smallholder, who employs mainly family labour and uses the minimum of equipment, is far less vulnerable to drastic price reductions than is the heavily capitalised estate producer, for whom some minimum return over cost is absolutely essential to survival."[1]

Thus, the better adjustment of smallholders to price reductions by virtue of comparatively low production costs under unfavourable market conditions ensured the necessary economic requisites for the production of traditional plantation crops.

Moreover, this transition could be effected at a relatively fast rate only because in the postwar period the use of cash was no longer restricted in the African village solely to paying taxes. Money gave rise to new demands in the village which could not be satisfied by the subsistence economy. Soap, salt, sugar, cotton clothes, alcoholic drinks, tobacco

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[1] *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, London, 1969, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 50.

and, in the richer families, transistor radios, watches, bicycles, etc. became common in the African village. The demand for a variety of commodities was greatly enhanced by education and the intensive development of mass media. More and more cash was needed to buy these goods. One of the major cash sources was the production of crops for sale. In connection with the dissolution of the migrant system and the growth of a hard-core proletariat, such production became vital in districts cut off from markets, since reduced employment of migrants in capitalist enterprises had made it more difficult to earn cash. Thus, the sharp conflict between the demands generated by commodity production and the subsistence forms of farming accelerated the expansion of commercial agriculture. A large role in this process was played by the peasant farms, which began growing traditional plantation crops.

Furthermore, the expansion of commercial agriculture entailed the abolition of regional restrictions inherited from the colonial past. In the colonial period, commercial agriculture regions existed side by side with regions where market production was practically non-existent and where the population depended on migrant labour to obtain cash. These regions ensured the normal functioning of the system of colonial exploitation of Africans. But now that the migrant system is becoming redundant as the basis of hired labour at large enterprises and that a growing number of landless peasants compete with migrants for jobs in regions of African commercial agriculture, regions of no marketable production are becoming an anachronism. Their existence retards economic development and heightens social tensions. This is why African governments have taken steps to introduce commodity production in districts which in the past served the colonialists only as sources of cheap labour.

At the same time commodity agriculture developed not only in breadth but in depth. The elimination of colonial restrictions prohibiting cultivation of traditional plantation crops on peasant farms and the system of state preferences for African enterprise enlarged the material and technological base of capitalism. Thus, according to H. Ruthenberg, in the Nyeri District (Kenya) the owner of 5-year-old coffee plantations could receive a net income of 3,841 shillings per acre in the early 60s, even if the entire labour force was hired. In the same district one hour of tending grade cattle gave a net income of 2.47 shillings, whereas the wage per working hour was equal to 0.25 shillings.[1]

At the same time, even in industries where capitalist forms of hiring have proved economically profitable, they have not yet completely replaced pre-capitalist methods of exploitation. In the same Nyeri District, hired labour accounted for 50 to 70 per cent of the labour force engaged in the production of coffee, 45 per cent in productive stockbreeding, and up to 60 per cent in tea-growing (except for the planting season).[2] Wide use of pre-capitalist forms of exploitation is due to the survival of subsistence farming. This cannot but affect the production of cash crops, since the upkeep of a labourer exploited by pre-capitalist methods is cheaper than that of hired labour. The different cultivation periods for producing food and cash crops, and labour shortages during the harvesting season, still make it possible and necessary to exploit labour on a pre-capitalist basis in commercial cropping. This is largely facilitated by the fact that wages are normally higher during the harvesting period.

Besides, the number of indigenous farms producing only market crops is growing, notably in the Maghrib countries and Egypt. Though in a less developed form, this process is also under way in the Tropical Belt of the continent. The greater commercialisation of peasant farms, reflected in the increased use of hired labour, has widened the gap between commercial and subsistence farming. By contrast, the colonial period was marked by a close connection between the two types of agriculture.

These processes are witnessed not only on farms growing export crops, but also where food is grown for the domestic market, this being related to the growth of the urban population and the slow but continuous spread of commodity relations to the villages.

Since the mid-50s Africa has seen a rapid growth of towns, largely attributable to the migration of the rural population to urban regions. In 1958-1969 the population of cities like Dakar, Abidjan and Lagos doubled. This urbanisation suggests that the population of the larger African towns

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[1] See H. Ruthenberg, *African Agricultural Production Development Policy in Kenya 1952-1965*, pp. 18, 20, 22.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 21, 26.

will continue to increase at an annual average rate of 8 per cent and towns with a population of more than 10,000 at a rate of 3 per cent, which gives a total annual average growth of 5.5 to 6.3 per cent.

As the urban population increases so does the demand for farm produce. But that is not all. The point is that in many African countries the urban population determines the demand for foodstuffs, since the village still satisfies its basic food needs by subsistence farming. In Tropical Africa, for example, the towns account for only a small part of the total population; however, they dispose of one-third of all cash incomes, and urban Africans spend 40 to 70 per cent of their family budget on food.[1]

In the colonial period food production for the domestic market was developed in only a few countries, notably in Northern Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo and Egypt. In almost all the colonies whose economies were based on peasant production of export crops, commodity food production was artificially retarded, the shortage being covered by imports. In the colonial period, therefore, the food trade was mainly confined to regions where food was produced. Now export production has ceased to be a universal feature of commodity agriculture in the vast majority of African countries. There are now regions producing exclusively for the domestic market. This process has been marked by the appearance of state-run organisations purchasing produce for domestic consumption in many African countries (the People's Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Zambia, etc.). They specialise in buying different kinds of food, regulate prices on local markets and control the range and quality of produce.

All this does not mean that agriculture in most states of Tropical Africa has already shifted emphasis to the domestic market. Often the proportion of the output for the domestic market is insignificant. In mainland Tanzania, for example, only 20 per cent of agricultural commodities are produced for the home market. A different process is taking place, viz. the disintegration of the colonial structure of commercial agriculture, which used to be regarded as a mere supplier of agricultural raw materials for the world capitalist market.

[1] See V. Morozov, "Tropical Africa: Problems of Food Production", *The Economy of Africa*, Moscow, 1973, p. 66 (in Russian).

One of the important factors hindering the growth of commodity food production in African states is its importation from the US and the capitalist countries of Europe. Local production cannot compete with the output of developed capitalist states. According to Soviet economist V. Morozov, "lower production and distribution costs allow the developed capitalist countries to establish lower world prices than those on the domestic African market".[1]

Under these conditions the policy of establishing lower prices for food exports than those on the home market is the only possible means for the young states to protect national food production against the fatal consequences of imperialist dumping. This, in fact, is the measure used by governments of developed capitalist countries to protect their national production from the competition of international exporters. The only difference is that in the case of developing countries such a policy weakens their dependence on multinational monopolies, whereas in the case of developed countries it leads to their enrichment and greatly narrows the chances of exporting agricultural commodities from developing countries.

"If Western Europe," writes O. Gulbrandsen, "which at present gives a protection by 50% to its agricultural produce accepted free trade, this would lead to an increase in world market prices of the magnitude of 25-30%. This would lead to a doubling of world trade and a trebling of the foreign exchange earnings of the poor countries, and this in its turn would lead to a 30% increase of agricultural production and income of the agricultural population in the poor countries."[2]

Another important factor checking the increase in food production is the poor home market based on the low living standards of the bulk of the urban population and the still surviving subsistence farming in the villages. "In terms of solvent demand for the final product (demand which determines the capacity of the home market—*Y.I.*) three-quarters of independent African countries are inferior to a small European town with 250,000 residents. In this

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[2] T. Ekström, "East Africa and World Perspective. An Economic Survey", *International Institute for Labour Studies. East African Seminar on Labour Problems in Economic Development*, 1967, p. 61.

respect Ethiopia, with its population of nearly 25 million, is comparable to a European town with a population of 400,000."[1]

On the whole, the postwar period was marked by the destruction of colonial methods of peasant exploitation, based on extra-economic coercion and colonial privileges for foreign capital. This destruction was related to the commercialisation of peasant farm economies in the context of overproduction of agricultural raw materials on the world capitalist market. However, this period also saw the establishment of the main requisites for neo-colonialist exploitation of the African peoples, which is largely contingent on the mechanism of international market prices controlled by imperialist monopolies.

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[1] A. Elyanov, *Toward the 20th Century*, Moscow, 1969, p. 30 (in Russian).

Chapter III

THE VILLAGE: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CLASS CONTRADICTIONS

Economic Differentiation Among Peasants

In Africa large-scale landownership was largely concentrated in the North of the continent. For example, in Algeria on the eve of the Revolution, 4 per cent of all Algerian landowners owned 37.9 per cent of the land at a time when there were 600,000 landless peasants in the country as well as 440,000 peasants with next to no land.[1] The concentration of land in large estates was even greater in the case of Egypt where, according to L. A. Fridman, a Soviet researcher, in 1950 99 per cent of landowners possessed 55-56 per cent of all lands, while 1 per cent owned 44-45 per cent of all lands.[2] But in addition, profound economic inequality existed within North Africa's peasantry itself, which included wealthy as well as poor peasants, and peasants possessing land as well as landless peasants. In particular, in the case of Egypt in 1950, 60,000 wealthy peasants and closely associated social groups constituting 2.3 per cent of landowners possessed 15.7 per cent of the entire area of privately-owned lands. If leased land is also included, moreover (for wealthy peasants continually expanded the area of leased lands), the share of large farms in land utilisation was 20-21 per cent.[3] More generally, the existence of far-reaching economic differentiation within the villages of North African countries has been widely confirmed by agricultural census materials and is recognised by the majority of researchers.

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[1] N. M. Frolkin, Op. cit., pp. 16, 20.
[2] L. A. Fridman, Op. cit., p. 19
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 211-12.

The situation is different, however, with regard to studies of economic differences in property ownership in the villages of the continent's Tropical Belt. For in spite of abundant literature the extent of differentiation of this type is still the subject of many debates. It is well known that relevant socio-economic studies are based primarily on materials concerned with surveys of individual households. In the colonial period, however, up until the early 1950s such surveys were very rare. In addition, their findings were seldom published and remained in archives. When the results of such studies were published (for example, W. Allan's *Studies in African Land Usage in Northern Rhodesia* and Ph. Deane's *Colonial Social Accounting*) emphasis was placed on average indicators, which reduce distinctions between individual social groups to a common level.[1]

At a time when traditional communal forms of land utilisation continued to slow down the separation of direct producers from means of production, colonial administrations and European entrepreneurs were interested in problems of exploiting African villages as a whole rather than in individual types of households. In particular, they were interested in marketable output and the extent to which peasants were provided with land in situations where traditional methods of farming continued to exist. As a result, during the many decades of colonial oppression researchers had access to almost no quantitative indicators which would make it possible to size up the property status of individual layers of the peasantry with an eye to analysing the nature of agrarian processes taking place in Tropical Africa.

At that time, since it was not possible to base studies on economic survey data, one of the most important sources of empirical materials was provided by ethnologists studying the way of life, culture and traditions of African tribes. Yet, while ethnologists collected an immense volume of factual material without which it would have been impossible to understand much about the villages in the Tropical Belt, they frequently paid little attention to social contradictions arising within the framework of the traditional institutions that they analysed. Since most of them did not find clear-cut property distinctions

[1] See W. Allan, *Studies in African Land Usage in Northern Rhodesia*; Ph. Deane, *Colonial Social Accounting*, Cambridge, 1953.

of the type characteristic of capitalism, they generally concluded that the egalitarian principles inherent in tribal societies, whose vestiges they found everywhere, in fact continued to prevail. The conclusions of M. Green, for example, who studied villages of the Ibo tribe, are typical in this regard. Noting the absence of marked property distinctions between individuals, he added that "this must be tentatively stated in the absence of exact calculations of individual wealth. There are, of course, variations: some people have more land than others, and more trees of economic value such as the wine palm than others. Some are better off in respect of wives and children. A few people own several cows, but as there is little opportunity for, or habit of, the accumulation of capital, no well-defined wealthy class has yet emerged in a rural community of this kind."[1] It is important to keep this in mind when problems of political organisation are considered, he stressed.

Such conclusions have served as a theoretical basis for the doctrines of African socialism that were counterposed to Marxism. One of their key tenets is the assertion that the problem of classes does not arise in traditional African societies and does not exist among Africans.[2]

At the same time, however, beginning in the mid-1950s, a growing number of surveys of African economies have been published that point to a far-reaching economic differentiation of peasants and thus disprove the theory concerning the classless character of African villages. Their appearance is explained by the fact that at a time when a crisis in colonial methods of exploitation had become apparent the continuation of exploitation required information that would explain the internal structure of African economies and their possibilities for adapting to low farm prices and to the mass migration of hundreds of thousands of peasants in search of work.

Once political independence had been won in a number of countries, interest in these problems continued to grow and the number of such studies continued to increase. Above all there has been an increase in the number of censuses

[1] M. Green, *Ibo Village Affairs*, New York, 1964, pp. 43-44. This study was first published in England in 1947. From the point of view of the head of a family, the more wives and children, the more workers.

[2] See, for example, *Government of Kenya. African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*, Nairobi, 1965.

and surveys in which the economic differentiation of peasant households was recorded. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s far more were made than in all preceding years. Since many of these statistical materials are not widely known, and debates among specialists concerning the degree of differentiation of the African peasantry and the nature of its social layers continue, we will attempt to analyse the results of those agricultural censuses and surveys that are, in our view, especially important.

One of the first major censuses of African households in Tropical Africa was the survey carried out by R. Galletti's group in 1951-1952 in regions of Western Nigeria where cocoa was produced. Its findings were published in 1956. The distribution of land among families that was recorded in this survey is presented in Table 12.

Table 12

The distribution of land among 187 families in cocoa-producing districts of Western Nigeria (1951-1952)

Size class of acreage	Average acreage per family	Percentage of families	Percentage of acreage
up to 2.49	1.53	2.62	0.18
2.5-4.99	3.71	8.89	1.46
5-7.49	6.25	14.29	3.95
7.5-9.99	8.62	10.79	4.11
10-14.99	12.01	18.38	9.77
15-19.99	17.33	11.37	8.72
20-29.99	24.31	12.54	13.49
30-39.99	33.72	8.31	12.40
40-49.99	45.19	3.79	7.58
50-99.99	60.01	6.71	17.83
100 and over	198.42	2.33	20.51
Total:		100.00	100.00

Source: R. Galletti, *Nigerian Cocoa Farmers. An Economic Survey of Yoruba Cocoa Farming Families.*

The data in Table 12 reveal striking contrasts in the property status of the agrarian population in the cocoa-

producing districts of Nigeria. In this connection the authors of the survey note that "a few families have a great deal of land, more than enough to meet the needs of increasing numbers and at the same time extend the cocoa farms, a great many families have very little land, so that they cannot keep enough for food farming to support themselves if they wish to farm cocoa at all".[1] These property distinctions are especially evident if households are grouped into fewer and larger size classes of acreage (see Table 13).

Table 13

Distribution of land among 187 families in cocoa-producing districts of Western Nigeria (1951-1952, aggregated groupings)

Size class of acreage	Percentage of families	Percentage of acreage
up to 14.99	54.95	19.47
15-19.99	11.37	8.72
20-29.99	12.54	13.49
30 and over	21.14	58.32

Source: R. Galletti, Op. cit., p. 458.

These substantial differences in access to land are reflected in the size of the corresponding revenues. This is indicated in the data presented in Table 14.

As in the case of size classes of acreage differences in revenue become more apparent when the corresponding data for individual households are aggregated (Table 15).

The data presented in Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15 indicate that in the early 1950s land and incomes were largely concentrated in wealthy households. More specifically, 21 per cent of the families controlled more than 50 per cent of the land and revenue while at the other extreme nearly 60 per cent of the families controlled about 20 per cent of revenues and land.

Subsequent census data concerning African households also point to a process of far-reaching economic differentiation of the peasantry in the cocoa-producing districts

[1] R. Galletti, Op. cit., p. 151.

Table 14

Distribution of net business receipts of 187 families in cocoa-producing districts of Western Nigeria (1951-1952)*

Groupings of households in terms of business receipts (pounds sterling)	Number of families	Total revenue of families (pounds sterling)	Average revenue per family (pounds sterling)	Percentage of families in total number	Percentage of receipts in total volume
Less than 20	4	33	8.1	2.1	0.1
20 to 40	18	607	33.7	9.6	2.0
40 to 60	25	1,192	47.7	13.4	4.0
60 to 80	23	1,582	68.9	12.3	5.3
80 to 100	20	1,807	90.3	10.7	6.1
100 to 120	17	1,868	109.8	9.1	6.3
120 to 140	14	1,832	131.0	7.5	6.2
140 to 160	13	1,936	149.0	7.0	6.5
160 to 180	8	1,364	170.5	4.3	4.6
180 to 200	5	952	190.4	2.7	3.2
200 to 250	11	2,362	214.5	5.9	8.0
250 to 300	13	3,501	269.5	7.0	11.8
300 to 400	6	2,125	354.2	3.2	7.2
400 to 500	4	1,797	449.3	2.1	6.1
500 to 1,000	3	1,816	605.3	1.6	6.1
1,000 to 1,500	1	1,051	1,051.1	0.5	3.5
1,500 to 2,000	1	1,735	1,735.0	0.5	5.9
2,000 and over	1	2,115	2,115.0	0.5	7.1
Total:	187	29,675	158.7	100	100

* These receipts include revenues from agriculture, commerce and non-agricultural activities. The authors have excluded receipts from wage labour, services and forestry because they were insignificant.

Source: R. Galletti, Op. cit., p. 458.

of Western Nigeria. In particular, the census carried out in 1963-1964 indicated the distribution of land among household groups that is presented in Table 16. This census included all households producing food products and excluded those which grew only cocoa. In particular the data in Table 16 show that 4.9 per cent of landowners controlled a greater volume of land than did another 40.7 per cent of the households.

In commenting on the findings of both the census of 1958-1959 and the census of 1963-1964, Rolf Güsten, who has studied the production of food crops, observes: "In

Table 15

Distribution of receipts among 187 families in cocoa-producing districts of Western Nigeria (1951-1952, aggregated groupings)

Groupings of farms in terms of size of income (pounds sterling)	Percentage of total number of families	Percentage of overall volume of income
less than 120	57.2	23.8
120-160	14.5	12.7
160-200	7.0	7.8
over 200	21.3	55.7
Total:	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on data in R. Galletti, Op. cit., p. 458.

Table 16

Distribution of land among groups of households in Western Nigeria (1963-1964)

Size of farms (acres)	Percentage of total farms	Percentage of total farm crop area
under 1.0	40.7	14.5
1.0-under 2.5	29.0	30.3
2.5-under 5.0	15.0	31.7
5.0 and more	4.9	23.3
Total:	89.6	99.8

Source: Rolf Güsten, *Studies in the Staple Food Economy of Western Nigeria*, München, 1968, p. 40.

spite of some discrepancies it follows from both surveys that 15-18 per cent of all farmers growing food crops at all command about 38-45 per cent of the food crop area. With individual food crop areas of 2.5-10 acres these should be the main sources of marketable surplus. Then there is a broad group of 30-40 per cent of the food-growing farmers

who have a food crop area which corresponds approximately to the average of Western Nigeria. To some extent, farmers belonging to this group may be expected to produce a food surplus too. Finally, there is a surprisingly large group of farmers (more than half according to one survey, nearly half according to the other) who do not have more than 1 acre of farm crops, frequently even less than half an acre."[1]

Thus, a series of census data (1951-1952, 1958-1959, 1963-1964) supports the conclusion that there existed profound economic inequality between individual household groups. Economically, Western Nigeria was the country's most developed part in those years. In 1963 agricultural exports from that region came up to more than 50 million Nigerian pounds, that is, over a third of the country's total exports (138 million Nigerian pounds). This may lead to the presumption that the data that have been cited concerning economic differentiation among the peasants of that region are not typical of the country as a whole, and that in agriculturally less developed regions the dimensions of that development were insignificant. Let us therefore consider certain materials relating to other districts of Nigeria.

In this connection the survey of a village called Batagarawa (Northern Nigeria) carried out by P. Hill, a British researcher, is of considerable interest. In order to identify the principal socio-economic layers of the peasantry she distinguishes four groups of households, namely:

"Group 1—units which were so far from suffering that they were in the position to render help to others, by gift or loan;

"Group 2—farming units which were not short of basic foodstuffs;

"Group 3—units the members of which were known to be suffering seasonal hardship over food consumption;

"Group 4—those who were suffering very severely."[2]

P. Hill's findings have shown that the average land available to the first group was 20 acres, while it was 8 acres in the case of the second group, 4 acres for the third, and 3 acres for the fourth. These findings are shown in Table 17.

[1] R. Güsten, Op. cit., p. 39.

[2] P. Hill, Op. cit., pp. 247-49.

Table 17

The distribution of land among household groups in the village of Batagarawa (Northern Nigeria). 1967

Household group	Percentage of total number of families	Percentage of total land area	Land area per person (acres)
1	10	32	2.0
2	26	32	1.4
3	44	27	0.8
4	20	9	0.6
Total:	100	100	

Note. According to P. Hill, it takes to cultivate two-thirds of an acre to meet one person's grain needs.
Source: Based on data in P. Hill, Op. cit.

Ground nuts are the staple commercial crop in the vicinity of Batagarawa. Generally, however, production for the market is not highly developed there. At the time of the survey there still existed unused lands which would have been suitable for cultivation. Only a few families did not possess land.

The economic differentiation of the peasantry in districts isolated from markets is even more obvious in the findings of a survey of three villages in Zaria Province (Northern Nigeria) carried out by D. Norman in 1966. This encompasses the village of Hanwa which is located on the outskirts of Zaria; Doka, on the main highway from Kano to Zaria and 25 miles away from the latter; and Dan Mahawayi, which is located away from roads and is cut off from the city six months each year. In each of these villages 40 households were chosen at random for the survey. D. Norman's findings are shown in Table 18.

By aggregating household groups we obtain even more persuasive data concerning economic inequality of peasant families (Table 19).

The data concerning Northern Nigeria that are presented in Tables 17, 18 and 19 show that the economic differentiation of peasant families is in fact a typical characteristic

Table 18

Grouping of 120 households in three villages in terms of the area of land occupied by each and their share in the total number of households and total land area (Northern Nigeria, 1966)

Size of holdings (acres)	Hanwa		Doka		Dan Mahawayi	
	Farmers per cent of total	Acres per cent of total	Farmers per cent of total	Acres per cent of total	Farmers per cent of total	Acres per cent of total
less than 0.25	1.56	0.02	1.3	0.03	1.07	0.02
0.25 to 0.49	3.12	0.21	1.3	0.08	5.38	0.37
0.5 to 2.49	28.12	7.8	11.69	2.73	9.68	1.7
2.5 to 4.99	18.75	10.96	19.48	8.46	20.43	8.45
5.0 to 9.99	25.0	31.40	33.76	26.8	34.41	29.28
10.0 to 24.99	23.45	49.61	29.87	48.93	21.5	31.72
25.0 to 49.99	—	—	1.3	4.93	6.46	22.48
50.0 and over	—	—	1.3	8.04	1.07	5.98
Total:	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Note. These data describe the distribution of land among groups of households within the villages themselves. Information concerning outlying households administratively related to villages was not considered in the present context and was examined by the author separately.

Source: D. W. Norman, *An Economic Study of Three Villages in Zaria Province. Land and Labour Relationships.* Zaria (Nigeria), 1967, pp. 15, 16, 17.

not only of regions in which favourable conditions exist for commercial agriculture but also of those that are isolated from markets.

Similarly, Table 20 contains data concerning the property status of peasants in Kenya. It shows that in the Kenyan village the bulk of the land is concentrated in the hands of a wealthy upper crust.

It may be seen from the data in Table 20 that over 51 per cent of owners of registered households possessed a mere 14.8 per cent of all land, while another 18.3 per cent of households possessed 58.7 per cent.

According to the data cited in *Employment, Incomes and Equality*, in the early 1970s there were approximately

Table 19

Grouping of 120 households in three villages in terms of the land area of each and the share of each within the total number of households and total land area (Northern Nigeria, 1966, aggregated groupings)

Size of holdings (acres)	Hanwa		Doka		Dan Mahawayi	
	Farmers per cent of total	Acres per cent of total	Farmers per cent of total	Acres per cent of total	Farmers per cent of total	Acres per cent of total
under 4.99	51.55	18.99	33.77	11.3	36.29	10.54
5.0 to 9.99	25.00	31.40	33.76	26.8	34.41	29.28
10 and over	23.45	49.61	32.47	61.9	29.30	60.18
Total:	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: D. W. Norman, Op. cit., pp. 16, 17.

Table 20

Size distribution of registered African small holdings in Kenya, 1969

Size (hectares)	Number of households (thousands)	Total area of households (thousands of hectares)	Percentage of total number of households	Percentage of total land area
under 0.49	91	28	11.7	1.1
0.5 to 0.99	121	89	15.5	3.4
1.0 to 1.9	192	274	24.6	10.3
2.0 to 2.9	128	303	16.4	11.4
3.0 to 4.9	104	404	13.3	15.1
5.0 to 9.9	88	629	11.3	23.8
10 and over	54	923	7.0	34.9
Total:	778	2,650	100.0	100.0

Source: Employment, Incomes and Equality. A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya, Geneva, 1972, p. 36.

300,000 families (22 per cent of the total number) in the agricultural regions of Kenya who did not possess any land, and many of them had to rent it; 620,000 families (44 per cent) received a yearly gross income of less than 60 Kenyan pounds, including the value of food crops. These families represented the village poor who were continuously compelled to seek work in other households or else migrate to cities in search of work. Nearly 250,000 owners of households (18 per cent of the families) were middle peasants who employed seasonal hired labour. Their yearly income ranged between 60 and 110 Kenyan pounds. And finally, 225,000 household owners (16 per cent of the families) represented a wealthy upper crust exploiting the non-family labour of permanent workers. The authors of the study emphasise that it is precisely the owners of these households that have gained most from the policy of creating African settlements on lands bought back from Europeans and from the registration of land holdings. In addition, there were 1,234 particularly large African-owned farms with an overall area of 0.5 million hectares.

These data, which refer to the early 1970s, generally conform to data from earlier censuses.[1] They clearly indicate that in a socio-economic sense Kenyan villages are not homogeneous. They contain both propertied and indigent strata and, inevitably, far-reaching social contradictions arise between them.

G. Hunter's well-known study entitled *The New Societies of Tropical Africa* indicates that in the coffee-producing regions of Buganda (Uganda) 2 per cent of the families in the late 1950s were large farmers, 19 per cent represented wealthy peasants, 27 per cent were middling peasants, 32 per cent were poor peasants, and 20 per cent were landless labourers.[2] In the present context the term large farmers refers to the owners of capitalist enterprises that sell from 26,400 to 44,000 pounds of coffee each year. Wealthy households are those that sell from 1,100 to 11,000 pounds of coffee on the market each year and regularly hire one or two day-labourers as well as one or two permanent workers.

[1] See *Kenya. African Agricultural Sample Census 1960/61*. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Nairobi, 1962; *Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64.*

[2] G. Hunter, Op. cit., p. 99.

In nearly all cases their owners themselves carry out part of the work. Middling households are those that sell from 200 to 1,000 pounds of coffee each year and seldom hire permanent workers. Owners of such households also work as carpenters, tailors, etc. in order to satisfy their cash needs.

Buganda is the most developed economic region of Uganda where (particularly in coffee-producing districts) economic differentiation is considerably more pronounced than it is in other regions of that country. Accordingly, the extent of differentiation among the peasants can be illustrated with particular clarity by the findings of the agricultural census of 1963-1964 that were published in 1966. These are represented in Table 21 which shows that economic differentiation among peasants is found in practically all districts within the country independently of whether they are economically developed or backward.

Table 21

Size distribution of holdings

Size of holdings (acres)	Buganda		Eastern Region		Western Region		Northern Region	
	Number of holdings, thous.	%	Number of holdings, thous.	%	Number of holdings, thous.	%	Number of holdings, thous.	%
under 1.24	28	7.9	32	8.0	40	18.3	19	9.8
1.24-2.48	49	13.7	31	7.7	27	12.4	17	8.8
2.48-4.96	126	35.3	72	17.9	51	23.4	47	24.2
4.96-7.44	72	20.2	53	13.2	32	14.7	35	18.0
7.44-9.92	33	9.2	43	10.7	19	8.7	21	10.8
9.92-12.4	24	6.7	38	9.4	15	6.9	19	9.8
12.4-24.8	19	5.3	66	16.4	22	10.1	24	12.4
over 24.8	6	1.7	67	16.7	12	5.5	12	6.2
Total:	357	100	402	100	218	100	194	100

Note. Data relating to the Toro District are not included in the findings of the census.

Source: Uganda Government. Report on Uganda Census of Agriculture, Vol. III, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Entebbe, 1966, pp. 18-19.

These data show that in all provinces there are far-reaching distinctions between households in terms of the land that they command. These differences, moreover, would be even greater if the census had analysed not land tenure but landownership, since many peasants have to rent land belonging to others.

The calculations of well-known Soviet agrarian specialist P. I. Kupriyanov based on materials from the census carried out in Ashanti (Ghana) in 1956-1957 indicate that 51 per cent of the 9,489 households that were studied produced less than 25 measures of cocoa (one measure equals 24 kilograms), while 22.6 per cent produced from 25 to 49 measures; 15.2 per cent of the households produced from 50 to 100 measures; 5.5 per cent produced from 100 to 149 measures; and 5.7 per cent of the households raised more than 150 measures. Households selling up to 25 measures of cocoa received a yearly income of nearly 100 pounds sterling.[1] B. Ingham's calculations indicate that such an income was less than the subsistence wage and that the owners of such households were never able to make ends meet (see Table 22).

The data in Table 22 show that only incomes between 100 and 125 pounds provide the subsistence wage. The preceding three groups of households with incomes less than 50 pounds, 50 to 75 pounds, and 75 to 100 pounds respectively, thus receive substantially less than the required minimum.

The far-reaching economic differentiation of cocoa producers is confirmed by a study of the village of Akokoaso that was carried by P. I. Kupriyanov. He established the share of output produced by the particular groups of households that he identified as well as differences between households in terms of the quantity of cocoa-beans that they produced (see Table 23).

On the basis of the data shown in Table 23, P. I. Kupriyanov concludes that there does exist a substantial differentiation between peasants in the village of Akokoaso. "Households growing up to 20 measures constituted 68.1 per cent of the total number of households but yielded only 21.3 per cent of all output; those that produced from 20 to 50 measures constituted 23.1 per cent of the total number of households and yielded 33.6 per cent. Similarly, households pro-

[1] P. I. Kupriyanov, Op. cit., p. 63,

Table 22

Income and expenditures of 1,600 cocoa-producing households in Ashanti, Ghana, 1956-1957 (pounds sterling)

Net earned income class	Estimated average net earned income (year as a whole)	Estimated average expenditure on consumer goods and services (year as a whole)
Under 50	40	80
50-75	74	92
75-100	98	115
100-125	123.5	123
125-150	151	127
150-175	178.5	139
175-200	199	150
200-250	242	157
250-300	294	171
300-350	347	180
350-400	391	181
400-500	470	216

Note. The net income is equal to the gross income minus such current expenditure as payments for wages, fertilisers, etc.

Source: Barbara M. Ingham, "Ghana Cocoa Farmers—Income, Expenditure Relationships", *The Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, April 1973, p. 367.

ducing from 50 to 99 measures accounted for 6.3 per cent of households and yielded 19.7 per cent of total output, while households producing more than 100 measures made up a mere 2.5 per cent of the households and yielded 25.4 per cent of total output. Actually 7 large households produced more output than 195 small ones."[1]

Such a far-reaching economic differentiation is not confined to cocoa-producing households. In this connection P. Hill, who has devoted many years to the study of these problems, observes: "This key feature of inequality rather than uniformity in the distribution of wealth is not unique

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

Table 23

Distribution of households in the village of Akokoaso in terms of output, 1961-1962

Groupings of households in terms of production of cocoa-beans (measures)	Number of households	Percentage of group's households in relation to total number of households in the village	Volume of group's output (measures)	Percentage of group's output in relation to total output of the village
Under 10	143	50.0	608	9.6
20	52	18.1	740	11.7
30	30	10.4	724	11.5
40	21	7.4	731	11.6
50	15	5.2	658	10.5
60	6	2.1	324	5.2
70	4	1.4	260	4.1
80	4	1.4	295	4.7
90	2	0.7	170	2.7
100	2	0.7	191	3.0
150	3	1.1	393	6.3
200	2	0.7	351	5.6
300	1	0.4	278	4.4
600	1	0.4	574	9.1
Total:	286	100.0	6,297	100.0

Source: P. I. Kupriyanov, Op. cit., p. 64.

to cocoa but is a fairly prevalent feature in West African indigenous economies."[1]

In a study entitled *The Development of Capitalism in African Villages of Rhodesia and Zambia* the present author carried out calculations describing the economic differentiation of peasant families.[2] They were based on survey data gathered by staff members of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and by Northern Rhodesia's Department of Agriculture and were related to peasant households. The reader

[1] P. Hill, *Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa*, Cambridge, 1970, pp. XIX-XX.

[2] Y. M. Ivanov, *The Development of Capitalism in African Villages of Rhodesia and Zambia*, Moscow, 1970 (in Russian).

may be interested in the indices describing the distribution of land and plows among individual categories of peasants in the Mazabuka District in 1945. At that time this was a district with the best-developed commercial agriculture (see Table 24).

Since hoes in the Mazabuka District were almost completely displaced by plows, and since the latter constituted a necessary condition for operating a household, the use of plows and the availability of draft animals were selected as a basis of these calculations. Accordingly, those households which did not possess plows or draft animals and that had to obtain them from owners of wealthy households were listed under the category of landless or land-starved peasants. Those possessing one plow as well as some draft animals were listed under the category of middle peasants, while the remainder were listed as wealthy peasants.

Table 24

Distribution of plows as a function of the wealth of peasant households (Northern Rhodesia, Mazabuka District, 1945)

Category of peasants	Number of families	Percentage of families	Number of plows	Percentage of plows
Landless and land-starved peasants*	8,700	51.2	2,900	20
Middle peasants	4,350	25.6	4,350	30
Wealthy peasants	3,950	23.2	7,064	50
Total:	17,000	100	14,314	100

* Families temporarily absent from villages as migrant labourers were not included.

Source: Y. M. Ivanov, Op. cit., p. 67.
Calculations are by the author and are based on *Land Holding and Land Usage Among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District. A Reconnaissance Survey, 1945*, London, 1948.

My book on Rhodesia and Zambia also contains calculations relating to the distribution of land sown to millet

in 13 villages of the Lala tribe. They were based on surveys carried out by D. Peters, of the Northern Rhodesian Department of Agriculture, in the Serenje District, where subsistence farming prevailed.[1] These calculations showed that 10 per cent of household owners controlled more land under millet than another 60 per cent of the households. Since in that particular district millet represents the staple food crop, these data did point to a differentiation of peasants of the Lala tribe, even though the data of D. Peters did not make it possible to establish the distribution of land devoted to vegetable gardens among individual groups of peasants.

A survey of African households was carried out in the Central Region of Malawi in 1965. Its findings indicate that substantial differences exist in the distribution of incomes among different groups of households.[2]

Cash income (in Malawi pounds)	Percentage of households
0	21
under 1	17
1-2.99	21
3-14.99	24
15 and over, including 75	17

The data that follow describe the distribution of cash incomes among groups of households in the Lilongwe District. This is the district in the Central Region of Malawi in which commercial agriculture is most developed.[3]

Cash income (in Malawi pounds)	Percentage of households
0	12
under 1	14
1-4.99	32
5-14.99	23
15 and over, including 75	19

In Senegal census data of 1960-1961 indicate that 40,700 households, each possessing more than 7 hectares,

[1] See Y. M. Ivanov, Op. cit., p. 69. The calculations were based on data published in D. Peters, *Land Usage in Serenje District*, London, 1950.

[2] *A Sample Survey of Agricultural Smallholdings in the Central Region of Malawi. March-May 1965*, Zomba, 1966, p. 19.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

controlled 43 per cent of the arable land, while 127,000 households, each possessing less than 2 hectares, controlled only 12 per cent of the land in use. Noteworthily, 2,800 households, each possessing more than 17 hectares, controlled twice as much land as did the households of 63,500 poorest peasants.[1]

Similarly, large property distinctions exist among peasant families on the Ivory Coast. According to data cited in a study of Y. N. Vinokurov, a Soviet specialist on Africa, 7.9 per cent of all peasants in the region of the town of Beumi possessed plots of less than a hectare and controlled only 2 per cent of the land in use (they are classified as extremely poor peasants); poor peasants possessing plots of 1 to 3 hectares (57.9 per cent of all peasants) controlled 34.7 per cent; middle peasants possessing holdings of 4 to 8 hectares (27.7 per cent of all peasants) controlled 41.6 per cent of all land in use; and finally, large plantations of more than 8 hectares were in the hands of 6.5 per cent of the peasants and accounted for 21.7 per cent of all cultivated land.[2]

Other data confirming the economic differentiation of peasants are cited in the afore-mentioned collection of studies by West German researchers entitled *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*. They reveal a large concentration of land, cattle and incomes in wealthy households. In particular, data provided by Manfred Attems relating to the Lushoto District, where three counties were surveyed, namely Soni (where 60 per cent of production in peasant households is for sale), Bumbuli (15 per cent) and Mulungui (14 per cent), indicated that approximately one-third of the families possessed two-thirds of the land in use. At the same time a third of peasant families listed as poor (with holdings of less than 1.2 acres) controlled less than 15 per cent of arable land.[3] Differences in the level of income

[1] See V. B. Iordansky, *The Blind Alleys and Prospects of Tropical Africa*, Moscow, 1970, p. 133 (in Russian).

[2] Y. N. Vinokurov, "The Problem of Agrarian Relations in Villages of the Ivory Coast (Types of Hired Labour in the African Sector of Agriculture and Their Evolution)", *The History of Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Moscow, 1972, p. 40 (in Russian).

[3] M. Attems' data concerning the distribution of cultivated land among household groups in the Lushoto District are confirmed by the observations of E. Winans of the University of California, who indicates that in that particular district 50 per cent of the households possess up to 2 acres.—Edgar V. Winans, *Shambala. The Constitution of a Traditional State*, Berkeley, 1962, p. 145.

were still greater. Thus 20 per cent of all the families received 50 per cent of all incomes, while 60 per cent of all families accounted for only 25 per cent. There was also an obvious connection between the family income and the size of land holdings. Families with holdings of less than one acre received an average income of 370 shillings, those with 1 to 2.5 acres received 1,320 shillings, and those with more than 5 acres received 4,000 shillings.[1]

According to the findings of Dietrich von Rotenhan, one-third of the families living in Sukumaland control two-thirds of the land in use. The concentration of cattle in that region, moreover, is still greater, with 13 per cent of the farmers owning half the livestock.[2] The surveys carried out by D. von Rotenhan have also shown that as commercial agriculture grows, so does the average size of land holdings. In particular, the shares of marketable output within the gross product of farms in the districts of Shinyanga, Ukerewe and Kwimba were 60, 46 and 45 per cent respectively, while the average size of land per farm was 8.1 acres in Shinyanga, 6.1 acres in Ukerewe and 5.7 acres in Kwimba.[3] Apparently this relationship is explained by the fact that in those districts where commercial agriculture is more developed there is a larger concentration of land among wealthy households, on the one hand, and a larger number of landless peasants, on the other. In those districts where commercial agriculture is practically absent or else is poorly developed, the village poor can retain modest holdings by bringing the communities' unoccupied lands into use. As a result the average size of land area per household is reduced.

In a coffee-producing area of the Bukoba District some 30 per cent of the households with the greatest incomes received 60 per cent of total incomes, while 30 per cent of the households with the lowest incomes received only some 20 per cent. A survey of 120 farms has shown that while their average gross income was 1,645 shillings, more than a quarter of the farms earned less than 900 shillings and nearly 10 per cent received more than 3,000 shillings. The dependence of the gross incomes of farms in that district on the size of farms is also indicative. The data in Table 25 show that as the size of households increases so do the incomes of their owners.

Table 25

Family incomes according to farm sizes
(Bukoba, 1964-1965)

Cultivated area (in acres)	Full-time farms without cattle (shs)	Full-time farms with cattle (shs)
Under 1	662	892
1-2	928	1,247
2-3	1,294	1,567
3-4	1,713	1,230
4-5	1,260	2,515
5-6	2,066	2,513
6 and over	2,272	3,020

Note. Only those farms were included whose owners were not employed outside agriculture.
Source: Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania, p. 203.

In 1964-65, S. Groenveld carried out a survey of peasant households in the Tanga District, where coconuts are the staple cash crop. According to his observations "there are essential differences to be found between the two villages studied as well as within the individual villages themselves. Approximately half the holdings realized gross returns under 900/- and a quarter of the holdings achieved returns between 900/- and 1,800/-. The great differentiation between the returns of holdings within one village is apparently a common characteristic of East African farming."[1]

[1] *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, p. 159.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56. This relationship is also confirmed by the findings of a survey carried out by P. Gulliver in the Rungwe District, where the average holding was roughly 3 acres in villages growing rice for sale. In those areas within the district in which market-oriented production practically did not exist the average size of land per household was only 1.3 acres. See P. Gulliver, *Land Tenure and Social Change Among the Nyakyusa. An Essay in Applied Anthropology in South-West Tanganyika*, Kampala, 1958. Thus with certain reservations the size of an average land holding may be employed to describe the level of development of commercial agriculture.

[1] *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, p. 229.

In summarising the findings of the surveys that were published in the collection entitled *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, H. Ruthenberg emphasised that approximately one-third of the households received over two-thirds of the incomes of the rural population. He concluded that "the smaller the holding the smaller is the scope for cash production with crops yielding high return per acre".[1]

The data concerning economic inequality that have been cited indicate that a continuous process of differentiation is under way among the peasants of Tropical Africa. This process is a direct consequence of exploitation of the working masses in the villages by capital. These conclusions do not agree with those studies by bourgeois researchers which allege that in Tropical Africa processes of differentiation among peasantry are only beginning to develop, that they have mainly encompassed districts with commercial agriculture and have not yet affected most of the peasants who continue to "preserve the traditions of tribal help and mutual assistance". Regardless of the authors' subjective wishes, such studies veil the class contradictions in the African village which are becoming ever more pronounced as capitalism penetrates African farming. Instead of conveying the actual facts based on the findings of numerous census activities and surveys, such studies produce the illusion of an idyllic patriarchal situation which in reality has long ceased to exist.

At the same time the accumulation of comprehensive statistical data concerning deep differences in ownership among African households is causing bourgeois researchers to alter the methodological foundations of theories that deny the presence of class differentiation in villages of Tropical Africa. In this respect an article by Professor Manuel Gottlieb of the University of Wisconsin on differentiation in Tanzanian agricultural and rural society is quite representative.[2] The author does not deny the economic inequalities in villages of mainland Tanzania. In his studies he relies on the

[1] *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, p. 335.

[2] Manuel Gottlieb, "The Extent and Character of Differentiation in Tanzanian Agricultural and Rural Society 1967-1969", *The African Review*. A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs, Dar es Salaam, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1973, pp. 241-61.

findings of a survey of 30,000 households that was carried out by Tanzanian government agencies. All these households were divided into three groups in terms of their cash income, namely: households whose income was less than 500 shillings; those with incomes ranging between 500 and 1,499 shillings; and, finally, those whose income was 1,500 shillings and over.[1] M. Gottlieb feels that in spite of certain shortcomings this survey has provided more reliable statistical data than have "private observations individually made in field work or in casual travels or intensive surveys in particular localities".[2]

The author concludes that the economic differentiation discovered in the survey "indicates only a limited process of social differentiation or class stratification".[3] In support of this assertion he points to a number of circumstances and particularly to the fact that the number of capitalist farmers is limited. According to his calculations only 13,400 African households in mainland Tanzania employ hired labourers who total merely 16,000 persons. He also argues that the existence of classical landlord types is mainly confined to the area of Bukoba; he feels that the latter is "very unrepresentative of Tanzanian rural life which is founded upon a broad distribution of communal tenure in the basic wealth of the country, its farm lands, its grazing fields, water holes and streams, and a strong urge to provide mutual help and assistance among kinfolk and relatives who are important sources of work assistance, of housing and of loans".[4]

Indeed, there are relatively few households in villages of Tropical Africa that are based on hired labour, and agriculture based on large estates has not developed widely. This does not mean, however, that there are no classes or deep social antagonisms within African rural society. It merely shows, moreover, that the criteria selected on the basis of studies of the late medieval and early capitalist stages of development of Europe are not always justified in the context of Tropical Africa, with its unique features that influence the establishment of capitalism here.

The following example illustrates how important it is to consider the specific features of social processes in the

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 242.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 244.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 257.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 259.

continent's Tropical Belt. Basing his argument on the fact that there is normally no discrimination in the distribution of material goods among members of a family in industrial societies, M. Gottlieb has sought to establish the value of average spending on family members in the higher, middle and lower groups of households. It was found that the groups did not differ greatly, the corresponding figures being 93, 89 and 66 shillings, respectively.[1] Moreover, he notes, the differences would have been even smaller if these groups had received incomes exclusively from agriculture.

While such an approach is fully justified in studies of consumer spending of an American family, it is not applicable to extended African families. This is because the particular extended-family relations that developed as a result of the disintegration of tribal relations are far from being of the idyllic type that is frequently ascribed to them. Among land-cultivating peoples, only the head of an extended family has the ultimate control of the use of land. In the words of Edgar Winans, "the control of land is conceived as the heart of familial authority".[2] Each wife of a family head receives a holding on which she works together with her children, subsisting on the crops that are gathered in this way. Frequently other household members are allotted land in a similar manner. The head of an extended family has his own separate field which is worked by his wives, children and other household members. Crops that are gathered from that field are stored separately in his own storehouse and disposed of at his will. In addition, household members offer him "contributions" in terms of the products of their work within their own households. Aside from this he usually disposes of the cattle for which his children care.

All these duties of household members in fact constitute forms of corvée and product rents, and this points to the exploitative foundations of cooperation within extended families. This aspect was already noted by Karl Marx. In analysing relations within extended families he stressed that "the *modern* family contains in embryo not only slavery ... but serfdom also, since from the very beginning it is connected with agricultural services. It contains within itself in *miniature* all the antagonisms which later develop on a wide scale within society and its state."[1]

Thus in the case of African villages exploitative relations and economic inequality already emerge within the framework of family cooperation. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to apply an average indicator of consumer expenditures per family member in dealing with the issue of social differentiation within the peasantry. The methodology proposed by M. Gottlieb amounts to an attempt to relate new statistical data to clearly obsolete theoretical propositions concerning the domination of an idyllic patriarchal society in villages at a time when even non-Marxist scholars are increasingly critical of such conceptions.

In our own view it is not possible to identify the social structure and class contradictions of African villages without considering those factors that determine the specific traits of agrarian structure.

It may be seen from the statistical data presented above that in the vast majority of regions in Africa the link between direct producer and the means of production can no longer impede the development of capitalism in agriculture. In order to meet their minimal vital requirements a substantial number of peasants have to work for persons who exploit them. At the same time this does not mean that capitalist relations have become dominant in African villages. The specific features marking the establishment of capitalism in African villages derive precisely from the fact that in spite of a far-reaching economic differentiation among peasants and a large concentration of means of production and of income in the hands of wealthy peasants, means of production are generally associated with the direct producers in a feudal or semi-feudal rather than capitalist form. In the setting of imperialist exploitation, the commercialisation of African agriculture has not entailed an abolition of the pre-capitalist social and technical foundations of the agrarian structure. This has facilitated the survival of feudal methods of exploitation. As a result, the social struc-

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[1] Manuel Gottlieb, Op. cit., p. 254.

[2] *The Family Estate in Africa. Studies in the Role of Property in Family Structure and Lineage Continuity*, ed. by R. F. Gray and P. H. Gulliver, London, 1964, p. 49.

[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1976, p. 234.

ture of the African village and its developing class contradictions have a number of specific features that did not exist in Europe at the time of the establishment of capitalism.

The Village Proletariat and Poor Peasants

The process by which individual families lose their land and become paupers is much more rapid than the process by which a proletariat is formed, and that is one of the key features of social structure in the African village. In Egypt on the eve of the revolution of 1952, for example, nearly two million households (i.e. three-fourths of all peasant families) were fully expropriated or else were gradually being ruined. Yet there were not more than 560,000 persons engaged in capitalist agricultural production. Most of the others continued to engage in "dwarf-size" agriculture or else joined the ranks of paupers, occasional labourers, and unpaid members of families.[1]

The process by which displaced peasants become proletarians is even slower in Tropical Africa. Thus, H. Oluwasanmi writes that "very few Nigerian farms employ permanent labour and in the cocoa-producing areas such labour was found to constitute only 9.8 per cent of occupied males in the survey area".[2] Similarly, in the case of Uganda some of the estimates indicate that in the early 1960s there were only 80,000 hired labourers working in African households.[3] In the case of Zambia data based on the 1963 census of the population indicate that only 41,000 permanent workers were employed by African entrepreneurs (largely in agriculture).[4] In Ghana, the capitalist use of hired labour continues to be quite limited, even in cocoa-producing regions. Speaking of these regions, P. Hill notes that "labour employment is not the crux of the matter: many capitalist farmers who, over the generations, have been accustomed to invest their

[1] Calculated on the basis of data provided by L. A. Fridman, Op. cit., pp. 238-39, 243.

[2] H. Oluwasanmi, *Agriculture and Nigerian Economic Development*, Ibadan, 1966, p. 76.

[3] H. Mettrick, *Aid in Uganda Agriculture*, London, 1967, p. 11.

[4] S. I. Kuznetsova, "Population Censuses as a Source for Identifying the Social Structure of Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1966, p. 152.

surpluses in the expansion of their business have never employed labourers".[1] On the Ivory Coast the use of hired labour is also limited (there were 90,000 agricultural workers in the early 1960s)[2] even though African commercial agriculture is well developed. Similarly, census data indicate that in the case of the Central Province of Kenya in 1963-1964 hired labour accounted for only 5 per cent of labour expenditure in African households.[3] Yet it was precisely in that province that households producing for the market were concentrated.

It may seem that these data regarding the limited character of the utilisation of hired labour do not agree with prevailing views concerning agrarian relations in the African village. Thus, in mainland Tanzania where, according to H. Ruthenberg, there are only a few export crops yielding incomes that barely exceed expenditures involved in the hiring of seasonal labour, the number of hired labourers during the harvest period is officially estimated at 500,000.[4] It would seem that such an estimate does not agree with the assertion of M. Gottlieb, for example, that in mainland Tanzania only 16,000 hired labourers work in African households.[5] Actually this is not the case. For the first reference

[1] P. Hill, *Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana*, Cambridge, 1963, p. 187.

[2] A. A. Onokhov, "Agrarian Relations and Government Policy in the Ivory Coast Republic", *Africa's Economy*, Moscow, 1965, p. 87 (in Russian).

[3] *Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64.*

[4] *The United Republic of Tanzania. Employment and Earnings 1967*, Dar es Salaam, 1968, p. 3.

[5] M. Gottlieb's calculations are confirmed by the observations of West German researchers. Their data indicate that in Sukumaland, which is the country's principal cotton-producing area, the hiring of labour is still viewed as a serious violation of traditions, although this does not apply to seasonal work and day-labour. In the coffee-producing areas of the Bukoba District in the mid-1960s only 6 per cent of labour expenditures were contributed by hired labour. In the Lushoto District, in an area with developed commercial agriculture, the corresponding figure was 20 per cent, while in areas with subsistence farming hired labour was absent altogether. See Hans Ruthenberg, *Agricultural Development in Tanganyika*, Berlin (West), 1964, p. 35; also *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, pp. 156, 198. Later we will show that even these modest estimates of the number of hired workers are in fact frequently exaggerated. This is because labourers who work on a yearly basis within African households and who are frequently counted as wage-workers are normally paid in kind.

relates to the total number of hired workers, including seasonal workers, while the second only refers to permanent workers in this category. A comparison of these indicators shows that hired labour is largely of a seasonal type. Since extensive agriculture calls for large labour expenditures within short periods of time, wealthy households usually experience an acute shortage of manpower that permanent workers, who are exploited primarily through patriarchal-feudal methods, are not able to meet. Accordingly, the owners of these households have to hire seasonal workers, in spite of the substantial expenditures that this entails. Collisions that arise in the process have been described by J. de Wilde: "While there are densely populated areas where labor is redundant, the available farm labor supply over much of Tropical Africa is often unable to cope with the workload at certain times of the year. This accounts in considerable measure for the apparently slipshod and hurried methods of tillage, planting and weeding which so strike the outside observer."[1] Thus while the market has added a stimulus to increased commodity production by wealthy households, the absence of an adequate material and technical base continues to hinder the development of capitalism.

It has already been noted that in African villages hired labour is largely of a seasonal type. Frequently, the hiring of seasonal labour is more expensive in terms of daily payments than is the hiring of a permanent worker. Workers who receive a monthly wage frequently get a much lower remuneration (expressed in terms of payments per day) than that for seasonal workers. In the case of Malawi, for example, data provided by W. Chipeta indicate that in 1968-1969 workers hired on a daily basis by African households usually received two shillings per day while those paid on a monthly basis received merely 36 shillings a month.[2]

At harvest time when the need for labour is especially great, landowners often agree low payment rates among themselves. In this connection J. de Wilde observes that "in recent years there appears to have been a growing shortage of casual labor for picking, at least at the low rates of pay that had prevailed. Thus in Mathira Division we were told that in 1963 farmers had paid up to Sh 2 per debi (35 lbs) for coffee picking in the competition for workers and that the coffee cooperative had accordingly passed a ruling that no member should pay more than Sh 0.85 per debi."[1]

Often seasonal workers and day-labourers are young unmarried men who do not have their own households and have to subsist in this manner. L. Mayr notes that "much of the work done is of the odd-job type, a day or two for a number of different employers in turn. Sometimes the labourers work simply for their food, at other times a payment for a fixed task, such as an area of land to be cleared, is agreed on after hard bargaining. This kind of work appeals mainly to young unmarried men...."[2]

An important indicator of the limited use of hired labour in regions of commercial agriculture in the countries of Tropical Africa is provided by the fact that permanent hired workers in peasant households are largely migrants from other regions. L. Mayr observes that "in agricultural societies where wage labour is a new development it is unusual for people to work for wages in their own homes.... The labour employment for wages is drawn largely from areas outside the village where they are employed, and often from different peoples."[3]

At first it may appear that the main reason for this lies in the Africans' attachment to tradition. In reality, however, there are primarily economic motives behind this, even though traditions do play a definite role. The fact of the matter is that in a situation where it is not advantageous or else not possible to hire labour on a capitalist basis the upper crust in the villages prefer to exploit the poor through pre-capitalist methods. And it is more convenient to exploit members of their own community than migrants from the outside since local people are related to wealthy landowners by blood, and this fact traditionally provides for duties on the part of the poor relative towards the wealthy one. It is more difficult for a community member than it is for a migrant worker to enter into long-term obligations, since he is

[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 23.
[2] See W. Chipeta, "The Nature and Significance of Resources Used in Malawian Peasant Agriculture", *Africa Quarterly*, New Delhi, 1972, Vol. XI, No. 4, p. 312.

[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 43.
[2] L. Mayr, *New Nations*, Chicago, 1963, p. 43.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

already bound by many fettering duties compelling him to work for wealthy households.

The relatively large production costs in wealthy households that are associated with the exploitation of hired labour are not attributable to a high level of wage payment. On the contrary, wages are extremely low. In the villages wage rates are lower than in large capitalist enterprises. This fact has been noted by many observers. In particular, the collection entitled *Government and Economic Development* emphasises that "the small-scale, indigenous entrepreneur generally pays lower wages than a large-scale modern firm".[1] This is true of both industry and agriculture. In the case of Cameroon, "non-recorded wages and earnings are substantially lower and—especially for farm labour—are paid mainly in kind and are based on more irregular employment",[2] says R. Green.

Until now very few African countries have extended minimal-wage legislation to the villages. In this connection Uganda's Minimum Wages Advisory Board emphasised that a minimum rural wage might "increase unemployment among the 85,000 workers who are employed by small-scale farmers, who ... may not be able to afford a regular minimum wage".[3]

Direct comparisons of wage payments in peasant households and large agricultural enterprises are generally inaccurate because of differences in the length of the working day. Accordingly, those calculations are more accurate which are based on hourly payments. For example, in the Bukoba District (Tanzania) in 1964 payment per hour in peasant households was 0.31 shillings,[4] while the average monthly wage rate at registered agricultural enterprises was 118 shillings.[5] Since the working week at such enterprises

[1] *Government and Economic Development*, ed. by G. Rains, New Haven, London, 1971, p. 120.

[2] *The Economies of Africa*, ed. by R. Robson and D. Lurry, Evanston, 1969, p. 279.

[3] International Institute for Labour Studies. East African Seminar on Labour Problems in Economic Development. Working Paper No. 1, *Labour Problems in the Economic and Social Development of Uganda*, 1967, p. 7.

[4] *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*. p. 184.

[5] *The United Republic of Tanzania. Statistical Abstract*, Dar es Salaam, 1966, p. 160.

was 36 hours and the calendar month includes roughly 4.3 weeks, it may be inferred that the wage paid per hour at registered enterprises approximated 0.76 shillings, i.e. more than twice the amount paid in peasant households.

Even though wage payments are low, hired labour in African peasant households does not often create surplus value. Its capitalist utilisation is still largely limited to such sectors as the production of coffee, tobacco, and tea, and it has already been noted that in these sectors pre-capitalist methods of exploitation are still widely employed.

A certain notion of the actual boundaries within which capitalist hired labour is employed in typical regions of commercial agriculture in Tropical Africa is provided by J. de Wilde's estimate for the Nyeri District in Kenya in the mid-1960s. Noting the size of areas in which coffee and tea are grown, and assuming that the working year of one worker averages 2,000 hours, he concluded that the utilisation of hired labour in the production of these crops is equivalent to a yearly labour input of 7,900 workers. His calculations also indicate that 375 hired persons may be employed in productive stock-breeding during the year. In his view the number of permanent hired workers in that sector would be 8,600 persons at most.

At the same time the author recognises that his estimate may in fact be exaggerated since it is based on surveys of households in which hired labour was used on a larger scale than is normally the case. Nevertheless, he finds that even if his data should be corrected by a factor of two, the actual number of hired workers remains substantial, since hired labour is largely of the seasonal type.[1]

If one notes, however, that in the Nyeri District there were more than 6,000 landless peasants in the mid-1960s and more than 19,000 land-starved peasants who were not able to subsist on an area smaller than three acres, these data indicate that capitalist forms of labour hiring could not yet become the major source of existence for the village poor.

The disparity between the very widespread bankruptcy among peasants and the limited scale of hired labour as a primary source of livelihood for the village poor is highly characteristic of the African village. As a rule, even the

[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 56.

partial use of hired labour is limited almost exclusively to market-oriented production and is almost completely absent in the subsistence households, which play a large role in agriculture.

In the case of African villages, three types of hiring may be distinguished. First, there is the hiring of more or less permanent workers who receive a monthly wage payment. The second category includes persons working on a daily basis. And finally, there are persons carrying out specific tasks in return for either money or a share of the crop. The last two categories of hired labour are employed on a particularly large scale during the harvesting season. The forms of payment, moreover, whether it is on a daily basis or in return for specific tasks, is determined primarily by the nature of the work being carried out. In this connection B. E. Rourke and S. K. Sakyi-Gyinae observe that "for work that can be fairly clearly specified and measured, the employer is likely to prefer a specific contract to avoid the necessity of constant supervision. If the work requires careful supervision in any case, by-day payments are likely to be made. Thus clearing, making of yam mounds, and weeding are frequently done by contract, whereas harvesting is normally done on a by-day basis."[1] It should be added that frequently payments are made on the basis of output even during harvests. Such forms of payment are used in Ghana, for example, in the harvesting of cocoa.

The payment of seasonal workers is not always made immediately after they complete their work. Frequently owners of households seek to postpone it until sale of the harvest. R. Galletti notes that in a locality called Ibesse it is still the practice for labourers to go home without pay, and then return several months later to receive their wages.[2] This means that advance payment is postponed. This is possible, however, only because the hired labourers in such cases are not persons who are completely deprived of means of production, but impoverished peasants who possess other means of livelihood in addition to wages. Such relations also presuppose a continuation of more or less stable relations

[1] B. E. Rourke and S. K. Sakyi-Gyinae, "Agricultural and Urban Wage Rates in Ghana", *Economic Bulletin of Ghana*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1972, p. 9.

[2] R. Galletti, Op. cit., p. 210.

between the owners of means of production and the person selling his labour.

In fact, such relations are a form of labour services characteristic of feudal relations rather than a form of hired labour in which labour power is sold at its value. In this connection Lenin has noted that "labour service is the economic essence of the serf system. In capitalist society, a man who has no means has to sell his labour-power in order to buy the means of subsistence. In feudal society, a man who has no means has to perform labour service in return for the means of subsistence he receives from his lord."[1]

A specific feature of the form of labour services that we are analysing is that the landowner does not force the peasant to produce the means of livelihood on his own land holding and instead "gives the worker the means of subsistence *in kind*".[2] This, however, does not alter the essence of these social relations in spite of the fact that, superficially, they remind one of labour hiring.[3]

One of the major conditions for the survival of labour services in return for food payments is a low level of development of commodity-money relations in the African village. This ensures the owners of land a monopoly on food which frequently makes it possible to exploit direct producers through feudal methods.

Such forms of labour services are by no means always short in duration. They can be associated with lasting relationships under which the owners of means of production do not pay their labourers in advance. In old Algerian villages, for example, there existed a special category of workers called family helpers. In return for a bowl of soup and several rolls of barley bread these helpers carried out the most unpleasant and difficult kinds of work. They cleaned out stables, washed laundry, cut bushes, and dug wells. Another form of such labour services is the labour of yearly migrant labourers in

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 482.

[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. 16, p. 435.

[3] Such labour services may indeed be transformed into genuine hiring when labourers receiving payment in kind sell their product on the market and employ the money they receive to purchase the means of livelihood that they require. In such cases the product received from the landowner becomes a wage in kind as is the case with seasonal workers employed in harvesting in cocoa-producing regions and paid on the basis of their output. See *Agricultural Workers in Asian and African Countries*, Moscow, 1969, p. 169 (in Russian).

return for which the owner of land provides them with food, housing, and clothing and also adds cash payment at the end of the year. The fact that cash payment is made in such cases indicates that developing market contacts cause such relationships to lose their original form peculiar to subsistence farming.

Available studies indicate that lengthy labour services by which the landowner compensates the worker *in kind* only with means of livelihood produced within his own household have become rare even where their form has remained the same. This is because the direct producers need commodities available on markets. Such relations are therefore generally anachronistic. They continue to exist largely because of the fact that in conditions where market relations exist, the use of hired labour often continues to be uneconomical since pre-capitalist methods of exploitation still remain competitive.

At the same time, since relationships based on the hiring of labour may not have a capitalist character even in the case of production for the market, there frequently develops a combination of purchase and sale of labour power, on the one hand, and pre-capitalist relations, on the other, as when hired workers receive food from their manager in addition to cash payments, for example. Such combinations of wage labour with labour services are widely employed in most regions of commercial agriculture. They represent one of the major reasons why low cash payments continue to exist.

Another way in which hired labour may be combined with labour services are those cases in which the worker receiving monetary wages is also given land. Before the revolution in Egypt, for example, workers often "received 1 or 1.5 feddans as rented land for which the rental payment was somewhat reduced in order to induce the migrant workers to work the holdings better and to retain them within the estate. The migrant worker and his family were then obliged to work a specified number of days and the wages that were then due were subtracted from his own rental payments.... Other forms of assigning land and effecting payments in kind were also practised. For example, permanent workers received the maize harvest from one feddan but its value was subtracted from his wage payments."[1]

[1] L. A. Fridman, Op. cit., p. 247.

Frequently pre-capitalist relations in African villages are not only combined with hired labour but also exist autonomously in forms that do not depend on the latter. One of them concerns labour services in return for land. Thus in Gambia immigrants from Senegal are often given housing and a plot of land in regions of ground-nut production. In return they are usually required to work four days a week for the landowner.[1]

In the case of Western Europe, the providing of labour services in return for access to land was practised with peasants possessing draft animals and implements. Accordingly, as Lenin noted, this practice was primarily based on the exploitation of middle peasants. A different situation has emerged in Africa, where the landowner himself often provides the peasants with equipment, or else the labourer works with his own modest tools, such as a hoe or an axe. Such labour services constitute one of the typical forms of exploiting the village poor.

It should also be noted that in addition to corvée rent share-cropping rent in kind is also widely employed in Africa.

V. Dmitriev, a Soviet researcher, noted that before the revolution in Algeria a person working in return for a share of the product (*khammès*) usually rented his services to landlords and wealthy local peasants under an arrangement which gave him draft animals and implements for working the land, as well as seeds. He was required to repay this by cultivating a land holding of 20 hectares in the lowlands, or else 10 hectares in the mountains. As a result he usually received one-fifth of the harvest, but if he made use of the owner's housing or water, or had received an advance payment in grain pending the next harvest, then his share was reduced to one-seventh or one-eighth of the harvest, from which loans made to the *khammès* were then also subtracted.[2]

In West Africa rental payments in the form of share-cropping are practised especially widely in coffee- and cocoa-producing regions. In this connection it is interesting to read P. Hill's description of the transition from labour services to share-cropping rental payments in kind and then

[1] See *A Review of Rural Cooperation in Developing Areas*, Geneva, May 1969, p. 213.

[2] *Agricultural Workers in the Countries of Asia and Africa*, p. 170.

to hired labour in Ghana's cocoa-growing regions. "On his first employment the labourer might be entitled to 'use' all the cocoa he plucked from the young farm on condition that he assisted the farmer in establishing new cocoa farms—which, later on, he would have a right to harvest. As the yield of this original farm increased the proportion of the crop to which he was entitled fell to 1/3—the traditional abusa share. Later on still, perhaps 7 to 10 years after his first employment, he might (especially if he had not been concerned with the original establishment of the farm in question) be transformed to a nkotokuano basis, receiving a certain sum of money for each load of cocoa he plucked, a sum always less than 1/3 of the value of cocoa."[1]

In many African countries, share-croppers are frequently immigrants from other countries and districts. Yet this does not mean that they could not afford to purchase land for permanent use. Even in the early 1950s it was relatively easy to acquire land in regions of commercial agriculture in Uganda. This is indicated by interviews of migrants in 1950-1951 who settled in Buganda after they had worked there as hired labour. These interviews have shown that 16 of them acquired land after one year, 24 after one to five years i16 after five to ten years, and six of them purchased land after 10 years in Buganda. Some of them acquired land immediately after arriving in that region.[2] The scale on which migrants settled may be judged from the fact that the proportion of landless migrant workers in the Busiro area and in Kyagwe was only 22.6 per cent, and only in Buddu did it reach 44.2 per cent.[3] The remaining migrants either owned land or else rented it.

Today it is far more difficult for migrants to settle than it was in the 1950s. Even when incomes from agriculture fell because of adverse developments on the world capitalist market, land prices continued to rise because of the growing demand. Referring to Buganda, D. A. Hougham has observed that "land prices in the main coffee zone seem to have doubled every ten years, a trend that has continued into the

[1] P. Hill, *Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana*, p. 188.

[2] See *Economic Development and Tribal Change. A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, p. 137.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

1960s despite falls in the coffee price".[1] As land prices increase, so do rental payments. Landowners require, moreover, that peasants renting land contribute an initial payment. In the more developed economic regions of Buganda this payment may amount to 300 shillings. As for lands that are still unoccupied, even natives of Buganda find it difficult to acquire them on the basis of general laws, with the exception of land in inaccessible regions. A similar situation exists in many other districts of Tropical Africa where commercial agriculture has been traditionally emphasised. In particular, there is no more free land in Ghana that is suitable for raising cocoa.[2]

As a result, peasants who leave their native areas for regions of commercial agriculture can now acquire land only on a rental basis. The alternative is to serve as wage workers, who constitute a growing core of village proletarians from non-native tribes.

Owners of wealthy households provide cattle as well as land to peasants on fettering terms. Moreover, a poor peasant generally receives the right to utilise both the milk and the blood of animals but does not have the right to slaughter them without the owner's permission. As a result, the latter acquires cheap work force to care for his cattle. In the case of most cattle-raising peoples of Africa the dependence of poor peasants on wealthy owners is still based almost entirely on such acquisition of cattle. Indirectly this is also associated with the acquisition of land which in such cases is utilised exclusively for grazing. This recalls Marx's observation that "among animal-herding peoples ownership of the natural products of land, such as sheep, for example, includes ownership of the pasture land on which they graze".[3]

[1] *Subsistence to Commercial Farming in Present-Day Buganda. An Economic and Anthropological Survey*, ed. by A. I. Richards, F. Sturrock and J. M. Fortt, Cambridge, 1973, p. 147. In a setting of spiralling prices and inflation, the purchase of land becomes one of the most advantageous and reliable sources of capital investment. Accordingly, urban strata of society as well as wealthy rural strata widely participate in the purchasing of land. In African villages today, this role of land may be compared to that which gold plays in the developed capitalist countries, whose economies suffer from monetary crises.

[2] H. P. White and M. B. Gleave, *An Economic Geography of West Africa*, p. 114.

[3] K. Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857-1858*, S. 391.

Since the rights to cattle are retained by its owners, caring for it by those who receive it constitutes a labour service. This type of labour service, however, possesses specific traits that in our view can be reduced to following: when receiving land the peasant receives not the product of labour but an object of labour from which he derives his livelihood. When receiving cattle, however, an altogether different situation emerges, in which cattle (the object of labour) is reproduced for its owner, while the peasant receives by-products, namely, milk and blood. This ancient method of feudal exploitation, which was widely applied even before the colonial period, still survives in many regions today.

In localities where plows are used for agriculture, payment in terms of labour services for the rental of plows and draft animals is widely practised by the village poor. In the district of Mazabuka (Zambia), for example, the authors of the survey found that 60 per cent of the families did not possess a sufficient number of draft animals or else possessed none at all, while 40 per cent did not have plows. Each family, however, could receive plows and oxen from wealthy kinsmen without cash payment though there is a reciprocal obligation to give some labour to the lender.[1] At the same time, however, the rental of draft animals and plows in return for money is also widely practised.

Indebtedness plays a big role in the exploitation of the poor, even though one may not always find usurers of the "classical type", i.e. persons who specialise exclusively in lending money in return for interest payment. N. I. Gavrilov, a Soviet specialist on agrarian relations, observes that "those who become usurers are above all persons who buy up agricultural output as well as all kinds of intermediaries and members of the wealthy tribal élite, i.e. persons who are closely associated with the peasants. They derive substantial income from lending operations. In Southern Madagascar, for example, the farmers are required to pay 40-50 per cent interest on loans of a few months and sometimes even 75-100 per cent when payments are made in kind."[2]

An important indicator of the scale of exploitative usury activities in African villages is provided by the fact that

[1] *Land Holding and Land Usage Among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District. A Reconnaissance Survey, 1945*, London, 1948, pp. 155-56.

[2] N. I. Gavrilov, Op. cit., p. 250.

local private merchant's capital in the villages is usually a form of merchant's and usurer's capital. P. Marris and A. Somerset emphasise that "if it served a local community beyond the reach of powerful competition, it had great difficulty in manipulating demand without hazarding its slender margin of profit. Here the problems of credit were crucial: if it refused credit, stonily ignoring the hardships of a community where cash in hand was always scarce, it gave up its best chances of attracting customers."[1] According to the findings of a survey the authors carried out in Kenya, 75 per cent of the store-keepers in localities engaging in commercial activities widely practise the supplying of credit to purchasers. As a rule, the village poor have no money and are compelled to accept any prices and to regularly rely on those store-keepers who sell to them on credit. Such merchants, moreover, provide credit not only in goods but also in money.

Store-keepers usually also buy up the output of their debtors, who therefore find themselves in a particularly difficult position. In this connection H. Hawkins writes that "the practice enables the retailer-cum-produce buyer to sell goods on credit to growers against future delivery of crops. This in itself is not necessarily undesirable, but the retailer normally takes advantage of his position to obtain very favourable terms for himself. In some areas buyers carry on a system of barter paying for the produce with consumer goods. This again usually leads to abuses. Furthermore, the fact that the trader is both buying produce and retailing gives him more room to manoeuvre of taking a generous offer on one half of the deal, while making a very large profit out of the other half."[2]

Characteristically, chronic indebtedness in Tropical Africa does not always take forms in which the debtor repays his creditor in money. When commodity-money relations are poorly developed, an impoverished peasant is often able to compensate his creditor only through labour services within his household. Labour services in compensation for debts appear to play a leading role in the exploitation of the village

[1] P. Marris and A. Somerset, *African Businessmen. A Study of Entrepreneurship and Development in Kenya*, London, 1971, p. 153.

[2] H. Hawkins, *Wholesale and Retail Trade in Tanganyika. A Study of Distribution in East Africa*, New York, 1965, p. 102.

poor. This is, above all, associated with the fact that, as commodity-money relations are poorly developed, a peasant finds it far more difficult to find money in the village in order to pay his debt than to work for his creditor.

These descriptions refer merely to the major forms of exploitation of the village proletariat and the poor. All the examples we have cited indicate that in African villages the direct producers became associated with the means of production through feudal or semi-feudal methods. To this day these methods tend to be structured by patriarchal families, especially in Tropical Africa. Peasants who become indebted to owners of wealthy households are usually related to them by kinship ties, since communities consist largely of relatives. In this connection A. Jones writes that "a nephew, son, or brother can be called upon for his labour, and the reciprocal obligation in terms of supplying material needs can be the same in all cases.... These obligations show a recognition of a difference in status which gives one man a degree of dominance over another.... In a dependent position decisions over housing, clothes and other material things are made by another, dominant, person. So to a large extent are decisions affecting relationships with other people. In short, a dependent person has decisions concerning a wide range of his social needs and activities made for him, in return for which he is obliged to perform manual services."[1]

It is not difficult to find within the framework of extended-family relations all the forms of exploitation that we have described above, including labour services in return for means of subsistence and for access to land holdings, chronic indebtedness and share-cropping payment. P. Hill has emphasised that the distinction between relatives and labourers is not necessarily "hard and fast, as sons and other relatives are sometimes, for instance, employed on an abusa (share-cropping—*Y.I.*) basis to pluck cocoa".[2] At the same time many of the afore-mentioned characteristics of extended-family cooperation were by no means brought into existence by colonial exploitation. They had been widespread within extended families and communities in pre-colonial

[1] *The New Elites of Tropical Africa.* Studies Presented and Discussed at the Sixth International African Seminar at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, July 1964, London, 1966, p. 276.

[2] P. Hill, *Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana*, p. 188.

times as well.[1] Yet they were definitely affected by the growth of commercial agriculture and the progress of commodity-money relations. Within the framework of extended families and communities many more of peasants who either did not possess enough land and cattle or did not possess any at all had to provide labour services to heads of extended families. In those localities where the conditions for the development of capitalism are more favourable, such labour services are gradually replaced by hired labour. In this connection the authors of the *African Labour Survey* emphasise that "one of the first signs of the change is often growing unwillingness of younger members of a family to work on the farm. Other able-bodied members may leave the farm in search of work outside the area in order to augment their cash resources. In areas where wage-paying enterprises are established the family worker may even demand money wages from the farmer for his service."[2]

At the same time levies in kind on household members tend to acquire a monetary character. This is particularly evident in cases where such persons leave for work in other localities and send money to relatives, often to compensate for debts or else for the plot of land on which the migrant worker's family works. Occasionally chronic indebtedness, too, becomes entwined with extended-family obligations. This frequently makes it difficult to distinguish monetary duties from older duties in kind. It is true, of course, that as the system of migrant labour in large enterprises declines, so does this form of income to heads of extended families. It would appear, however, that they will still draw from that source of cash revenue for a long time to come, particularly as the migrant labour system continues to develop in regions of African commercial agriculture, and to a lesser extent in cities.

Though it becomes disorganised under the influence of the market, extended-family cooperation does not disappear. Above all, relations peculiar to subsistence economy continue to exist, making household members dependent on the heads of large families who control the land. This right of extended-family heads operates as the material basis of their exploitation of the village poor.

[1] See Y. M. Ivanov, Op. cit.

[2] *African Labour Survey*, Geneva, 1958, p. 66.

The village poor who do not have permanent sources of income outside their tiny households constitute the bulk of the "excess" agrarian population. The insignificant size of their land holdings, moreover, is by no means always due to the absence of unoccupied agricultural land. In particular, such plots of land do exist in most regions of Tropical Africa, and as members of the community, poor peasants usually do have the right to work on them. For the village poor, however, such a right is in fact a purely formal one, since impoverished peasants are unable to cultivate the land owing to the specific economic conditions in which their households find themselves. "I see," writes P. Hill, "the older of these farmers ... as caught up in a vicious circle of poverty, which compels them to eke out their living from day to day and which saps their power to take the long-term decisions proper to a farmer. Such farmers find it difficult to raise their living standards by clearing additional land in the dry season, for during the farming season their granaries are apt to be empty so that they are obliged to devote themselves to earning a daily living, and have little time to work on their own farms."[1]

Both the exploitation of poor peasants on farms owned by the wealthy upper layers of village society and their work as migrant labour prevent them from expanding their own farms so as to provide for their own full employment. At the same time their labour is utilised by the well-to-do peasants primarily on a periodic basis, for seasonal work. Their employment in this capacity, moreover, often coincides with the work that the village poor must carry out within their own households. Unable to subsist on the products grown on their own plots, the village poor are compelled to work for the wealthy peasants. This results in a decline of their own economies and their inactivity in periods between harvest seasons, at times when permanent workers are active in wealthy households.

Even though a great number of poor peasants are inactive during much of the year this does not at all mean that there exists an absolute surplus of labour power in the villages. The reserve army of labour, made up of the unemployed and partially employed, is necessary for the normal function-

[1] P. Hill, *The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry...*, p. 259.

ing of agricultural production under existing agrarian relations. It allows the owners of wealthy households to pay meagre wages to workers, thus increasing the number of hired persons under circumstances in which wage labour often cannot yet serve as a source of surplus value.

In considering "relative overpopulation" as a consequence of prevailing agrarian relations it would be inaccurate, of course, to analyse it only in terms of the development of capitalism. "Relative agrarian overpopulation" is not an exclusive characteristic of the capitalist mode of production. In analysing the specific features of agrarian overpopulation in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century Lenin emphasised that in addition to its fundamental capitalist traits it also contained feudal features.[1] In African countries the dependence of agrarian overpopulation on the feudal relations is even more pronounced than it was at one time in Russia, since in Africa low labour productivity frequently makes regular capitalist hiring disadvantageous and the village poor are exploited primarily through feudal or patriarchal-feudal methods.

In conclusion it may be noted that in Africa the village poor include a large diversity of social groups, such as peasants who receive land in return for labour services, sharecroppers, hired workers, indentured labourers, migrant workers, etc. It should be emphasised, moreover, that the social boundaries between these various groups are highly flexible: in the course of his life an impoverished peasant may belong to any of these groups, or else to several of them at a time. Hence the village poor may be regarded as one social layer that is characteristic of the stage of disintegration of community and feudal relations under slowly developing capitalist relations.

Middle Peasants

The term middle peasants will refer to the owners of households in which normally only members of the owner's immediate family work, and in which daily expenditures are met from incomes from cropping and cattle-raising. Such households occupy an intermediate position in the villages as they are linked with the impoverished villagers, on the one

[1] See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 467.

hand, and the wealthy upper layers of the village, on the other.

The intermediate character of this layer may be seen in the fact that, when households experience a shortage of working hands during harvest times in regions of commercial agriculture, they have to hire seasonal workers. Some indication of the scale of seasonal labour in middle-peasant households is provided by the findings of a census carried out in the Central Province of Kenya in 1963-64 (see Table 26).

Table 26

The use of family and hired labour in households of middle and wealthy peasants in Kenya's Central Province (1963-1964)

Districts	Labour expenditures in middle-peasant households (working days)		Percentage of hired labour in households	
	family members	hired workers	middle peasants	wealthy peasants
Kiambu	527	62	10.5	17.2
Fort Hall	725	34	4.5	15.7
Embu	761	33	4.2	6.2
Nyeri	732	43	5.5	14.2
Meru	493	34	6.4	12.6

Source: Calculations based on: *Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64.*

The table indicates that hired labour does play a certain role in the labour expenditures of middle households, even though its share is substantially smaller than in the case of wealthy farms. At the same time it is important to consider the fact that in the 1963-1964 census of Kenya's Central Province the category of middle households also included a part of the wealthy ones, since it incorporated households possessing from 4 to 8 acres. In the Nyeri and Kiambu Districts, however, holdings of 6 acres usually belong to wealthy peasants. As a result, in individual districts of the Central Province the actual proportion of hired labour employed in middle households may in fact be somewhat lower than that indicated in Table 26.

It is safe to assert that in regions of commercial agriculture in Kenya middle households are those in which hired labour accounts for about 4.5 per cent of all labour expenditures. Yet that criterion should be applied with care, since even some wealthy African households do not employ any hired labour.

Hired labour in middle-peasant households does not in itself mean that the corresponding hiring relations are of an exploitative character. In a situation where even in wealthy households hired labour does not often produce surplus value, the possibility of its creation within middle-peasant households is still more limited, since they produce less output per unit of labour expenditures (see Table 27).

Table 27

Gross product and wages per working day in middle households located in Kenya's Central Province (shillings, 1963-1964)

Indicators \ Districts	Kiambu	Fort Hall	Embu	Nyeri	Meru
Gross product per working day	1.96	0.94	1.24	1.83	1.4
Wage payments per working day					
men	2.35	2.35	2.37	2.05	1.95
women	1.85	1.55	—	1.3	1.68

Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64 (table compiled by author).

It may be seen from this table that in all districts of the Central Province the gross product per working day in middle households was less than were daily wage payments to men. The owners of middle households were therefore interested in hiring women and children, whose wages were lower.

It should be recalled that in African villages seasonal hired labour is employed even within poor households when substantial labour expenditures are required over short pe-

riods of time because of the extensive methods of farming (Table 28), though this is only practised occasionally and is not associated with the creation of surplus value.

Table 28

The utilisation of hired labour by poor households in Kenya's Central Province (1963-1964)

Labour expenditures per household (in man days) \ Districts	Kiambu	Fort Hall	Embu	Nyeri	Meru
Expenditures of family labour	324	462	594	667	438
Expenditures of hired labour	14	18	5	21	10
Total:	338	480	599	688	448
Proportion of hired labour	4.1	3.8	0.8	3.1	2

Source: Table compiled by author on the basis of data in: *Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64.*

The use of hired labour by households of both middle and poor peasants is typical of North Africa and of the Tropical Belt as well. The results of a survey sponsored by the International Labour Organisation in Egypt in the early 1960s give an idea of this. The study encompassed all of the country's main regions. Its findings are presented in Table 29.

The data in Table 29 indicate that at least 24 per cent of the poor households and from 35 to 53 per cent of the middle households did rely on hired labour to some extent. Commenting on this fact, L. A. Fridman writes: "The day-labourer working either several days or weeks in a poor or else a modest middle household did not normally produce any surplus value. Quite often no significant surplus product was produced in such households at all. Hired labour was employed to produce the minimum necessary product, while the wage payments of day-labourers became a particular form of its redistribution among those participating in production. It is true, of course, that in more or less well-to-do

Table 29

The use of hired labour within peasant households in Egypt (early 1960s)

Household groups in terms of land area (feddans)	Percentage of households		
	Households employing both permanent and temporary workers	Households employing only temporary workers	Households employing no hired workers
0.5–2	2	22	76
2–5	10	26	64
5–10	20	33	47
10 and over	50	35	15
Total:	9	26	65

Source: L. A. Fridman, Op. cit., p. 240.

households a surplus product as well as a necessary product were produced, but the former was usually appropriated by merchant's and usurer's capital as well as by the state and by foreign monopolies...."[1]

Because in the case of middle-peasant households the gross product per working day is frequently less than the daily wage of a hired worker, middle peasants are interested in traditional communal work groups which still exist in many regions of Tropical Africa. In this connection J. de Wilde observes that "where wage labor is not yet available in significant quantities, communal work groups tend to be the only means of supplementing family labor. Such work groups which may be formed on the basis of ties of kinship, age or neighborhoods, still play an important role in much of Tropical Africa. They may be organized on the basis of reciprocity, with 'beer parties' at the conclusion of the work as the immediate incentive; or they may consist of groups of individuals who work for cash or payment in kind and cash."[2]

In such cases traditional communal relations disintegrate and produce rudimentary forms of hired labour in which

[1] L. A. Fridman, Op. cit., p. 240.
[2] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 87.

corresponding communal work is paid with money.[1] This is attributable primarily to the fact that the communal tradition of joint collective work has largely become a formality for the village poor owing to reductions in the size of their land holdings and their lack of grains for brewing beer. As a rule, poor peasants work for other households but are unable to invite members of the community to work for them. This is confirmed by the observations of many researchers, including H. Oluwasanmi, who writes that "in the Zinna district of Adamowa province beer supply is the ruling factor in cooperative farm work. A reasonably rich man can get a medium-sized farm quickly cultivated, planted and often extended, while the not-so-rich farmer has to rely on his own family if he is unable to provide cash to purchase sufficient beer."[2]

The position of middle peasants is different. In their case, community members' work within their households is a necessity in view of the relatively large size of their land holdings. Moreover, joint collective work is considerably less expensive than is the hiring of workers. According to the calculations of W. Chipeta, in the Katete District of Malawi two tins of millet valued at one pound are sufficient to brew two pounds worth of beer for sixty workers, while if one hires a worker at two shillings a day it is only possible to hire 20 workers.[3]

As commercial agriculture and the use of hired labour develop, collective labour becomes less important as a source of non-family labour power and is increasingly replaced by hired labour. Thus in many districts of Sokolo Province in Nigeria the tradition of work for beer is vanishing, and work for money has become more widespread. Collective work for beer is now mostly used on special occasions, such as assistance to newly-weds in the construction of a new compound or assistance to the sick. Otherwise the tradition of collective work for beer is gradually being abandoned.[1]

[1] Even where it still exists, traditional communal labour has largely ceased to be a form of mutual assistance. In fact, various degrees of antagonism between the worker and the household owner are becoming typical of such relations. Referring to the Ndembu tribe in Zambia, W. Turner observes that "if much beer has been brewed, much bush will be cleared; if little, a much smaller area. The productive individualism of Ndembu finds expression in the grumbling and mutual recriminations over the amount of work to be done...."—W. Turner, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society*, Manchester, 1957, p. 22.

[2] H. Oluwasanmi, Op. cit., p. 73.

[3] See W. Chipeta, Op. cit., Vol. XI, No. 4, p. 312.

The decline of traditional communal work in regions of commercial agriculture contributes to the ruin of the peasantry's middle layers who periodically require additional labour services. It is precisely in those regions, moreover, that the need for additional labour expenditures increases, since peasants have to grow commodity crops as well as crops for their own consumption.

In Tropical Africa the wealthier middle peasants, who need additional labour, seek to extend internal family cooperation because hired labour remains unprofitable to them. In particular, they rely on polygamous marriages, which are most typical of owners of wealthy households. This is indicated, for example, by the fact that, according to many surveys, the number of persons engaged in polygamous marriages is substantially bigger than the highest estimates of the number of wealthy household owners. Thus polygamy, which occurs among the relatively well-to-do layers of the middle peasantry, has become associated with the contradictions that are typical of extended-family cooperation.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, before colonialists had arrived, there existed a custom among many tribes of Tropical Africa according to which wives were allotted land holdings from which they subsequently derived their livelihood, while the husband owned a separate field, revenues from which were entirely his own. Under subsistence farming, differences between the land holdings of the husband and those of his wives related primarily to their size. As commercial agriculture developed, however, qualitative differences appeared as well. In particular, food crops were grown mostly on the fields controlled by the wives, while cash crops were grown on fields controlled by the husband. The conflicts to which this custom led may be inferred from Anne Martin's observations that "women sometimes not only resent their husbands working on cash crops because the latter compete for a limited labor supply, but even refuse to work on cash crops though these represent a more profitable use of family labor".[2] This is explained, above

[1] See H. Oluwasanmi, Op. cit., p. 75.

[2] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 55.

all, by the fact that husbands receive the entire revenue from sales of crops. Such contradictions were even sharper at one time in Nigeria, where it was traditionally accepted that the oil palm fruit belongs to the husband and the kernel to the wife. With the introduction of mills which extracted oil from both the fruit and the kernel, husbands began to appropriate themselves the entire revenue from the sale of oil—"a development which led women to demonstrate violently against the erection of new oil mills".[1]

The custom of assigning land to wives requires a quantity of land that is not available to the village poor. Their land holdings are so small that they do not even sufficiently support their owners. In such cases a wife is not only unable to produce a surplus product for her husband, but she cannot even provide for her own livelihood from the land holding that she receives. As a result, the tradition of assigning land to wives can no longer be practised.

Similarly, that practice is also increasingly abandoned by wealthy households which produce for the market. There the land holdings assigned to wives and other members of the family are reduced while the area devoted to cash crops increases. But this does not yet lead to an abandonment of patriarchal-feudal relations, since in fact wives continue to carry out earlier duties even after they are deprived of land. In such cases labour duties in return for land are replaced by similar duties in return for means of livelihood.

But the custom according to which wives are assigned land continues to exist mainly among owners of middle households who have sufficient land and are not so closely tied to the market as are wealthy peasants.

Differences between middle and wealthy households with regard to their ties with the market are clearly evident in the findings of a survey in Kenya's Central Province in 1963-1964. These are presented in Table 30.

These findings show that the share of contributions in kind to the overall revenue of households is inversely proportional to the size of that revenue and that, accordingly, owners of middle households are less dependent on the market than are wealthy household owners. The table also indicates that the owners of middle households are more dependent on the market than are the village poor. This is a specific fea-

[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 55.

Table 30

Selected economic indicators of farms grouped according to their gross revenue (1963-1964, Kenya's Central Province)

Household groups on the basis of gross revenue / Basic economic indicators	up to 1,000	1,001-1,500	1,501-2,000	2,001-2,500	2,501-3,500	3,501-5,000	5,001 and over
Marketable output (shill.)	109	252	466	560	807	1,262	2,602
Revenue in kind (shill.)	340	482	645	707	821	961	1,355
Gross revenue from agriculture (shill.)	449	734	1,111	1,267	1,628	2,223	3.957
Percentage of marketable output in gross revenue from agriculture	24	34	42	44	50	57	66
Average gross revenue, including receipts from non-agricultural activities (shill.)	727	1,209	1,705	2,128	2,881	4,094	9,226
Percentage of revenue in kind in overall revenue, including receipts from non-agricultural activities	47	40	38	33	28	23	15

Note. The "Average gross revenue" section includes receipts from commerce and hiring labour as well as farm income.
Source: Calculations are based on: *Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64.*

ture of the peasantry's disintegration that embraces many regions in North Africa and other parts of the continent.

It is well known that in Europe middle peasants were in fact least involved in commodity-money relations by comparison with other social groups. In analysing peasant bud-

gets in Russia at the beginning of the century Lenin observed that "the percentage of the cash income and expenditure increases (expenditure with particular regularity) *from the middle groups to the extreme ones.* The farming is of the most sharply expressed commercial character in the case of the peasant with no horses and of the one with many. This means that both live mainly by selling commodities, except that in the one instance the commodity is labour-power, while in the other it is goods produced for sale, with (as we shall see) a considerable employment of wage-labour, i.e., a product that assumes the form of capital."[1] This lesser dependence of middle peasants on the market in comparison with the extreme groups on either side is one of the major indicators of the fact that in Europe the decay of the peasantry produced proletarians, on the one hand, and capitalists, on the other.

In Tropical Africa, however, as well as in many regions of the continent's North, processes of differentiation among the peasantry take place in a different way. Increased commodity production by wealthy peasants has not been accompanied by the establishment of a rural proletariat. Impoverished peasants are exploited by the wealthy upper crust in their villages primarily through pre-capitalist methods, of which labour service constitutes the principal form, rather than as hired labour selling their labour power. The poor do not sell much of their produce on the market. This explains why poor peasants are less involved in commodity-money relations than are middle peasants, who transform part of their output into commodities.

It is an established fact that the development of capitalism causes the ruin of middle peasants. Taxes, the pressures of the world capitalist market which bring down prices on commodity output, the high cost of credit and the growing need for money in situations in which only limited opportunities exist for increasing cash revenue through further expansion of production are all factors that cause large numbers of middle peasants to join the ranks of the village poor as the development of capitalism proceeds. Since most of them do not have sufficient means for improving their households they experience famine in years of crop failure, become indebted and have to depend on occasional earnings.

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 154-55.

All their hopes are associated with years of good crops, which are usually followed by unfavourable years that return them to famine and poverty once more. This point is well made by E. Colson, who carried out surveys in what is now Zambia: "The uncertainty of the harvests works most hardship on the small producers who are trying to improve their resources. In a good year they invest in implements and cattle and hope with these to increase their incomes the following year. Then comes a crop failure and they may have to trade livestock and other resources for food and for seed for planting. Their history is likely to be one of constant beginnings, each advance followed by a setback which reduces them to about the original level of operations."[1]

At the same time middle layers possess features similar to those of the exploiting rural classes. These include patriarchal-family traditions, polygamy, the seasonal hiring of communal workers, and striving to become wealthy household owners. In germ form their households contain the same contradictions that are fully apparent in the case of wealthy peasants. This expresses the dual and contradictory nature of the middle layers, a minority of whom do succeed in becoming wealthy household owners, even though many of them are condemned to impoverishment.

Wealthy Peasants

In today's African villages wealthy peasants by no means always become capitalist entrepreneurs in the strict meaning of the word, though they do concentrate means of production in their households. Such a transformation is largely impeded by the low level of development of productive forces that results from imperialist exploitation. This is precisely the factor that reduces possibilities for accumulation in agriculture, and in most cases makes it necessary to maintain subsistence production. This, in turn, consolidates the corresponding pre-capitalist production relations.

The low revenue of wealthy peasant households frequently makes the use of hired labour unprofitable. Production relations of owners of such households with the village poor are therefore mainly of a pre-capitalist nature. Only a relatively

[1] E. Colson, *Marriage and Family Among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia*, Manchester, 1958, p. 76.

small number of wealthy peasants (and this is especially true of Tropical Africa) constitute genuine capitalist farmers and entrepreneurs who tend to concentrate around cities and in areas producing the more profitable crops. The majority of wealthy households in African countries continue to be based on a patriarchal-feudal and merchant's and usurer's exploitation of peasants, many of whom are their kinsfolk.

Wherever extended families continue to exist a variety of forms are available for expanding intra-family cooperation at the expense of patriarchally dependent relatives. One such form is polygamy. For not only do wives represent a cheap form of labour power, but they also raise a large number of children who are obligated, until they themselves marry, to work for the head of the family. Aside from polygamy, family cooperation is also expanded by enlisting the aid of families of younger brothers, sons and other relatives. According to F. Girling, "every household-head seeks to add to the number of his dependents by marrying several wives, producing children by them, and inducing kinsmen of various degrees to settle near him. The surpluses of grain from the fields of his wives and his own holding of livestock are devoted to this end."[1]

It is well established that family cooperation serves as a basis for capitalist cooperation. This applies to African as well as to European villages. Yet while its operation in Europe was limited to only the smallest commodity producers, in Africa, where in most regions patriarchal-family forms of peasants' exploitation play a big role, family cooperation continues to be important for relatively large commodity producers as well. Not only do family relations, which extend far beyond the core families, generate the prerequisites for capitalist exploitation, but they often entail the corresponding practice. Yet such relations are only possible because of the immature character of capitalism. For experience shows that in the course of time capitalist development inevitably results in the elimination of patriarchal-family relations between exploiting and exploited groups, and in their replacement by relations involving sale and purchase of labour power which are independent of kinship ties. Within the framework of patriarchal-family relations,

[1] F. Girling, *The Acholi of Uganda*, London, 1960, p. 28.

however, traditional forms of peasants' exploitation prevail, and while they gradually disintegrate under the influence of commodity-money relations they are only very slowly replaced by the hiring of workers.

Of course, such shifts in forms of exploitation also take place in those regions of Africa in which there are no extended-family forms of cooperation veiling the exploitative character of social relations.

In terms of the extent of disintegration of pre-capitalist exploitation under the influence of growing market relations three types of wealthy African peasant households may be distinguished.

1. Wealthy patriarchal-feudal households of a traditional type in regions that are in fact isolated from markets. In such cases trade operations are conducted on an occasional basis, and the principal sources of cash income are the earnings sent home by migrant peasants and work in local administrative bodies. Even though the basic forms of peasant exploitation characteristic of the pre-colonial period survive here, there have also been substantial changes in these regions. As a result of the temporary migration of peasants to other areas holdings of exploited peasants have become smaller and more peasants are unable to maintain their own households and have to perform labour services in order to repay wealthy households for clothing and food.

2. Households of a transitional type. Located in regions of commercial agriculture, they employ both hired labour and traditional methods of feudal exploitation adapted to market relations. (For example, the rental of land in return for money or else for a share of the marketable product.) Labour obligations in return for the allotment of land holdings or for sustenance also play an important role.

3. Capitalist households based on the exploitation of hired labour. Feudal methods and methods of commercial and usury indebtedness are not employed.

Unfortunately available statistical data do not make it possible to specify the numbers of each of these types of wealthy households in one or several countries. Nevertheless it can be asserted with confidence that capitalist households of the third type represent a relatively small portion of wealthy households. These specialise largely in the production of goods sufficiently profitable to justify a capitalist hiring of labour, and they are located in areas where

food trade is large enough to make the growing of food crops unprofitable.

Their origins are also explained by the fact that their owners do not have kinship ties with local residents. This makes the use of traditional methods of exploitation unlikely.

It is important to note that the tendency of wealthy peasants to become a class of small capitalists has become more pronounced in the post-colonial period. This may be largely attributed to policies that encourage private enterprise in countries developing along capitalist lines.

There appear to be many more wealthy households of the transitional type than there are traditional households. Indirect evidence supporting this is provided by the fact that in Africa the population of areas isolated from markets is often smaller than that of the remaining parts. Thus Arthur Hazlewood, who is a well-known British specialist, singled out regions of commercial agriculture and developed capitalism, within a distance of 45-50 kilometres from railway stations and ports. According to his rough estimates these areas account for 71 per cent of the population in Kenya, 45 per cent in Tanzania, and 63 per cent in Uganda. It follows that the corresponding shares of areas isolated from markets are 29, 55, and 37 per cent respectively, while for East Africa as a whole, it is 41 per cent of the population.[1]

Besides, in areas of commercial agriculture conditions for the development of wealthy households are more favourable than in areas isolated from markets. Accordingly, the proportion of wealthy households is substantially smaller in the latter than in areas of commercial agriculture.

Besides their numbers, the role of transitional-type wealthy households is also determined by other and more important factors. They generally account for the overwhelming share of the commodity output of African villages. Hence, their leading role in the commercialisation of African farming.

According to Lenin, the transformation of masses of producers into hired workers is one of the key attributes of the evolution of small-scale commodity production. In his

[1] *Bulletin, Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 31, No. 4, November 1969, p. 248.

"Vulgar Socialism and Narodism as Resurrected by the Socialist-Revolutionaries" he wrote that "as commodity economy develops, our peasants, like all small producers and by the very fact that they are such, come under the category of petty bourgeois: they break up into a minority of entrepreneurs and a mass of proletarians".[1]

In Lenin's opinion, this kind of differentiation is a major and essential attribute of bourgeois relations since there can be no bourgeoisie without a proletariat.

In African villages, however, the development of commercial agriculture, which has occurred primarily on the basis of pre-capitalist material conditions, has not been accompanied by a corresponding transformation of the bulk of direct producers into hired workers. It is therefore inappropriate, in our view, to list as capitalist entrepreneurs all owners of wealthy households in areas of commercial agriculture. While capitalist enterprise is typical of processes of peasant disintegration in European countries, in Africa these processes follow a different course and only relatively small number of wealthy households may be considered specifically capitalist.

Wealthy households of the transitional type and capitalist households possess certain common features. Both represent private commodity producers exploiting impoverished peasants. But there the similarity ends. For even intra-family cooperation, which played a big role in Europe during the early stages of capitalist development, differs substantially in the case of wealthy African peasants, extending far beyond the immediate family of the household owner and resting on patriarchal-feudal relations.

Another important measure of the differences between wealthy households of the transitional type and capitalist households is this: in the process of capitalism's establishment in agriculture, capitalist households usually control the larger share of land rented out for use by others, including land rented from impoverished peasants. This was the case in Europe, for example. In Africa, however, the majority of wealthy peasants themselves rent land to the village poor on exorbitant terms. This distinction reflects the opposite foundations on which the two household types develop. In the former case it is the exploitation of hired workers,

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 267.

while in the latter it consists of labour service and share-cropping.

In this connection the *African Labour Survey* for 1958 notes that "in certain areas, depending on the type of agriculture followed, the head of the family may allocate to more senior members plots of land on which they can cultivate their own crops. In return for these services the members of the family have duties to the farmer. Their entire services are more or less at his disposal. They may not only be required to work on his farm or farms but to perform other subsidiary services such as building or renovating the houses."[1]

This practice is to be found in the continent's North, where capitalist agriculture is much more deeply rooted, as well as in the Tropical Belt. Thus, in pre-revolutionary Egypt, for example, if both explicit and unpublicised rental arrangements are taken into account, wealthy farmers rented about 580,000 feddans to small-scale fellahs. This represented 47 per cent of all the land that they controlled and at least 63 per cent of the land area that could not be worked by their own families. In this connection L. A. Fridman writes that of course some wealthy peasants expanded their land area cultivated by tractors by renting machines from large landowners, but this does not alter the overall picture: like the large landowners themselves, they leased to fellahs in return for a semi-feudal rent over half the land in excess of a peasant family's "working norm".[2]

Since pre-capitalist relations still exist in the villages while possibilities for wage labour outside of agriculture are limited, the village poor cannot but cling to their land holdings, since these provide them with a permanent source of livelihood. Besides, wealthy farmers induce the village poor to work within their households. Relatives usually receive land for permanent use (since kinship ties traditionally include labour services for landowners), while non-kinsmen receive it in return for rental payments. In both cases, however, access to land is associated with labour duties, share-cropping, and other obligations that producers are expected to fulfil.

Of course, the concentration of land in wealthy households is not a new phenomenon in African villages. The

[1] *African Labour Survey*, Geneva, 1958, p. 65.
[2] L. A. Fridman, Op. cit., p. 219.

arrival of colonialists, however, lent it qualitatively new features since colonial exploitation entails a large-scale impoverishment of peasants and the development of commercial agriculture. In particular, the growth of commercial agriculture has expanded the output of wealthy households and this has been accompanied by an advancement of relations based on private landownership in North Africa, and the emergence of such relations in the continent's Tropical Belt. In the latter case, the prime material factor has been the transition from clear-and-fallow farming to continuous land cultivation. In this connection K. Mitchell observes that "where cash-cropping has become established the cultivated areas tend to be extended both in area and in time. Gardens are kept under cultivation, often with short periods of rest and sometimes with the aid of manure, instead of being abandoned to the common pool for regeneration; and they will usually be transferred to or inherited by another individual rather than abandoned to the common pool. At this point usufructuary tenure with reversion to the tribe when the holder dies or abandons the plot begins to crystallize into more exclusive individual rights which can be inherited or transferred, sometimes with a money consideration."[1]

Generally private landownership did not exist in Tropical Africa in the pre-colonial period. Land holdings belonged to communities and were assigned to peasants by the community head rather than by community meetings. Moreover, this was usually not effected directly (by assigning a specific plot), but indirectly, through the decision of the community head (following approval by the chief) to allow a person to live in the village. This automatically gave him the right to work any unoccupied holding and to use land set aside for common use as well. As the fertility of his current holding declined it was abandoned and became part of the community's general land stock, from which the peasant in question chose a new holding. Following the emergence of commercial agriculture such a system of land cultivation and use, far from impeding the appropriation of communal lands, frequently favoured it. According to tradition the initial clearing of a cultivated field entitled one to own it

[1] *Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London, 1960, p. 295.

until it was abandoned. Its size, moreover, was limited only by the quantity of labour power that was at his disposal, and naturally wealthy peasants had more of it than other members of the community. As commercial agriculture developed and as a transition took place to a continuous working of land, wealthy household owners were thus able to appropriate more communal lands and transform them into their own property.

This kind of appropriation was often directly encouraged by native governments. At the same time the scale and intensity of this process varied in different locations. In areas isolated from markets, where subsistence farming prevailed, factors stimulating the growth of wealthy households were limited. This is reflected in census data that indicate a smaller number and smaller size of wealthy households in such areas as compared with cash-cropping areas. The traditional systems of communal landownership and land use were retained there in a greater measure. Yet in these areas, too, by comparison with the pre-colonial period, the area of land cultivated by wealthy households has also grown through the exploitation of impoverished peasants who are unable to sustain themselves with the resources of their own households.

In areas of commercial agriculture the scale of such appropriations of communal lands and their subsequent transformation into private property was directly proportional to the rate of development of market-oriented production. As a result, the traditional system of assigning land to peasants within the community decayed. As communal land became more scarce, following the expansion of cultivated lands in wealthy households, the traditional system of indirect assignment of land to peasants gave way to its direct allotment by village headmen. The allotment fee was then increased. Speaking of the Basoga tribe in Uganda, Lloyd A. Fallers notes that "the peasant who wishes to take up a new kibanja (a holding, usually consisting of a plantain garden plus land for annual crops) should engage someone to act as his mukwenda (representative) in his dealings with the headman. The mukwenda should be a person well-known to the headman who can vouch for the good character and future loyalty of the new tenant. He is paid for his services by the prospective tenant and is his legal representative in the transaction.... The headman and the peasant's representative agree upon the allotment fee to be paid and the time of payment.... The sum paid may range from as little as twenty-five to as much as five hundred shillings, depending upon the size and quality of the holding, and the demand for land in this area. It may be handed over in its entirety ... or it may be paid in instalments, depending upon the terms of the contract."[1]

While the position of the headman is still very strong—in particular, no one can enter the community without his consent, and he receives relatively large contributions on such occasions—symptoms of a decline in his role as redistributor of communal lands may already be seen in these agreements. In fact, upon entering a community the peasant usually depends, above all, on the mukwenda through ties of indebtedness, rather than on the headman. In most cases this implies that wealthy peasants assign communal land to poor peasants who are dependent on them, once a contribution to the headman has been made.

Wherever commercial agriculture is limited headmen continue to control the distribution of free communal land. In areas where it is relatively well developed, however, such control has either already ceased to exist or else is being rapidly eliminated due to the absence of free land. Having appropriated communal land, wealthy household owners assign plots to poor peasants without asking for the headman's consent. One of the consequences of this practice is a breakdown of traditional villages into outlying plots and individual farms. V. Turner observed that "in the last few years profound changes have occurred in the residential structure in this area (an area inhabited by the Ndembu tribe in what is now known as Zambia—*Y. I.*): the most noteworthy has been the breakdown of traditional villages into small units headed by younger men who participate in encouraging cash economy. These units known as mafwami (from the English farms) increased enormously.... Most true

[1] Lloyd A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy. A Century of Political Evolution Among the Basoga of Uganda.* Chicago, 1965, pp. 164-65. The tradition of paying an allotment fee existed among the Basoga already before the arrival of colonialists. At that time peasants entering into a community were required to offer a chicken to the headman or else clothing made from bark. Today, however, these contributions are no longer made in kind and the "gift" itself is, as we see, much more expensive.

farms are situated beside the motor roads, for the typical farm-head is a man who has earned money, often on the line of rail, and who intends to earn more locally. He may be a petty trader, a tailor with his own sewing-machine, a 'tea room' proprietor, a 'beer-hall' owner, a peasant producer raising cash crops. For all these purposes easy access to motor roads is necessary and propinquity to administrative and trading centres advantageous. For these reasons most farms are found in the northern pedicle, or near Boma, or close to chiefs' capitals, or in the vicinity of Mission stations."[1]

In administrative terms, these farms are formally considered a part of the traditional village even though they are usually located some distance away. But in fact village headmen have no power over their owners or their residents. The decline in the headman's role in distributing communal land and the growing practice of assigning land to impoverished members of the community by owners of wealthy households are important indicators of the establishment of relations based on private landownership.

Another important indicator of the establishment of such relations in Tropical African villages is the growing number of cases in which land is mortgaged by the village poor seeking loans from owners of wealthy households. Although formally the debtor may recover his earlier rights over mortgaged land upon repaying the loan, in practice poor peasants lose their rights to land as they experience a chronic need for money and are unable to return such loans. According to X. Flores, "the system allows a relative degree of land mobility to the benefit of the stronger savers. But it must be regarded as a transitional stage in the progress towards other forms of land tenure, such as tenancy and métayage."[2]

Together with the mortgaging of land its purchase and sale also increases. The growth of trade in land plots contributes to the further concentration of land among wealthy households. Yet the growth of market-oriented production is not the only factor contributing to this process. For primitive agricultural techniques provide few possibilities for intensifying production, since, as labour outlays per unit of

[1] V. Turner, Op. cit., pp. 9, 37.
[2] X. Flores, *A Review of Rural Cooperation in Developing Areas. Institutional Problems in Modernization of African Agriculture*, Geneva, 1969, p. 212.

land increase, a threshold is reached fairly soon beyond which production growth falls behind increased labour costs. Thus, a survey in Western Nigeria has shown that as labour outlays increase the volume of output per acre increases at a relatively slower rate. In other words, marginal revenue decreases as labour outlays on a given plot increase.[1] On the one hand, this enhances the interest of wealthy household owners in increasing the area of land under cultivation. But it also increases the rate of pauperisation among the village poor, whose reliance on intensive methods of farming can only marginally compensate for declining output from decreased land holdings.

In Africa it is usually poor peasants who use intensive methods of land cultivation, together with backward agricultural techniques. The smaller the farm, the higher the costs of production per unit of cultivated land and the smaller the volume of output per unit of labour time. Primitive methods of management often make it impossible to intensify agricultural production in such a way as to increase labour productivity. Wealthy household owners therefore seek to increase output and reduce production costs by expanding cultivated land areas.

When capital tends to assume control of an agriculture developing largely on a pre-capitalist basis, merchant's and usurer's capital prevails over industrial capital and the former is fused with large landownership. In Africa this is manifested by the fact that many owners of wealthy households operate as usurers and traders as well as landowners. Income from trade and usury operations conducted by such households constitutes an important share of their cash receipts, which increase both relatively and in absolute terms with the size of farm.

One of the most important characteristics of income formation among Africa's wealthy peasants is the large share of receipts earned in wages. This differs from Europe, for example, where such earnings declined both absolutely and relatively from lower to higher groups of peasants. The picture in Africa is the very opposite. Frequently the absolute value of these receipts increases in direct proportion to the degree of wealth of the corresponding households, while

[1] B. Johnston, *The Staple Food Economics of Western Tropical Africa*, Stanford, 1958, p. 131.

their share in the overall income is approximately the same for both lower and higher income groups among the peasants. Table 31 indicates that in wealthy households av-

Table 31

Cash incomes of farm owners and receipts from hired labour (Kenya's Central Province 1963-1964)

Basic financial indicators \ Average cash income of farm owners (shill.)	387	727	1,060	1,421	1,990	3,134	7,871
Cash income from agricultural production	109	252	466	560	807	1,262	2,608
Income from hired labour	125	241	281	506	581	1,020	2,527
Percentage of income from hired labour in average cash income	32	33	27	36	29	33	32

Source: Compiled by author on the basis of data from *Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey of Central Province 1963/64.*

erage receipts from hired labour are almost equal to the cash income from agricultural activities.

In the setting of undeveloped commodity-money relations and limited sources of cash income, hired labour becomes important for all categories of peasants. Thus the larger incomes of wealthy peasants are primarily explained by the fact that they usually engage in regular hired work calling for specific skills and general education while the village poor usually take up hired work on an irregular basis, largely as unskilled seasonal workers.

It has already been noted that during the colonial period a system of payment for hired labour developed under which extremely low wages for unskilled work were com-

bined with extremely high payments for labour requiring skills and education. Frequently wages in the latter category compared "favourably with those earned in the richest countries in the world".[1] After independence in the 1960s this sharp difference in levels of payment survived almost unchanged. In the late 1960s the monthly salary of a clerk in the Central African Republic, for example, corresponded to three years' work by a peasant.[2] It is not surprising, therefore, that the 15,000 civil servants in the Ivory Coast, who accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of its population, absorbed 58 per cent of the budget in 1964. In Benin their share of the budget was even larger and constituted 64.9 per cent.[3]

A definite level of education is needed in order to obtain skilled work. Education requires financial expenditures that are beyond the means of the village poor. They are sometimes too large even for wealthy peasants. Education gives them access to highly paid positions.

The principal type of highly paid work in rural districts is civil service. In a setting in which the government is able to accumulate an enormous volume of surplus product through both direct and indirect taxes, while cash incomes from farming are usually modest even in the case of wealthy peasants, the salary of a civil servant frequently exceeds the cash income that Africans are able to receive from other sources.[4] Civil service is thus a very profitable occupation, particularly since, aside from a salary, it provides access to other incomes in the form of "gifts" that Africans traditionally contribute to officials in return for "consideration".

At the same time, in view of the numerous uncertainties associated with the position of civil servants (the threat of discharge, reduced income following retirement, the depen-

[1] G. Hunter, Op. cit., p. 57.

[2] Pierre Kalck, *Central African Republic. A Failure in De-colonisation*, London, 1971, p. 180.

[3] Ruth First, *The Barrel of a Gun. Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'État*, London, 1970, p. 110.

[4] Marx noted the connection between the interest of the exploiting classes and the functioning of state apparatus. He wrote, in particular, that "it is precisely with the maintenance of that extensive state machine in its numerous ramifications that the *material interests* of the French bourgeoisie are interwoven in the closest fashion. Here it finds posts for its surplus population and makes up in the form of state salaries for what it cannot pocket in the form of profit, interest, rents and honorariums."—Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 433.

dence of one's career on the political situation and the like), well-paid Africans working for salaries usually seek to develop other sources of income. This generally refers to the acquisition of land and farms.

According to J. de Wilde, "it is noteworthy also that in Africa the educated man who takes up another occupation seldom loses interest in farming. He usually retains a stake in some land and may, in fact, as we observed previously, become a successful and progressive farmer on the side, provided he is close enough to his farm to give it effective supervision."[1] The 1950 agricultural census in Egypt showed that 9,040 owners of plots of less than 50 feddans worked as doctors, engineers, civil servants, and lawyers, and viewed those occupations as their primary ones. Most of them lived in the city.

Cash savings from wage work play an important role in the emergence and growth of wealthy peasantry. When they are invested in agriculture, with its undeveloped commodity-money relations and primitive techniques, these savings are used to set up or strengthen farms based on patriarchal-feudal forms of exploitation. Yet the owners of such farms are generally more closely associated with the market and more responsive to its requirements, thereby promoting capitalist development, precisely because they possess sources of monetary accumulation outside the sphere of agriculture, and notably, in the sphere of hired labour.

Naturally in rural localities, where sources of cash savings are more limited, wage or salaried work (above all, civil service) is more often combined with landownership and farming than it is in cities. This is characteristic not only of regions isolated from markets but also of those where commercial agriculture exists. Thus in pre-revolutionary Egypt at least every third wealthy peasant was also a civil servant and made use of this position to increase his personal income. According to L. Fallers, who surveyed the village of Buyodi of the Basoga tribe in Uganda, of the 43 people outside the sphere of agriculture only the local government employees (three policemen, the road headman, and the parish chief) and the teacher had full-time jobs, and even these occupied peasant holdings on which they and their

[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 188.

families grew both food and cash crops.[1] A similar situation was observed in Tanganyika. Thus for members of the Kaguru tribe who grew maize for sale, there were almost no possibilities for full-time employment outside the mission or local government services. Yet, with the exception of a few single persons, those who succeeded in obtaining such positions were also engaged in agriculture.[2]

In terms of their origins, customs and traditions the majority of civil servants in rural localities are closely related to wealthy peasants. As a rule, they are landowners engaged in farming and exploiting the village poor. In their service functions, therefore, they promote the vital interests of the wealthy rural élite.

The wealthy peasants' association with the government administration as well as the stability of their economic position deriving from their landownership and commercial and usury activities tend to endow them with a dominant status in village life, particularly in places where there are no landed estates, or where the power of tribal chiefs has declined. The findings of many researchers indicate that within the framework of the current agrarian structure, the village poor are unable to lessen their dependence on wealthy peasants, which increases as capitalism develops further. Thus B. and R. Le Vine describe a village of the Gusii tribe in Kenya in the following terms: "In Nyansongo, as in most communities, there are one or two wealthy men who are the acknowledged leaders, and whose opinions on local affairs are granted extraordinary weight.... Often a rich man uses his influence (or wealth in the form of bribes) to establish legal claims to property belonging to a less influential person or to extort excessive fines from a neighbour for a minor offence. Unless such actions are overruled by a higher authority, they go unchecked, for Gusii consider themselves powerless to rebel against a person of superior wealth."[3]

Under conditions of capitalist development, the tenor of life in African villages is determined not by the democratic traditions lauded by bourgeois researchers with the deliberate aim of idealising Africa's communal life, but by

[1] Lloyd A. Fallers, Op. cit., p. 55.

[2] *Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies*, ed. by J. Steward, Vol. 1, Urbana, 1967, p. 189.

[3] R. Le Vine and B. Le Vine, *Nyansongo: Gusii Community in Kenya*, New York, 1966, p. 12.

the omnipotence of the wealthy upper layers. Their abuses have been made possible, above all, by the fact that civil servants themselves often own wealthy households.

Directly associated with local government, wealthy peasants normally do not need a separate political organisation. Such a need arises only when well-organised social forces emerge on the political scene due to support from the masses. It is precisely because of their ties with the state administration that the upper layers in the villages are amply able to defend their interests under both multiparty and one-party systems and under military dictatorship as well.

When viewed against the backdrop of imperialist exploitation and the rise of national liberation movements, contradictions between wealthy peasants and the masses of working people often recede into the background. But as such movements also develop into a struggle against exploitative relations, the interests of the different layers of the peasantry diverge further and further, since on the whole the wealthy social layers merely seek to overcome obstacles to their own enrichment through exploitation of the poor.

Feudal Nobility

The feudal nobility is one of the main sources of political and economic support for imperialism on the African continent. In its Northern region this social layer is basically made up of landlords who exploit peasants mainly as sharecroppers on their enormous lands.

While some of them already possessed their own capitalist farms based on modern machinery and techniques during the colonial period, they usually find even now that the rental of land to peasants is more advantageous, since an acute shortage of land and a growing agrarian overpopulation make it possible to increase rents even further so that they amount to three-fourths of the crop harvested by the peasants. This provides a socio-economic basis for widespread absenteeism among landlords.

Because they control the levers of political power and also possess substantial monetary resources, landlords are able to channel large investments into banking operations, commerce, and industry, where returns are frequently larger than they are in agriculture. By purchasing stocks and bonds issued by corporations and joining their governing boards as members or "co-founders", the landlords have secured a close intertwining between their land properties and non-agricultural firms so that their estates are currently only one of many sources of income for them. In this way many landlords have become what L. A. Fridman calls "landlord-capitalists". Typically they develop a wide range of ties with corporations that are active in such non-agricultural fields as publishing, mining, wholesale trade, river transportation, banking, real-estate operations in urban centres and film production.[1] All this contributes to the concentration of capital in the hands of the "landlord-capitalists" and strengthens their economic position and political power.

Far from interfering with traditional forms of landed estates and land use, a merging of landed estates with finance capital often helps their preservation. This is because shareholding landlords do not have enough funds to transform their estates into capitalist farms.

At the same time a continuous decline of prices for many types of raw materials over a number of years has visibly affected landlords' incomes. That is why a growing number of landlords have been interested in a gradual expropriation of their estates for compensation in order to rechannel the corresponding receipts into non-agricultural spheres. This phenomenon, which originated in the 1960s, explains the seemingly paradoxical demand on their part that large landed estates be nationalised—naturally in return for a "reasonable" compensation.[2] That was the case in Sudan, where following a decline in cotton prices in the 1960s that put many irrigation facilities in the red the Saddik group within the Umma Party called for land nationalisation in return for compensation so that landowners might receive investment funds to be channeled into non-agricultural sectors. At the same time those landlords who were unable to adapt to the needs of the modern sector of the economy interpreted that proposal for agrarian reform as an ominous attack on their own interests.[3]

Thus under certain circumstances, including political ones, as was the case in Sudan, intense contradictions may

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[1] See L. A. Fridman, Op. cit., p. 34.

[2] See *Developing Countries: Laws of Development, Trends, Prospects*, Moscow, 1974, p. 227 (in Russian).

[3] Ruth First, Op. cit., p. 267.

develop within the feudal class itself with regard to prospects for its future. While the more conservative members of that class seek to preserve landed estates, others, who are more closely linked to national and international monopoly capital, seek to liquidate that system in return for compensation so as to enhance their capacity for enterprise outside the agricultural sphere.

If landlords closely associated with monopoly capital prevail, a situation may develop in which members of the feudal class themselves propose the abolition of landed estates in return for substantial compensation from the state. In such cases former landowners become "pure" capitalists. Clearly, such "agrarian reforms" inspired by landlords have nothing to do with democratic agrarian reforms carried out in the interests of peasants.

As for the Tropical Belt, private landed estates do not generally exist there even though there is a feudal nobility consisting of tribal chiefs.

Even in the pre-colonial period tribal chiefs acting as representatives of state power already served as de facto redistributors of communal land. They established boundaries between communities, permitted peasants to settle in villages with the headmen's consent (thus granting them the right to work the land) and often fixed the dates for the start of the agricultural work. In a socio-economic sense, this inherited right of chiefs to control land made them de facto landowners. And indeed they acted in this capacity as representatives of the state when they collected corvée rent and rent in kind from peasants. In describing similar relations, Marx wrote that "the state is then the supreme lord. Sovereignty here consists in the ownership of land concentrated on a national scale. But, on the other hand, no private ownership of land exists, although there is both private and common possession and use of land."[1]

This changed under colonial rule, however, when the parent states rather than traditional African authorities had become de facto owners of land. Nevertheless, the institution of chiefs possessing feudal-state attributes continued to exist. Chiefs controlled by colonial administration exercised their authority on the territory defined by the

[1] K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1975, p. 791.

colonialists and assigned land to the peasants in accordance with tribal traditions.[1]

The incorporation of the institution of chiefs into the system of colonial administration following the establishment of colonial rule was not a chance phenomenon. For the despotism of traditional power, which usually combined legislative, executive, and judicial authority in one person, was needed by colonialists in order to hold Africans in submission. R. Delavignette emphasises that "African chieftainship was in fact one of the essential resources of administrative authority. Without the chiefs the governor-general, the eight lieutenant-governors of French West Africa and the 300 district officers in the bush would have been helpless. For it was the chief who represented his community in its dealings with the administration, and even more importantly, the administration vis-à-vis his community. In French West Africa there were some 2,000 chefs de canton and around 50,000 chefs de village. In French Equatorial Africa, in Togo, in Cameroon, the administration and the chiefs were similarly linked. If this network had been destroyed at one stroke, chaos would surely have followed."[2]

The institution of chiefs fitted the despotic system of colonial administration so well that the colonialists deliberately established it in those regions where it did not exist. In this way colonial rule helped not only to preserve but also to expand feudal-state relations in the African village.

One of the main results of consolidation of the chiefs' right to land was the conservation of tribal exclusiveness, which promoted ethnic parochialism and hostility to other

[1] Hence the patterns of direct and indirect rule overlapped in many respects and it is probably inappropriate to contrapose them. In this connection W. Barber observes that "European administrators held the ultimate authority and had the power to appoint and dismiss the salaried chiefs and headmen. In the strict sense, the pattern of rule was direct; but use of the chiefs and headmen as agents made the governing process itself an indirect one."—W. Barber, *The Economy of British Central Africa*, pp. 19-20. It seems that the patterns of direct and indirect rule differ only in that the latter provided a certain measure of formal autonomy to the chiefs.

[2] *Colonialism in Africa. 1870-1960*, Vol. 2, *The History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960*, ed. by L. Gann and P. Duignan, Cambridge, 1970, p. 267.

tribes. This was advantageous not only to tribal chiefs but to colonialists as well, who have always conducted divide-and-rule policies. Present-day tribalism, which represents a major obstacle to the social and political progress of African peoples, is closely associated not only with African traditions but also with the policies that were employed by colonialists to strengthen and intensify tribal exclusivism and hostility.

Such policies were facilitated by the colonial forms of peasant exploitation which contributed to conserving the closed nature of ethnic and community relations. The development of commercial agriculture in a situation where permanent non-agricultural sources of livelihood were limited enhanced the peasants' interest in land and hence their dependence on their traditional leaders. This dependence was not destroyed by the migrant labour system because peasant migrant labourers had continually to return to their communities and thus remained both economically and politically dependent on their chiefs. In this connection the authors of the collection *Social Change in Modern Africa* emphasise that "the vast majority of those who go to towns still expect to return to tribal homes in old age. The full nexus of tribal rights and obligations which binds them at home is in obeyance rather than broken."[1]

The chiefs exercised their right to land by forcing peasants to perform labour services, among other things. Thus in Northern Cameroon, inhabited by the Tupuri tribe, the chef de canton relied on his own police in order to force peasants to work for him. In particular he appointed villages that were obliged to contribute the hay, timber, and manpower for construction and repair work within his own household. Forced labour was also employed in working his fields. Peasants were required to work on plantations whose area usually attained 400-500 hectares. Each village in turn was required to send all its men for clearing, sowing, and cultivating such cotton fields. The chiefs received the entire income from the cotton raised through peasant labour. In commenting on this V. B. Iordansky, a Soviet researcher, emphasises that such cases are interesting insofar as they are typical. He notes that "differences in the position of

[1] *Social Change in Modern Africa*, ed. by A. Southall, Oxford, 1961, p. 42.

cantonal headmen in individual localities concerned only secondary details. In Forest Guinea, for example, they employed forced peasant labour in order to create and cultivate coffee plantations, while on the Ivory Coast this related to cocoa plantations."[1]

It should be kept in mind that colonialists officially prohibited such services for chiefs, assuming that the chiefs could reduce the flow of labour into their own enterprises. Naturally official bans could not fully terminate such services since chiefs retained control over the land and used the powers given them by the colonial administration for collecting rents in kind in unofficial ways. Yet these bans did produce a situation where such duties were no longer viewed as legally valid and this unquestionably contributed to their decline. That, in turn, eliminated the basis for the development of large landed estates on communal property.

As services in kind lost their significance, salaries collected from taxes on the local population became one of the main sources of monetary income for the chief. In 1960, for example, the Emir of Northern Nigeria received 7,700 pounds sterling. In Western Nigeria in the 1950s many Yoruba chiefs received salaries of 2,000 pounds sterling. Besides, "in French as well as in British Africa chiefs were granted allowances in addition to their salaries. They also put in claims for money ostensibly spent for public services but actually used for private purposes."[2]

Since the chiefs' salaries represented a payment for their administrative work their position became similar to that of colonial administrators, particularly since towards the end of the colonial period colonialists often ceased to reckon with the chiefs' lineage and rank and their right to inherit particular responsibilities. Some of the traditional chiefs were replaced by others who were able to serve the needs of colonialists better.

The salary given to chiefs had a unique social nature. It was largely derived from rents collected from peasants in the form of monetary taxes. This was particularly evident in countries with indirect rule since such rule made it possible to trace the actual sources of monetary salaries of chiefs.

[1] See V. B. Iordansky, Op. cit., pp. 79-80.
[2] *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, Vol. 2, *The History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960*, p. 362.

Among these taxes, which were used almost entirely for the upkeep of the chiefs' administrative personnel, the native poll-tax played the major role. Its economic content was a monetary rent determined by the colonial administration which operated as the supreme owner of the land being utilised by the native population. As the Soviet specialist on Africa I. I. Potekhin has noted, from the very first chiefs were in fact demoted by the colonisers to positions of servants of the crown. They were given a part of that rent while the remaining part was channeled into the colonial treasury.

In addition to the poll-tax levied by the colonial administration the chiefs themselves introduced local taxes. These, too, represented a monetary form of rent contributed to native treasuries. Another important source of the chiefs' incomes were rental payments in the form of court fees. Finally, a major share of contributions to native treasuries consisted of government subsidies, which enhanced the dependence of native authorities on colonialists.

The relative shares of these sources of revenue may be inferred from data pertaining to native treasuries in Northern Rhodesia, which are presented in Table 32.

Table 32

The structure of revenue and expenditure of native treasuries in Northern Rhodesia (per cent of total, 1957)

Revenue		*Expenditure*	
Native poll-tax	29	Personal emoluments	41
Levies	15	Other recurrent (repair of office buildings, cost of uniforms, etc.)	27
Fees and licenses	13		
Court fees	8	Extraordinary (construction of roads, schools, markets, etc.)	24
Grants and subsidies	28		
Other	7	Surplus funds	8
Total:	100	Total:	100

Source: Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, p. 712.

It is apparent from Table 32 that in 1957 at least 65 per cent of all revenues represented different forms of feudal rent while about one-third represented government subsidies. The bulk of these revenues (68 per cent) was spent on maintaining the administrative services of chiefs (salaries, travel expenses, repair of office buildings, etc.) and only 24 per cent were spent on the construction of local roads, schools, markets and the like.

Aside from duties in kind and salaries, chiefs possessed other sources of revenue, namely incomes from their own farms and from commerce, usury, and entrepreneurial activities. Thus in Sukumaland (Tanganyika) in the early 1950s at least twenty out of the twenty-five chiefs interviewed indicated that aside from incomes associated with their position, they also received revenues from the sale of cotton, ground nuts, sunflower seeds and cattle, as well as from renting houses, shops, fishing nets, and canoes. Over half of them stated that in 1952-53 they received from 100 to 500 pounds sterling from private sources each. Twelve of them had a car, a lorry or a motor-cycle, four owned tractors, eleven had ploughs, and three owned cream separators.[1]

Their control of tribal lands through headmen offered chiefs great opportunities to appropriate communal lands. M. Sorrenson, in his study entitled *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country*, describes instances of such appropriations. He notes, in particular, that in the Nyeri and Fort Hall districts "a few individuals, usually chiefs, obtained far larger areas of the land than they could have inherited".[2] Similarly, Arthur Phillips, who studied African court procedures in Kenya in 1945, observed that "it is a regrettable fact that chiefs and other influential men, including members of the Tribunals, are taking advantage of the present uncertainties to acquire large areas of land and are seeking to advance their position to become feudal landlords".[3]

Although the households of chiefs are usually somewhat larger in size than are those of wealthy peasants, there are few differences between them from the point of view of the

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[1] *East African Chiefs. A Study of Political Development in Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes*, ed. by A. Richards, London, 1960, p. 244.

[2] M. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country*, p. 40.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

social relations that they personify as private owners of the means of production. Both groups widely practise feudal and usury methods of exploitation combined with the use of hired labour. These relations differ in form rather than in content, in the sense that households belonging to chiefs rely on methods of exploitation that are less patriarchal in character.

During the colonial period, chiefs frequently represented the most educated layers of village society. M. Kilson notes that "some mission schools made special provision for the education of the chiefs. Civil servants had a natural interest in seeing to it that the chiefs employed as auxiliaries of the colonial authorities should be better educated than their subjects. The French, too, encouraged schooling for the sons of chiefs."[1] A survey carried out in Buganda in 1953 showed that 40 per cent of the chiefs had an elementary education, 45 per cent a secondary education, 10 per cent a higher education, and 5 per cent had no education at all, even though they were literate.[2] If one keeps in mind that even in the early 1960s there were only 4,000 students in Buganda's secondary schools, of whom only 200 could continue their education, it is evident that the level of education of chiefs in Buganda was substantially higher than that of the remaining population.

While chiefs often represent the most literate portion of the population, they are the most persistent champions of tribal traditions. Occasionally changing their European suits for traditional clothes, they propound adherence to traditions and ethnic uniqueness, since feudal-patriarchal laws and customs constitute one of the major conditions for the continuation of their privileged position.

Researchers are nearly unanimous in agreeing on the important role of civil service as a preparatory stage for assuming the responsibilities of a chief. This produced additional incentives for chiefs to place their associates and relatives in key well-paying positions within the local administration. Colonial administrators gave every encouragement to such an interest on the part of chiefs in order to acquire well-trained, loyal servants from the local population. Between 1947 and 1952, for example, nearly 33 per

[1] *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, Vol. 2, p. 359.
[2] *East African Chiefs...*, p. 68.

cent of the members of the Ivory Coast's Territorial Assembly were related to traditional ruling families (by 1959 their share increased to 43 per cent), while in Mali kinsmen of chiefs accounted for 35 per cent of the members of the Territorial Assembly. The proportion was 45 per cent in the case of the Upper Volta, 70 per cent in Niger and about 50 per cent in Guinea.[1]

On the whole, chiefs represent the most reactionary and conservative layer of the village population. Their privileges are rooted in the colonial past, when tribal separatism was consolidated through the institution of chiefs. The colonialists' policy towards this institution generally met the interests of the chiefs themselves. Their criticism of the colonial authorities referred only to individual measures that encroached on their interests, such as expropriation of their lands and the interference of colonial administrators in tribal affairs.

The achievement of political independence by African nations produced favourable conditions for ending feudal-tribal parochialism and creating a unified system of courts and administration, and hence, for weakening the power of chiefs. Even if traditional systems of landownership are retained, this ultimately brings about a termination of their salaries (which are one of their major sources of income) and contributes to the further decline of services and duties in kind. Accordingly, even though chiefs hailed independence, in fact they often helped colonialists to maintain the system of colonial exploitation and to preserve both tribal exclusivism and their own privileges.

Just before independence and in the first few years following its attainment, political organisations expressing the interests of chiefs issued insistent demands for local autonomy. This was clearly illustrated by the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), set up in 1960. This party opposed the establishment of a centralised state and proposed a plan to divide the country into six regions, each of which was to have a large measure of autonomy and control its own land resources. The pattern of state organisation became a key issue in many countries of Tropical Africa at a time when they gained political independence, and tribal chiefs were then especially concerned about intensifying tribal

[1] *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, Vol. 2, p. 375.

tendencies associated with the preservation of feudal-tribal divisions.

It is also characteristic that separatist tendencies encouraged by imperialist powers were particularly strong in regions producing for export, since their population had fairly high incomes and was less interested in the development of a national market. There the chiefs were often able to secure the temporary support of a portion of the peasant masses, as was the case in Buganda (Uganda) and Ashanti (Ghana). They mainly relied on wealthy peasants, who, just as the chiefs themselves, were not disposed to share export revenues with less developed regions and anticipated increased incomes through higher farm prices and the financing of agriculture by the state.

This is not to say that there are no contradictions between wealthy peasants and the nobility in Africa. Of course, there are, and they may grow or recede in the course of time. Yet Africa's case is different from that of Europe, where they were largely centred around the issue of large landed estates. It has already been noted that in Tropical Africa, with the exception of a few regions, there are no large private estates. The renting of land to wealthy household owners plays a limited role. As a rule these households themselves rent land to the village poor. Accordingly, the interests of the feudal nobility and the wealthy peasants clash mainly when it comes to decisions pertaining to the control of communal land and of local administrative services, and regarding state credits and subsidies, the termination of duties in kind or constraints on extortions practised by chiefs. Yet these social layers also possess important common traits insofar as they represent similar types of exploitative households and farming arrangements, which inevitably serve to unite their efforts in opposing the village poor, who present their own demands.

Chapter IV

THE OPTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT AND IN SOLVING THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

The solution of the agrarian and peasant question is of primary importance to the struggle of the peoples of Africa for genuine social and economic liberation. Backward agriculture, obsolete production relations, and the poverty of the bulk of the peasantry are all factors that hinder the economic and social progress of the new states.

Backwardness stems from the entire course of historical development of the African countries, which were brutally exploited by colonialists over many decades. While they drew the village into commodity-money relations, the colonialists immensely limited its possibilities for accumulation, and helped preserve subsistence forms of reproduction and the corresponding traditional production relations. Under such conditions existing trends towards capitalism encouraged by the growth of market relations developed slowly and with difficulty. The continued use of hoes and axes as basic implements of production did not provide an adequate material and technical basis for a capitalist transformation of villages.

The commercialisation of African agriculture was accompanied by a growing economic and social differentiation among the peasants, but it did not overcome the pre-capitalist material and social foundations of the agrarian structure.

To this day merchant's and usurer's capital rather than industrial capital continues to play a dominant role here. As Lenin noted, this represents only the initial, embryonic form of capitalist production relations. On the one hand, that form of capital has merged with large landownership

and is closely associated with pre-capitalist (patriarchal and feudal) relations, while on the other, it is linked to monopoly capital through commerce, cooperatives, and banks and serves as its agent and intermediary. The technical backwardness of African villages, which hinders the transformation of commercial farming into capitalist agriculture, operates as a prerequisite for the functioning of merchant's and usurer's capital.

Such dominance by the "worst" and "lowest" forms of capital, their merging with pre-capitalist relations, and the extremely slow transition to developed industrial forms of capital are all factors which shape the specific features of the social structure of African villages, which differs in many ways from the one that emerged in Europe at the time of the appearance of capitalism in agriculture.

It is well known that in Europe the peasantry was divided into the classes of bourgeois society, namely capitalists and hired workers. Referring to Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, Lenin wrote that "the differentiation of the peasantry, which develops the latter's extreme groups at the expense of the middle 'peasantry', creates two new types of rural inhabitants. The feature common to both types is the commodity, money character of their economy. The first new type is the rural bourgeoisie or the well-to-do peasantry.... The other new type is the rural proletariat, the class of *allotment-holding wage-workers*."[1]

A different situation has emerged in Africa, where wealthy peasants operating in a context of imperialist exploitation and the attendant low labour productivity, make wide use of feudal and semi-feudal methods of exploitation and commercial and usury dependence which they combine with the exploitation of hired labour. Objectively speaking, due to the development of commodity relations such wealthy peasants manage households of a type that represents a transition from feudal to capitalist forms of exploitation. On the whole, their farms are similar to those of the feudal nobility.

Another important feature of the agrarian structure of African countries concerns the fact that as the development of commodity-money relations causes the ruin of peasants, these do not always become hired workers, and their pauperisation thus proceeds more rapidly than does the process of their transformation into a proletariat. To this day the principal type of direct producer in African agriculture is not a hired worker but a peasant overwhelmed by feudal as well as merchant's and usurer's exploitation. The number of persons who fall into the category of agricultural proletarians exploited through capitalist methods is still relatively small, and they are concentrated primarily in localities where modern plantations exist.

The extant patriarchal relations influence the development of class antagonisms in the village in a specific way, rendering them more complex as well as more muted. Since wealthy peasants are often kinsmen of the poor peasants whom they exploit, and since exploitative relations are frequently veiled by traditions of mutual assistance and respect for elders or higher ranking persons, it is more difficult for working peasants to understand the essence of exploitative relations and to conduct a conscious struggle for their rights. This explains the complex and contradictory character of the political activities of peasants in African countries. Addressing the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1969, L. I. Brezhnev noted that "the peasants in that part of the world (Asia and Africa—*Y. I.*) are a mighty revolutionary force but in most cases they are an elemental force, with all the ensuing vacillations and ideological and political contradictions. Nor could it have been otherwise for the time being, because the great majority of the peasantry still lives in conditions of monstrous poverty, denial of rights and surviving feudal and sometimes even prefeudal relations."[1]

An important feature of the evolution of agrarian structures in African countries concerns the fact that, due to the limited scope of the market, the development of capitalism in agriculture is confined to individual regions. Such incubation points of capitalism, in which a minority of the population is employed, tend to play the decisive role in commodity production, particularly in the context of the Green Revolution, while the share of the other regions in such production may decline in both absolute and relative terms. The stagnation of agricultural production in these regions in general,

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 176-77.

[1] *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, Prague, 1969, p. 153.

and particularly of commodity production, fosters production relations that are typical of subsistence farming and leads to the parcellation of households. Such regions thus tend to become gigantic centres of mass unemployment and déclassé elements.

These characteristics of capitalist transformation in African villages call for a reformulation of the question concerning the relative possibilities of the Prussian and American ways of capitalist development in African agriculture.

In referring to the experience of Europe and America, Lenin repeatedly stressed that the forms of development of commodity production and of capitalism in agriculture may follow one of two courses: "The survivals of serfdom may fall away either as a result of the transformation of landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the landlord latifundia, i.e., either by reform or by revolution....

"In the first case the main content of the evolution is transformation of feudal bondage into servitude and capitalist exploitation on the land of the feudal landlords—Junkers. In the second case the main background is transformation of the patriarchal peasant into a bourgeois farmer."[1]

The classical Prussian course of the development of capitalism in agriculture presupposes a slow transformation of the landlord farms into capitalist ones. In many of the young states of Africa, however, there are no large estates even though feudal and semi-feudal relations do exist within the households of the wealthy rural élite. In other words the slow capitalist transformation of villages is governed not only by the evolution of large landed estates but also by that of wealthy peasant households.

At the same time the classical American course of development of capitalism in agriculture is not possible in Africa, since the liquidation of large landed estates cannot yet lead to the abolition of feudal relations. The point is that patriarchal peasants often play a leading role in commercial agriculture, but their transformation into capitalist farmers is hindered by the backward material and technical basis of production and the limited scope of the market—factors stemming from continuing imperialist exploitation.

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 239.

Confined to separate regions, capitalism is unable to rapidly influence and shape in its own way the pre-capitalist production relations in villages throughout Africa, even in the context of radical reforms contributing to its development. Accordingly, only one course of development of capitalism in agriculture is possible in Africa under present conditions, namely one that is associated with lasting pre-capitalist relations and slow development of agricultural production. This indicates that, given the dominance of monopoly capital, capitalism no longer possesses the progressive potential that would enable it to overcome Africa's agricultural backwardness within a short period in history.

The African countries do not face the choice between the Prussian and the American approach to the development of capitalism in agriculture. Realistic possibilities for solving the agrarian question here are intimately linked with a choice between the capitalist and non-capitalist paths of development. R. A. Ulyanovsky observes that "the essence of the class struggle that is currently being waged in the Asian and African village no longer relates, in effect, to choosing one of the two alternative paths of capitalist development, but rather to a struggle between the capitalist and non-capitalist paths of development, which itself reflects the struggle between the two world systems".[1] In today's African villages feudal and semi-feudal relations are so closely intertwined with capitalist relations not only on landed estates but also in wealthy peasant households that they cannot be fully overcome without measures that are also directed against capitalism generally.

Thus the on-going struggle in Africa which centres around the agrarian question is inseparable from the struggle for choosing an approach to socio-economic development that reflects the dominant trend of our age, namely, a worldwide historical transition to socialism. The possibility of such a transition is historically predetermined by the elimination of colonial oppression under conditions in which national liberation movements in the developing countries receive all-round support from the world socialist system and the international workers' movement.

[1] R. A. Ulyanovsky, *Socialism and Liberated Countries*, Moscow, 1972, p. 292 (in Russian).

That support is wide and multi-faceted. The struggle of socialist states for international détente and for respect for national sovereignty forms a part of the struggle for a recognition of the legitimacy of the social systems chosen by the peoples of liberated countries, including socialist-oriented development.

Active support on the part of the socialist countries in defending the sovereign rights of the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe, and the Republic of South Africa, their consistent struggle against apartheid and racial discrimination, their direct aid to the national liberation movements, and their support for ideas stressing anti-imperialist unity in Africa all help immeasurably in the struggle of all African states for national and social liberation and for choosing a socialist orientation.

Similarly, preferential trade agreements with socialist states concerning the sale of commodities produced by developing countries play an important role in strengthening the economies of socialist-oriented countries. As early as 1972 the African trade of the socialist countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance approximated 2,000 million dollars, of which more than 80 per cent was accounted for by trade with countries following the non-capitalist path of development. In carrying out their commitments the CMEA countries are assisting in the construction of hundreds of major projects in Africa. Towards the mid-1970s 400 projects were either under construction or beginning operations with the assistance of the USSR. Of these, 80 per cent were located in socialist-oriented countries.

The world socialist system is an important factor contributing to the socialist orientation in the development of young African states and assisting them in carrying out far-reaching reforms, including in agriculture.

The African countries liberated from colonial dependence have abolished colonial-state landownership. This refers to lands that were formerly owned by colonial authorities and that have now become the property of the young African states. At the same time the new national governments have acquired important levers of state influence over their countries' economic development. A number of them employ these levers to solve the agrarian question on a capitalist basis, while other governments are seeking ways to move beyond the narrow framework of capitalist development.

In such a context a comparative study of agrarian reforms being carried out in countries following different socio-economic orientations is of major scientific-theoretical interest.

Agrarian Reforms in Capitalist-Oriented Countries

The principal objective of agrarian reforms in capitalist-oriented countries is to create a favourable climate for the development of capitalist farms on the basis of private landownership in the villages. This envisages the assistance of foreign capital.

The dependence of such policies on assistance from foreign capital determines the attitude of these African governments towards foreign private landownership, which arose from the plunder of lands owned by native African populations. Thus in the Ivory Coast and Cameroon the area of foreign-owned land continued to grow following independence.[1] In Morocco a Royal Decree of 26 September, 1963 provided for a redistribution of 272,000 hectares of foreign-owned land to peasants over a period of 8 years. In this connection N. I. Gavrilov observes that "if the agrarian reform were to proceed at such a rate, it would require 20 years in order to return all the lands that were appropriated by foreigners. But even this rate is not being followed in practice."[2]

This does not mean, of course, that agrarian reforms have not included large-scale appropriations of foreign-owned land in capitalist-oriented countries. Such appropriations did take place where foreign private landownership had become a major obstacle to the development of local private enterprise. But they were carried out slowly and on terms acceptable to foreign capital, and also involved the payment of compensations that increased the debt bondage of these countries.

A vivid example of such land appropriations from foreign-

[1] *The Socio-Economic Effects of Agrarian Reforms in Developing Countries*, Moscow, 1966, p. 187 (in Russian).

[2] N. I. Gavrilov, Op. cit., p. 320.

ers is provided by Kenya, where on the eve of independence Europeans possessed more than 7.6 million acres, of which only 18.7 per cent were cultivated. Colonialists had expropriated that land not only in order to develop it but also in order to create land shortages in African villages and thereby to encourage a steady flow of labour power to European-owned enterprises. It is noteworthy that such lands began to be repurchased from Europeans under the colonial administration, which sought to dampen discontent among peasants. That process was intensified by the government of independent Kenya. While the declared objective was to reduce the shortages of land in reservations, in fact the redemption of such lands made it possible for European farmers to get rid of non-profitable farms and secured land for the propertied layers of the urban and rural population in a way that simultaneously increased the country's dependence on its former metropolitan country.

Nearly 1.2 million acres were repurchased from European settlers between 1961 and 1966, with uncultivated holdings accounting for a large share of those lands. And yet the corresponding agreement with Britain stipulated that Kenya would pay enormous sums for these lands which had originally been appropriated from Africans. They were repurchased at 1959 prices, which were higher than those established in the early 1960s when many Europeans sought to dispose of their farms in view of imminent independence. The agreement with Britain also provided for very high prices for the pedigree livestock purchased from European settlers.

Foreign loans and subsidies amounting to over 25 million pounds sterling were required for that reform, which included the partial repurchase of farms and the settling of natives on them. These loans were granted by Britain, the FRG, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, among others. The government of Kenya made the payments for these loans and for the interest on them incumbent on the African peasants who settled on the repurchased lands as private owners. Thus the new settlers were immediately subjected to a very large debt. According to estimates provided by H. Ruthenberg, the debts of farmers living in small-scale settlements (excluding interest payments) constituted an average of 195 pounds sterling per farm, while in the case of settlements based on large-scale farms

the figure was 560 pounds sterling.[1] According to these estimates expenditures per acre of repurchased land were 22 pounds sterling, of which only 6.8 pounds were channeled to the needs of agricultural development. The remaining expenditures (15.2 pounds per acre) constituted non-productive expenditures associated with the repurchasing of lands.

It is possible to estimate the extent to which the repayment of these loans constituted a burden on farmers by noting that following their repayment the yearly revenue of small-scale settlers was expected to be only 25 to 75 pounds sterling, while for large-scale settlers this figure was 100 pounds. Yet in many cases the actual monetary income of peasants was far lower. It is therefore not surprising that during the first five years of that programme the new settlers were only able to repay 58 per cent of their indebtedness for that period, and that in 1967 the government had to postpone the initial repayment of loans for two years. Frequently the new settlers repaid their indebtedness from money earned on the side, rather than from revenues from farming on the new lands.

Britain gained the most from the partial repurchasing of land from Europeans that Kenya carried out in the 1960s. In fact its economic position in Kenya was strengthened following the granting of political independence. Former European owners of repurchased farms received 30 million pounds sterling by the beginning of 1970 in return for the purchased farms. This sum did not include interest payments. "In turn, the new African farmers assumed with their land extensive debts.... A high proportion of these new farmers were selected as being landless and therefore lacking both capital and regular income, so that they started farming in debt almost to the full value of their land and stock."[2]

The partial repurchase of land from European settlers and its appropriation in the form of private property were advantageous to African wealthy social layers as well. The major part of Kenyan lands repurchased from Europeans

[1] H. Ruthenberg, *African Agricultural Production Development Policy in Kenya 1952-1965*, p. 82. These estimates of indebtedness of African settlers include loans received to repurchase land and also loans for its initial cultivation.

[2] Quoted in: J. Due, *They Said It Couldn't Be Done. Two Agricultural Development Projects in Kenya*, s.d., p. 6.

became the property of wealthy farmers. This is largely explained by the fact that the high payment for land reduced the possibilities for the indigent layers in the villages for acquiring it.

As a result of that reform 34,652 families settled on land repurchased from Europeans by the summer of 1968. Of these 27,684 joined small-farm settlements. But in order to receive a farm even in a small-scale settlement the payment of a stamp-duty was needed as well as an initial instalment of 6 to 9 pounds sterling. Such payments could usually be made only by persons whose savings were large, by African standards. It should be recalled that the minimal expected monetary revenue in such settlements was to be 25 pounds sterling per year.

In many cases farmers in small-scale settlements received several plots of land. At the same time large houses and auxiliary buildings beyond the means of peasants as well as 100-acre plots were sold by leaders of local communities to members of the Central Assembly and Senators.

Thus it was mostly middle and wealthy peasants as well as the few workers who had accumulated savings who received land holdings in small-scale farming settlements rather than the usually indebted village poor. Many observers have noted that during the 1960s and 1970s the considerable indebtedness of settlers and lack of funds for operating profitable farms brought about the ruin of many settlers from among former workers and middle peasants, forcing them to leave in search of earning from wage labour or to work on oppressive terms for wealthy farmers. In this connection H. Ruthenberg notes that "the number of High Density holdings where the settler is now looking for outside employment, while his wife is scratching the surface of the plot trying to grow some subsistence crops, is probably rather large".[1]

In repurchasing land from Europeans the Kenyan government also sought to create large-scale private African farms. It was with this aim in mind that it repurchased 180,000 acres and organised large-scale farming settlements, on which 4,967 families began living after making an initial payment varying from 100 to 500 pounds sterling. It was assumed that following the repayment of debts the average

[1] H. Ruthenberg, Op. cit., p. 73.

monetary income of such farms would be 100-250 pounds.

In addition 171,500 acres were transferred to 1,688 owners of cooperative ranches employing numerous hired workers, while another 34,000 acres were transferred to 143 private owners who received loans from special funds created for organising settlements. At the same time the Central Land Council purchased farms from Europeans in order to sell them to Africans who made a 10 per cent down-payment, with the remainder payable in 20 years. As a result of this policy there were 464 large African farms by the mid-1960s in the Rift Valley Province alone and their total area was 482,500 acres.

Most large African farms repurchased from Europeans are capitalist enterprises.[1] Wealthy peasant farms, on the other hand, rely largely on patriarchal-feudal methods of exploitation, though they do employ hired labour. This reflects the immature character of general economic conditions for the development of capitalism in Kenya's agriculture. Thus H. Ruthenberg emphasises that owners of farms in large-scale settlements make use of their kinsmen as workers: "Relatives and friends establish themselves at the farm worker's place and take the odd corner of the large farm in cultivation. On some farms the acreage taken by squatters amounts to 1/4 of total."[2]

Another major indicator of the immature general conditions for capitalist development in Kenyan villages is the substantial use of land by peasants for growing subsistence crops in regions formerly settled by Europeans. G. Hunter notes in particular that "it is the Kenyan African farmers who naturally cling to subsistence most strongly: some of them, when first settled on ex-European commercial farms,

[1] A description of a large farm that has been transferred to an African cooperative was given by *Sunday Times* correspondent P. Cox: "It is a typical ranch covering over 30,000 acres and with its own small river. The board paid 120,000 pounds for it, including 29,000 for the stock. 60 kamba cooperators who now own it subscribed 18,000 pounds as the down-payment—that is 300 pounds each. The day-to-day life at Kobo Rock had altered little with the change of proprietor. The labour were paraded as before at 7.15 a.m. every morning. Although some were close relatives of the new owners, they were only being paid the minimum agricultural wage of 23 d. a day."—P. Cox, *Kenyatta's Country*, London, 1965, p. 67.

[2] H. Ruthenberg, Op. cit., p. 86.

insisted upon this insurance, even uprooting high-quality pyrethrum to grow maize on land unsuited to it."[1]

It is of considerable interest in this connection to examine data concerning the sources of capital of those who either acquired large farms or else established wealthy households on lands purchased from Europeans. According to data cited by a number of researchers many of those who became large landowners were government civil servants or else party functionaries nicknamed Delamers.[2] Writing in 1966 H. Ruthenberg observed that "almost every politician, official and functionary has recently acquired some property".[3] A. Segal, an American researcher who has studied agrarian reforms in East Africa, fully agrees with this view: "Politicians and civil servants have been the first to consolidate their farm lands and to purchase formerly non-African land on a willing-buyer, willing-seller freehold transaction basis."[4] In addition to civil servants and political leaders, traders and wealthy farmers have also become large landowners in the White Highlands. Many of them possess land holdings in former reservations as well.

These developments produce favourable conditions for the widespread practice of absentee landownership. Many large landowners do not manage their own farms and live in cities instead or else are engaged in trade, entrusting their farms to proxies or renting them. According to J. de Wilde, "experience has shown that a man with capital often has a business or an occupation which pays well and he may therefore acquire a settlement plot (in the White Highlands—*Y. I.*) without living on it or without giving sufficient attention to farming it properly. We noted that farmer absenteeism was more marked on low-density schemes and that some of the most neglected farms belong to businessmen or government employees who were occupied elsewhere. In a number of cases such people have managed to obtain two

[1] G. Hunter, *Peasant Societies. A Comparative Study in Asia and Africa*, London, 1969, pp. 84-85.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[3] H. Ruthenberg, *African Agricultural Production Development Policy in Kenya 1952-1965*, p. 104.

[4] A. Segal, *The Politics of Land in East Africa*, Toronto, 1968, p. 287. Consolidation of lands refers to an integration of scattered plots into a single strip. In capitalist-oriented countries such a consolidation is usually viewed as a major prerequisite for formalising a person's rights of private landownership.

or more settlement plots on a scheme without farming any of them adequately."[1]

It appears impossible to calculate even approximately the number of large landowners who have acquired land in the White Highlands, and this is not merely due to a lack of statistical data. For frequently persons listed as official landowners in fact act on behalf of "shadow partners", i.e. kinsmen or acquaintances who provided the funds for purchasing land and who now receive the corresponding income. In such cases the linkage of civil servants and traders with landownership is less explicit since it is mediated by other persons who received money to acquire land and now pay a specified part of the income from the land. Indirect evidence suggests, however, that the number of large African landowners in the White Highlands who received land repurchased from Europeans is quite substantial. They provide a "social cover" for European entrepreneurs in Kenya who continue to control millions of acres of the best and most fertile land.

In Tunisia the process of land appropriation from Europeans followed a somewhat different course. At the time of independence in 1956, there were 4,700 Europeans there who owned 600,000 hectares, while 42 per cent of the rural native families did not have any land and a third of Tunisian landowners did not receive sufficient incomes from their land to provide for the minimum requirements of livelihood.[2]

In 1957 the government sought to reduce the shortage of land in Tunisian villages by signing an agreement with France concerning the repurchasing of colonist-owned land. As a result of that agreement and of similar agreements in 1960 and 1963, repurchasing operations transferred 370,000 hectares of French-owned land to state ownership by early 1964. The repurchasing of these lands thus required approximately 7 years.[3]

[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 213.

[2] See *The Working Class and the Workers' Movement in the Countries of Asia and Africa*, Moscow, 1965, p. 175 (in Russian); *The Eastern Village Today: Basic Development Trends*, Moscow, 1973, p. 76 (in Russian).

[3] See *The History and Economics of Countries of the Arab East*, Moscow, 1973, p. 114 (in Russian).

This slow rate of land repurchasing activities caused dissatisfaction among the progressive public in Tunisia, who called for more decisive measures similar to those that were carried out with regard to foreign properties in Egypt and Algeria. Finally, in 1964, a decree was adopted concerning the nationalisation of foreign-owned lands. In this way foreign ownership of land was liquidated. Subsequently, as in Kenya, a substantial part of the land appropriated from Europeans was sold to the local population and became their private property. In addition, production cooperatives began to be organised on these lands. These largely served the interests of wealthy farmers and were intended to help their enrichment through the latest methods of large-scale production.

According to the provisions of cooperative charters any landowner could become a member of such a production cooperative, providing that he had a specified minimum of land. Those who did not possess the needed quantity were required to either purchase it or rent their own plots to the cooperative, or even to work in the cooperative as hired workers. Only landowning members were entitled to elect the cooperative's Administrative Council. This made it possible for wealthy farmers to occupy key positions within such cooperatives. Income was distributed largely according to members' relative share of land rather than in accordance with the labour contributions of each.

By 1967 there were 479 such cooperatives with a membership of 50,000.[1] Most of them, however, were in fact unprofitable. This may be attributed to the fact that over 20 per cent of their land assets largely consisted of lands rented from civil servants, doctors, lawyers and entrepreneurs who did not live in villages. It was also partially due to the fact that private sub-contractors frequently charged very high prices for such tasks as threshing, and plowing, and for transportation and construction.[2] In 1969 the government had to agree to terminate the activities of most production cooperatives and to transfer their lands to private owners.

[1] *The History and Economics of Countries of the Arab East*, p. 116.

[2] See E. S. Melkumyan, "Concerning Agricultural Cooperatives in Tunisia", *Arab Countries. History and Economics* (Proceedings of the Third All-Union Conference of Arabists, Yerevan, 1969), Moscow, 1974, p. 175 (in Russian).

An important aspect of the agrarian reforms in capitalist-oriented countries concerns policies that seek to destroy the basis of traditional agriculture and to introduce private landownership.

In Kenya that policy began to be widely applied in the colonial period. It was based on the Swynnerton Plan adopted in 1954, one of whose objectives was to give legal force to the relations of private landownership that were spontaneously developing at the time. J. de Wilde observes that "increasingly, individual Government officers, and later the Government, began to look upon the land tenure reform as a promising measure to deal with Kikuyu discontent. It was hoped that land consolidation and registration, followed by a vigorous program of farm development, would effectively counter the political agitation among the Kikuyu by establishing a class of prosperous farmers who, in turn, would employ on their holdings most of the landless Kikuyu."[1]

During the reforms the owners of wealthy farms appropriated the most fertile lands, adding holdings belonging to poor farmers. They influenced the decisions of government clerks through bribes in order that holdings not belonging to them be registered in their names and also in order to increase the area of holdings that they did own.[2]

Consolidation of lands and their formal registration as private property increased the inequality of land distribution in Kenyan villages. Many tenants were expelled from rented land during the reforms. In addition the reforms affected adversely the position of household members in extended families as they lost their traditional right to land within the family hierarchy. Yet traditional forms of land rental and land assignment to household members did not disappear as a result of the legal sanctioning of private landownership. They survive because patriarchal-feudal methods of exploitation are able to compete with the use of hired labour.[3] At the same time there is no doubt that, given a

[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 9.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[3] Incidentally, this explains the failure of attempts to overcome the parcelling of land on large farms, in spite of the policy of land consolidation that was pursued both by the colonial administration and by Kenya's national government. The sanctioning of the right to private ownership of land merely provides a legal basis for extending

legal sanctioning of rights of private landownership and the development of commercial agriculture, the position of household members as direct producers possessing land was definitely worsened.

The agrarian reform also affected the interests of heads of patrilineal associations and chiefs who lost the right to control communal land that had played such a big role in those regions where relations of private landownership were relatively undeveloped. In these regions the consolidation of lands and their registration as private property took place very slowly and met with opposition from tribal upper layers as well as from below.

In those regions, on the other hand, where private landownership was widely accepted, as in the Central Province, for example, the tribal leaders' control over communal lands had in fact ceased to exist by the time the reform took place. Chiefs and elders themselves became large private landowners and were interested in a legal sanctioning of their position as landowners. Accordingly the consolidation and registration of land holdings proceeded far more rapidly in the Central Province than it did in other regions of Kenya.

At a time when Kenya's national liberation movement was growing in intensity, the colonial administration followed a policy of registering land as private property with great circumspection, giving particular emphasis to those regions where the traditional land-holding system had been substantially undermined and where wealthy farmers were interested in its liquidation. In those regions, on the other hand, where the tribal upper layers persisted in opposing the reassigning of land as private property and usually received the support of the village poor, such reforms were not, in fact, carried out. As a result, only some 1.5 million acres were registered as the private property of Africans by mid-1965, and an area of approximately the same size was consolidated and surveyed, i.e. prepared for official registration as private property. This represented approximately 10 per cent of the lands being utilised by Africans. According to J. de Wilde, "it is only since attainment of self-

the boundaries of fields belonging to landowners and sown to cash crops. While this is achieved by reducing land holdings of household members and of persons renting land, this alone does not produce a transition to capitalist forms of economic organisation.

government and independence that Kenya's own political leaders have shown interest in accelerating land enclosure and consolidation".[1]

In fact, the political leaders who came to power in Kenya in December 1963 pursued the policy initiated by the colonialists even more energetically. By 1970 more than four million acres of land were registered as private property owned by Africans. The government adopted an objective to consolidate one million acres each year beginning in the early 1970s and to increase the overall area of African-owned private land to 25 million acres, of which 13 million are only fit for cattle-raising. Unquestionably such a policy contributes to a further loss of land on the part of peasants and to a concentration of land in farms belonging to the villages' wealthy upper layers, which are gradually shifting to capitalist methods of exploitation.

There is evidence that the actual rate at which the programme of consolidation is being carried out is lagging behind these goals. Probably this is explained by the dissatisfaction of not only working peasants, but also of that part of the traditional tribal upper layers, who, having lost control over land, are not yet able to go over to a more or less continuous production for the market. That is why the implementation of the programme of consolidation and the scheme for developing the private ownership of land will depend substantially on the possibilities for the further development of African commercial agriculture. That development, however, is constrained not only by the limitations of the home market itself but also by occasional deteriorations in the terms of export sales.

The importance of such factors may be judged in relation to Tunisia, where in 1957 a law was passed providing for the transfer of the communal lands of semi-nomadic tribes to private ownership. Its terms specified that the establishment of rights of private ownership on a communal plot being farmed by an individual required that "improvements" be carried out, including the planting of fruit trees, the regular sowing of grains, and the cultivation of cactus plants on at least one half of the holding. In regions of irrigated farming it was necessary to increase the productivity of land so as to increase its value by at least 15 per cent. In this

[1] J. de Wilde, Op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 14-15.

way the terms associated with the acquisition of rights to private ownership of the communal lands of semi-nomadic tribes clearly favoured wealthy farmers, since the village poor did not possess the means for "improving" their holdings. In view of the poor development of commodity-money relations, however, these terms were not carried out. Only 19,339 hectares, or less than one per cent out of a total of two million hectares, acquired the status of private property between 1958 and 1964. The government therefore had to suspend the registration of such lands as private property.[1]

Similar policies designed to encourage the development of private landownership and to do away with traditional systems of land-holding are being carried out in many African countries. Thus in Senegal the law of 1964 concerning national land assets allows persons who merely use land to acquire full rights of private ownership. "Yet," N. I. Gavrilov notes, "usually it is only persons with a privileged position in society who are able to take advantage of such a possibility. In effect that law strengthens the economic inequality that already prevails in villages between owners of the means of production (and above all of land), on the one hand, and persons who are deprived of these means. As it does not provide for measures aiming at the redistribution of land or else its assignment to those who need it, the law merely registers the already existing situation in the sphere of land relations."[2]

A policy of establishing rights of private landownership is also being carried out in the Ivory Coast, where a division of communal land is taking place. Preference is being given by the government to the wealthier farmers, who thus acquire uncultivated land.

A highly ambivalent policy with regard to traditional forms of land-holding is being carried out in Africa's largest country, Nigeria. Thus, its second plan of national development (for 1970-1974) states that it is necessary to consolidate holdings in the South and to retain the effective control by local authorities in the North.[3] According to

[1] See *The History and Economics of Countries of the Arab East*, p. 111.

[2] N. I. Gavrilov, Op. cit., pp. 302-03.

[3] See S. Famoriyo, "Elements in Developing Land Tenure Policies for Nigeria", *The Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1973, p. 57.

the plan the government has delegated responsibility for carrying out land reforms to individual states and has limited its own role to the provision of funds "to encourage the reform movement".[1]

Commercial agriculture is relatively more developed in Nigeria's South than it is in the other regions of the country, and a relatively well-developed market for landed properties already exists there. The governments of individual states located there have chosen to support a transition to individual ownership of land. In the early 1970s Nigeria's Western State carried out a policy designed to create settlements of private landowners. At the same time the possibility of encouraging a voluntary consolidation of plots as a preliminary step to a legal recognition of private landownership was also being considered. Similar issues related to a voluntary consolidation of lands were being debated in other Southern states as well, including the Central Eastern State, the River State, and the South Eastern State.

As for Northern Nigeria, commercial agriculture is relatively less developed, and the feudal upper layers of society continue to retain control over land.

One of the most important consequences of the evolution of land relations in Tropical Africa concerns the destruction of feudal-state landownership as represented by chiefs. In capitalist-oriented countries, where that process generally proceeds slowly, a gradual liquidation of the rights of chiefs to land is effected in two ways: by a policy of developing private forms of landownership, and by the government's intervention in the sphere of traditional laws governing landownership and land use. Thus in Cameroon, in 1963, the government established limits on the size of land holdings available to individual tribes. The appropriated land constituted a national asset that was to be controlled by government agencies alone. In the Upper Volta legislation permits the government to set aside a part of agricultural lands for needs of "special purpose planning" as well as to establish state ownership over sparsely settled lands and lands located far from populated areas. In Senegal, a law adopted in 1964 made the government the owner of all non-registered land, which constituted a very large share of all agricultural land assets. Significantly the law paved

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

the way for terminating the rights of traditional rulers and elders over land and also the rent they received from peasants.

Another factor that served to undermine the feudal-state land-holding system concerns the transition of the state functions and associated privileges of chiefs to government civil servants. In Uganda, for example, the institution of chiefs itself was liquidated following independence. In three Southern regions of Nigeria, chiefs were deprived of any effective power, and far-reaching changes have taken place even in the country's North, where traditionalism prevailed. In particular, while emirates continued to exist in three out of the six Northern states traditional authorities had lost control over the police, courts and prisons by the end of the 1960s.

In losing their traditional rights over land and the prerogatives of state power chiefs are deprived of control over the reserves of free uncultivated land from which they formerly assigned lands to peasants. They also cease to receive rents in the form of salaries, which used to be one of the major sources of their monetary incomes. Their relations with peasants increasingly lose their public character and pass into the sphere of private law. All this contributes to a weakening of their political position and to a strengthening of the centralisation of state power. Yet, since chiefs are large landowners who are frequently engaged in entrepreneurship and in commercial and usury operations, they continue to retain their influence over their fellow tribesmen and government civil servants, and hence it would be premature to believe that they have lost their economic and political position.

New developments combine in strange ways with old practices in the daily life of African states. Now things develop in accordance with existing laws, now in contravention of them. In Senegal, for example, in spite of a law adopted in 1964 that deprives traditional rulers of their rights to land, earlier relations continue to exist in many ways. Former landowners and especially Marabuts (a religious sect—*Y. I.*) continue to control land in many regions and are viewed by most farmers as the only group possessing a right to land.[1] This is one of the reasons why the payments of tithes

[1] See *Basic Problems in African Studies*, Moscow, 1973, p. 191 (in Russian).

by farmers as well as a diversity of traditional forms of gifts continue to be practised. But it is not the only reason. For in view of their important influence on the outcome of elections to the National Assembly, the government has formally assigned to the religious fraternities of Murids and Tijans the lands that they were utilising.

Evidence of the continuing influence of chiefs in the 1960s may be found in the fact that in spite of their loss of prerogatives of state power the title of chief is often sought by both entrepreneurs and political leaders. This was the case in Southern Nigeria, for example, where, according to a collection entitled *Problems of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule*, "most politicians on attaining ministerial office considered it appropriate to have chiefly titles. In some cases they obtained these in virtue of a hereditary claim. More often 'honorary' titles, held for life only, were bestowed by chiefs on eminent citizens abroad, notably successful businessmen in Lagos, who paid them a fee for the honour. When it became clear that politicians welcomed such marks of distinction, some towns began to offer titles to other than 'native sons'. Thus Awolowo obtained seven titles during his first five years as Premier of the Western Region."[1]

Similarly, feudal landlords also continue to exert an important political and economic influence in capitalist-oriented African countries. They have kept the bulk of their holdings and have been little affected by land reforms. According to official data, holdings larger than 50 hectares constituted more than a third of all holdings in Tunisia in 1970.[2] In Uganda the maximum size of an African land holding is limited to 500 acres. In this case land legislation affected the interests of a very small category of landowners and was not aimed at abolishing landed estates as a whole.

The feudal nobility's gradual loss of privileges contributes to the erosion of social boundaries within the class of large landowners. Their numbers continue to grow in capitalist-oriented countries due to the acquisition of land by entrepreneurs and civil servants. The Africanisation of the

[1] *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, Vol. 3, *Problems of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule*, ed. by V. Turner, Cambridge, 1971, p. 188.

[2] See *The Eastern Village Today: Basic Development Trends*, Moscow, 1973, p. 77 (in Russian).

state administration, accompanied by a growth in salaries of civil servants and political leaders, has contributed substantially to this trend. While in Kenya in 1963 "a member of parliament received 620 pounds sterling per year, his remuneration nearly doubled during the three subsequent years to 1,200 pounds sterling, not counting privileges. Forty-six Ministers and their Deputies received approximately 250,000 pounds sterling per year, i.e. a sum that could provide housing to 500 families,"[1] states a Soviet book on Tropical Africa.

Aside from their salaries civil servants possess other sources of income, whose growth is enhanced by the pursuit of personal wealth in capitalist-oriented countries. In this connection, R. First observes that "Nigeria's First Republic (this refers to the period following the declaration of Independence in 1960—*Y.I.*) became an orgy of power being turned to profit. Political, public and private financial interests fed greedily upon one another. The men who controlled the parties used them to commandeer business, and the business, in turn, to buy party support.... Government resources were freely used to acquire economic interests and this, in turn, to command more political support."[2] It goes without saying that Nigeria was not the only country in which state resources were widely used for increasing the wealth of private persons.

Civil servants and political leaders have appropriated enormous funds and used them for purchasing lands, engaging in commercial operations, and purchasing stocks of foreign companies. In capitalist-oriented countries large landed property is increasingly merging with both the government administration and local and foreign capital. All this contributes to the gradual erosion of boundaries separating individual social groupings within the propertied part of the population, namely large landowners, civil servants, owners of foreign stocks, and traders since many of them simultaneously exercise socially heterogeneous functions while retaining their role as a single social layer.

Because it is closely associated with local as well as foreign capital this social layer relies on state power in

[1] *Tropical Africa: Problems of Development*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 95-96 (in Russian).

[2] R. First, Op. cit., pp. 102-03.

carrying out policies that encourage the development of capitalism in agriculture. This includes programmes drawn up in capitalist-oriented countries for the development of agricultural production, arrangements for providing funds and credit to rural producers, and methods for developing the supply andj distribution activities of cooperatives managed by the wealthy upper layers. All these plans are designed to contribute to the growth of private enterprise.

Yet possibilities for the development of capitalism within the continent's agriculture are usually quite limited. V. G. Solodovnikov, a prominent Soviet student of African affairs, has emphasised that "today there are no conditions for the emergence and normal development of a capitalist society. Capitalism is a formation of the past. Its development in Africa is lagging so much that now it will never be able to flourish."[1] The ratio of capital investment to resulting added value continues to be lowest in agriculture. Even in the case of Kenya, where very favourable conditions exist for the development of agricultural production, that ratio was only 0.8 in 1965-1968 as against a value of 4.6 in the processing industries, 10.6 in power engineering, 3.6 in transportation and 2.2 in other sectors.[2] The poor material and technical basis of agricultural production as well as the limited scope of the home and external markets that continue to be constrained by the entire system of economic ties between African states and developed capitalist countries, operate as major obstacles to the growth of capitalist production relations and contribute to the conservation of feudal, commercial and usury methods of exploitation. As a result, developing countries cannot expect anything more from the capitalist way of development than existence as economically backward appendages of the world capitalist system exploiting them through neo-colonialist methods.

Policies that provide subsidies and credits to wealthy farms and that encourage private enterprise in every possible way serve to intensify economic inequality in the villages, as does the encouragement of private landownership. One of the documents of the Food and Agriculture Organisation has stressed that "the surest way to deprive a peasant of his

[1] V. G. Solodovnikov, *Africa Chooses Its Path. Socio-Economic Problems and Prospects*, Moscow, 1970, p. 131 (in Russian).

[2] See N. I. Gavrilov, Op. cit., p. 139.

land is to give him a secure title and make it freely negotiable".[1] In the case of African states where the possibilities for employment outside agriculture are usually extremely limited, while capitalist forms of utilising hired labour in agricultural production are by no means always possible, large-scale land deprivation of peasants entails most tragic consequences, increasing their poverty within a social environment where the wealth and abundance associated with modern civilisation are increasing and accumulating in the hands of a small social layer. This cannot fail to produce sharp political confrontations and attempts to find a way out of the narrow framework of capitalist development.

Agrarian Reforms in Socialist-Oriented Countries

Agrarian reforms in socialist-oriented countries are an integral component of thorough-going socio-economic transformations that subsequently grow into a struggle against all forms of exploitative relations, both feudal and capitalist. Above all this has been made possible by the fact that the present-day struggle between the two world systems, the capitalist one and the socialist one, has extended the social framework of national liberation revolutions. While at one time their scope encompassed only the solution of bourgeois-democratic problems, their extension beyond the problems of purely capitalist relations has now become a reality. This is confirmed by the experience of socio-economic transformations in states following a non-capitalist path of development.

Before the 1960s democratic revolutions emphasised the overcoming of feudal relations in the village and gave little attention to influencing the social structure of cities, where capital was concentrated. Since that time, the scope of the socio-economic transformations accomplished in the course of democratic revolutions has widened enormously. In socialist-oriented countries the nationalisation of industry, transport, banks, insurance companies, and wholesale trade and active offensives against the positions of big and, partly,

[1] Quoted in: *A Review of Rural Cooperation in Developing Areas*. Geneva, May 1969, p. 218.

medium-sized capital are now combined with the abolition of foreign and feudal landownership and of the privileges of the feudal nobility.

Non-capitalist development is not always a continuous process. The socialist orientation of some countries has been subjected to changes following the arrival in power of social forces subscribing to the principles of capitalism. We will therefore seek to analyse the transformations associated with periods of socialist orientation in individual African states irrespective of their current policies.

Practically all countries which adopted a non-capitalist approach to development have nationalised private foreign-owned lands. Their aim was to lessen their dependence on international monopoly capital and to create the conditions needed for independent economic development. Thus in the case of Mali, in 1961, large cotton and rice plantations then belonging to the French company Office du Niger were taken over by the state without any compensation. The government of Mali intended to transform the Office du Niger into a modern agro-industrial complex with higher economic indicators than either traditional or private capitalist farms. It expected to rely on that complex in creating a state sector within the country's agriculture and also in assisting the development of production cooperatives among colons renting land on an individual basis. With this aim in view, two state enterprises were organised on Office du Niger lands at a time when Mali envisaged a socialist path of development. In 1964-65 they possessed 8,700 hectares of arable land, while colons possessed 25,500 hectares.[1]

In Tanzania a law adopted in 1962 provided for the termination of private landownership by persons of European or Asian origin. At the same time it gave them a right to rent land for a period of 99 years, providing that they use it productively. That law was aimed not only against the few European settlers entitled to private landownership but also against owners of large sisal and sugar plantations rented from the English crown for a period of 999 years.

In commenting on the significance of that law A. Segal has observed: "The change from freehold to leasehold tenure has had several important consequences. It provides the government with crucial leverage in negotiating with

[1] See N. I. Gavrilov, Op. cit., p. 362.

foreign investors, particularly in insisting that new sisal investments provide for cooperative villages and outgrowers schemes. It effectively discourages African civil servants and entrepreneurs from investing in land and narrows the economic and social base of the African middle class."[1] It is difficult to agree with A. Segal's view that the law which terminated private landownership by persons of European and Asian origin "narrows the economic and social base of the African middle class". For the number of private landowners of European and Asian origin was insignificant, while the possibilities of Africans to purchase their land without subsidies and loans were limited. Yet A. Segal is right in stating that the law has contributed to restricting the operations of foreign capital when it defined the position of foreign landowners as persons renting state lands. This played an important role in 1965, when the state appropriated 34,000 acres of fertile lands from non-Africans in the Arusha region, and then, in accordance with the Arusha Declaration of 1967, nationalised six large sisal plantations and repurchased 60 per cent of the stocks of another 33 companies producing sisal, thus creating the basis of Tanzania's sisal corporation.

Since Tanzania acquired independence, its government has succeeded in substantially reducing the sphere of operation of foreign capital within the country's agriculture. By the early 1970s it largely asserted its control over the production of sisal, to which nearly 60 per cent of the land cultivated by persons of European and Asian origin was devoted. In addition a tough taxation policy has been applied to such persons since the end of the 1960s. The government has also introduced a number of constraints on the transfer of profits abroad, thus reducing the outflow of capital. Having nationalised the banks, the government fully controls the financial and credit operations in agriculture, which in the past were monopolised by foreign capital. Foreign capital has also been largely eliminated in the spheres of purchasing, primary processing, and storing of staple cash crops. At the present time almost all enterprises engaged in the primary processing and storing of such produce are either cooperatives or else belong to the state.

[1] A. Segal, *The Politics of Land in East Africa*, p. 278.

The expropriation of private foreign-owned lands acquired substantial dimensions in Algeria. In 1962, on the eve of the victory of the national liberation revolution, there were 1.1 million rural residents in that country who did not possess any land. Six million hectares of land were occupied by small- and medium-sized holdings (90 per cent of them occupied less than 4-5 hectares each) while 26,000 foreign landowners possessed 2.7 million hectares of the best fertile lands and 8,500 large native landowners possessed 1.7 million hectares. The resulting shortage of land was one of the most serious problems in Algerian villages.

Following the signing of the Evian Agreements and the declaration of independence, the overwhelming majority of Europeans living in Algeria left that country, and many European-owned agricultural enterprises stood idle. In such a situation agricultural workers and landless peasants began to occupy the lands abandoned by colonists. They renewed field operations and created obstacles to the removal of equipment as well as to its sale to local feudal landholders and speculators. All this was not accompanied, however, by a division of former estates into private farms. In fact, the opposite took place: agricultural workers and landless peasants spontaneously formed production collectives directed by self-management committees. This movement was encouraged by the government. In particular, the decrees of March 1963 together with subsequent legislative acts gave legal force to a transfer to workers' management of enterprises that had earlier belonged to foreigners.

In this way, a self-managing sector associated with large-scale social production emerged within Algeria's agriculture. By the beginning of 1970 it possessed approximately 2.3 million hectares of the most fertile lands (nearly 30 per cent of the land under cultivation) and produced 90 per cent of the country's grapes, 80 per cent of its fruits, 48 per cent of its vegetables, 46 per cent of its industrial crops, and 35 per cent of its cereals. Approximately 230,000-250,000 permanent and temporary agricultural workers worked on 1,800 self-managing farms that produced 50 per cent of the country's gross agricultural product.

To a certain extent the boundaries that emerged between the state sector and the self-managing sector are arbitrary, for the self-managing farms possess common features with state enterprises. In particular they are created and dissolved

by state bodies; their funds and land constitute national assets that are made available to them by the state; their day-to-day management is effected by a person whose appointment is confirmed by a government administrative body; their production programmes are subordinated to the overall tasks confronting their particular sector; and their payments for work are made in cash and depend on a person's skills and responsibilities. It is only on individual farms that part of the output is sold to members of the collective at purchasing prices. In all these respects self-managing farms are similar to state enterprises. Yet they do differ from the latter in a strict sense of that term. For all economic decisions are made collectively by local management bodies which have the right to choose the direction of economic activities. Self-managing farms may establish their own regulations concerning work activities, and within certain limits, they determine the size of bonus payments and make decisions on a number of other issues. In these respects they are close to cooperatives.

Self-managing farms represent one of the forms of large-scale social production that has developed on land expropriated from foreign owners. Their development constitutes one of the trends in the evolution of agrarian relations in socialist-oriented countries.

As a result of the nationalisation of foreign-owned properties (including banking operations, enterprises processing agricultural products, and transportation) as well as the development of nationally-controlled large-scale social production, the direct influence of foreign capital on agriculture in states following the non-capitalist path has sharply declined. Yet foreign capital is still able to influence their economic development, including agricultural production.

The issue concerning the need to struggle for economic independence in these countries is by no means resolved. This refers not only to direct capital investments, whose sphere of application is being narrowed as the struggle for a socialist orientation' proceeds, but also to the fact that the economies of countries following non-capitalist approaches to development, particularly their agriculture, continue to be largely oriented toward the world capitalist market, whose commercial terms are defined by international monopoly capital.

Monopolies dump the prices that they pay for agricultural raw materials while selling industrial products at very high prices. They impose their own terms with regard to loans and credits and seek to hinder the socio-economic progress of young states. In such a context comprehensive cooperation with the world socialist system acquires crucial importance. Both the economic and technical assistance of socialist countries and their great moral support facilitate far-reaching socio-economic transformations that prepare the ground for a socialist reorganisation of society.

An important aspect of the agrarian policies of socialist-oriented countries concerns the systems of measures directed against the feudal class. In Tropical Africa this has been expressed, above all, in a decisive abolition of the traditional feudal-state forms of land-holding whose existence during the colonial period was encouraged by colonial policies. Two factors have played the key role in this respect. First, the abolition of the institution of chiefs and of the headmen appointed by them. Both have been replaced by elected bodies of power; secondly, the nationalisation of land, which deprived the upper layers of tribal societies of control over reserves of uncultivated land. This destroyed the very basis of feudal-state landownership, namely the political power of chiefs and the traditional system of assigning land to peasants. Reforms of this type were carried out in mainland Tanzania, in Guinea, and Mali.

Yet chiefs continue to exert considerable influence in villages, even though they have lost their traditional privileges. Referring to Tanzania, Clyde R. Ingle notes that "at the district level traditional leaders rank last, but at the village level traditional leaders are 'nearly as important as the party leaders'".[1] This view is shared by H. Bienen, an American sociologist, who notes that in spite of the termination of the institution of chiefs they continue to remain authoritative figures.[2] The influence of chiefs in Tanzania is also indicated by the fact that in spite of the ban on so-called *niarubandzhi*, which is a form of feudal exploitation of peasants by the tribal élite, it continued to be practised in the early 1970s so that the government had

[1] *The Journal of Developing Areas*, No. 2, 1972, p. 219.
[2] H. Bienen, *Tanzania. Party Transformation and Economic Development*, Princeton, 1967, p. 354.

to create special tribunals in the regions of Bukoba, Mwanza, and Kilimanjaro in order to expose it.

The continuing influence of chiefs is explained not only by the generally viable nature of traditions, but primarily by the fact that in their own villages chiefs are usually the largest owners of private land and also occasionally usurers and traders. This enables them to make peasants heavily dependent upon them.

As a result of reforms carried out in the socialist-oriented countries of Tropical Africa, the regulation of land relations has been taken away from the chiefs and fully transferred to the control of state administrations. For example, following the nationalisation of land the government of the Republic of Guinea forbade the purchase and sale of land plots, and any transfer of land is now possible only with the permission of authorities. "We have 4,300 communes," stated President of the Republic of Guinea Sékou Touré. "Land is the property of the nation, and in each commune it is in the charge of the municipal council. Our people have the right to exploit the land, but no longer the right to own it, since it is nationalized."[1] A similar situation has also developed in mainland Tanzania, where the government has the right to dispose of all uncultivated lands according to its discretion, while plots that are being cultivated or are occupied by buildings may be bought and sold, even though in principle they are viewed as the property of the Republic.

The nationalisation of land in socialist-oriented countries provides an important prerequisite for the future socialist transformation of society. It makes it possible to distribute land to both landless peasants and peasants possessing next to no land, and facilitates a transition from individual peasant farming to collective farming. In other words, the nationalisation of land makes it possible to create "an agrarian system which is the *most flexible* from the point of view of the transition to socialism".[2]

It should not be forgotten, however, that in the states of Tropical Africa that are following a non-capitalist path of development, traditional relations within the communities, though regulated by local organs of power, have on the

[1] Sékou Touré, "Our Liberation—Our Contribution to World Peace", *International Affairs*, No. 1, 1960, p. 70.
[2] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 314.

whole undergone few changes. Jean Suret-Canale is entirely right in emphasising this point when he writes: "The abolition of the institution of chiefs represented only one stage in the process of democratisation which was made relatively easy because of the extent to which this institution had been discredited. It was far more difficult to achieve profound democratisation at the level of the villages themselves within a traditional society accustomed to hierarchical and non-egalitarian structures. The struggle against the dominance of 'founding' families within villages and against prejudices concerning members of castes and former captives, against women's inferior status and also against gerontocracy is far from being over."[1]

The abolition of the institution of chiefs and of their rights to land has increased the influence of wealthy patriarchal peasants whose elevation in local status is now no longer hindered by representatives of the titled nobility. A number of researchers have noted the considerable influence of that layer of the peasantry on village life in socialist-oriented countries. In referring to Tanzanian villages, C. Ingle observes: "Research suggests that in most cases elders and cell leaders are the same people.... Where not actually elders, cell leaders perform in the village political system as elders have in the past.... The leader—cell leader, ward chairman, mayor, or other—can requisition resources from the community for community projects such as welcoming a visitor, building a road or well, or assisting the leader in times of need. He may receive special prices for items purchased."[2] An important indicator of the political role of wealthy peasants is provided by their close relations with local civil servants. In particular, P. Van Hekken and H. Van Velzen observe that civil servants serve as patrons for privileged farmers in protecting them from their less successful neighbours. They also help some of the wealthy farmers to obtain positions in local government councils, party cells and other official organisations. Whenever farmers are appointed to well-paid positions, which are few and far between, they are selected from among the rich. It is clear that civil servants derive advantages from such an alliance, for wealthy farmers give them valuable lands

[1] J. Suret-Canale, *La République de Guinée*, Paris, 1970, p. 168.
[2] *The Journal of Developing Areas*, No. 2, 1972, pp. 220, 223.

(formally, as a loan) and gifts as well as valuable political information.[1]

A similar situation existed in Ghana in the 1960s when its government was following a socialist-oriented road. When a survey was carried out by M. Kilson in 1964-65 it was found that in Agona (Central Region), of the ten persons, constituting the Local Council three were cocoa-brokers, six cocoa-farmers, and one lorry-owner. Similarly, of the twelve Councillors on the Local Council of Nsawam Aburi (Eastern Region) one was a cocoa-broker, two cocoa-farmers one contractor, two clerks, one merchant, one ex-civil servant and three persons' occupations were not identified. There were also twelve Councillors on the Local Council of Amansie (Ashanti), of whom four were cocoa-brokers, and eight cocoa-farmers who were also middle-size merchants.[2]

Thus the decay of feudal-state landownership in socialist-oriented countries of Tropical Africa produced a new alignment of social forces at the level of villages which served to increase the political role of wealthy peasants.

The struggle against the feudal nobility has been different in countries of the African continent's Northern Region that follow the non-capitalist path of development. While in the socialist-oriented countries of the Tropical Belt radical reforms terminated the privileges of the feudal élite relatively quickly, far-reaching forms of intervention had to be employed in North Africa, where private ownership of landed estates was sanctified by tradition. This largely determined the protracted, stage-by-stage implementation of anti-feudal reforms there.

In Egypt the first anti-feudal measures began to be carried out in 1952, at a time when the government was seeking to achieve economic growth with the help of private capital.[3] This factor, above all, explains their limited results.

[1] P. Van Hekken and H. Van Velzen, *Land Scarcity and Rural Inequality in Tanzania. Some Case Studies from Rungwe District*, Mouton, 1972, p. 47.

[2] *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, Vol. 2, p. 370.

[3] One of that reform's objectives was to secure a re-channeling of landlords' capital into industry, thus encouraging their transformation into "pure" capitalists. In this respect, however, its actual results were modest. In particular, G. I. Smirnova notes that "in 1955, for example, 46 million Egyptian pounds were released from the agrarian sphere but only 6 million pounds out of that total were invested in

The basic principles governing the reform concerning the redistribution of land were the following: 1) establishing the maximal size of privately-owned land at 300 feddans; 2) distribution of land (2-3 feddans) to peasants possessing little land in return for a considerable compensation; 3) an obligation on the part of those who receive land to cultivate it; 4) requiring persons receiving land to join cooperatives. At the same time rental payments for land were limited to 50 per cent of the net income in kind.

The corresponding legislation provided that landowners had the right to sell surpluses of land above established norms. In this connection V. K. Ariskin, a Soviet specialist in agrarian studies, observes that "the private sale of land reduced the land reserves which the agrarian reform administration had earmarked for distribution among landless peasants and peasants possessing little land (by 1954 the expected area of 600,000 feddans was reduced by 145,000 feddans)".[1] It was only on 15 June, 1964 that the private sale of land was prohibited altogether. But landlords found other loopholes to avoid expropriation. In particular, since the law provided that a landowner could possess not only a maximum of 200 feddans but also an additional 100 feddans for two children, landowners began registering land in the names of all their children. It is therefore not surprising that five years later official data indicated that there remained 483 landlord households which accounted for over half a million feddans, and of the 37 largest each possessed more than 5,000 feddans.[2]

In addition those peasants who did receive land found themselves highly indebted. Their compensation to landlords was not only seventy times larger than the land tax collected from their holdings but also included the cost of buildings, equipment and other forms of real estate. Such farmers undertook to repay their debts in equal portions over a period of thirty years. They were required to pay an addi-

industry."—G. I. Smirnova, "The State Sector as the Basis of Economic Independence in the ARE". *Arab Countries. History and Economics* (Proceedings of the Third All-Union Conference of Arabists, Yerevan, 1969), Moscow, 1974, p. 179 (in Russian).

[1] V. K. Ariskin, "The Agrarian Policy of the ARE Government", *Arab Countries. History and Economics*, p. 140.

[2] See *Socio-Economic Effects of Agrarian Reforms in Developing Countries*, Moscow, 1966, p. 131 (in Russian).

tional 15 per cent to cover expenditures associated with the sequestering and redistribution of land. On the average a feddan of land therefore cost the peasant 231 Egyptian pounds.[1]

Subsequent changes in the policies of the Egyptian government, which adopted a non-capitalist approach to development, reinforced the anti-feudal character of agrarian transformations. The reforms that followed corresponded to the interest of working peasants. In 1961, for example, the maximal area of land that could be owned by farmers, including lands belonging to immediate relatives (wife, children, etc.), was reduced to 100 feddans. That law affected approximately 250,000 feddans of land owned by 3,240 landlords. Yet not all this land was transferred to working farmers, because the decree permitted landowners to sell excess land to peasants within a year. In 1964, the right of landowners to compensation was abrogated and payments for the land being redistributed among peasants were reduced by 75 per cent. In 1969, the largest permissible size of land was reduced once more—to 50 feddans per person or 100 feddans per family.

As a result of these agrarian reforms the share of land belonging to small landowners (possessing 5 feddans or less) rose from 35.5 per cent to roughly 55 per cent of all cultivated land by the early 1970s. It thus increased by more than fifty per cent. The working layers of villages (the village poor and middle peasants) received at least one million feddans through both the redistribution of lands belonging to large-scale owners and cultivation of new lands.

Another consequence of the agrarian reform concerned increases in the land owned by wealthy farmers. This increase was somewhat lower than in the case of the village's working peasants and was achieved through the purchasing of lands. But the number of persons owning 100 feddans of land increased, while the social layer of large landowners possessing more than 100 feddans vanished altogether.

Far-reaching changes in land-holding relations are also taking place in Algeria, where in the early 1970s the government initiated a redistribution of land in favour of working masses. The law relating to land reform provides for a redistribution of state and wakf lands as well as surplus lands expropriated from large landowners to landless peasants, agricultural workers, share-croppers, and the urban unemployed. In this way it is planned to redistribute 3 million hectares of land, of which 2 million hectares must be expropriated from large-scale private landowners.[1] Thus, if one excludes the holdings of the village poor (plots of less than 10 hectares), this redistribution will encompass more than one-half of all privately-owned land.

While in countries following the capitalist path of development the redistribution of lands expropriated from foreigners and feudal lords is intended to contribute to the development of capitalism in agriculture, in socialist-oriented states these measures, which are carried out in the interests of working peasants, create conditions that are needed for a subsequent development along non-capitalist lines. In this respect the policies of the state and party leadership of these countries play an important role in terms of encouragement of farmers' participation in production cooperatives, as an alternative to capitalist development. A major objective of the agrarian reform in Egypt, for example, was to bring about a participation of farmers who had acquired private landownership in cooperatives that would provide for a single pattern of crop rotation as well as a joint utilisation of agricultural equipment. Within the cooperative societies that were thus established the farmers' plots were divided into three large fields, on each of which a single crop was raised. At the same time each member of the cooperative also possessed his own small plot in each of these fields and thus collected harvests of all three crops. Agricultural machines were used primarily for plowing, while sowing and harvesting were carried out on an individual basis with seeds and fertilisers received through the cooperative. L. N. Vatolina notes that "such a system has agronomic advantages, since it is more effective to raise a single crop on each of these fields. It also has important social advantages, since it gradually introduces

[1] V. K. Ariskin, Op. cit., p. 140.

[1] See K. Sutton, "Agrarian Reform in Algeria—the Conversion of Projects into Action", *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1974, p. 67.

the individualist fellahs to collective methods of work."[1]

The revenues of these cooperatives were divided approximately as follows: 40 per cent were channeled to the cooperative reserve fund, 30 per cent were dividends distributed in accordance with shares that matched the size of land holdings, 20 per cent were allocated to needs of social development, and 10 per cent were distributed to cooperative members in compensation for their own expenses.[2] Not only did the volume of output per unit of land increase in cooperatives but so did the incomes of producers. These increases, moreover, were not attributable to increases in labour productivity alone. For in addition, the taxes paid by cooperative members were substantially lower than former rental payments, credit was less expensive, and certain types of technical assistance were made available free of charge. Aside from this, the villages' wealthy upper crust and landlords now had fewer possibilities for exploiting cooperative members since landowners possessing more than five feddans were not allowed to enter cooperatives.

The agrarian reform initiated in Algeria in the early 1970s also provides for the development of production cooperatives. Beyond this the Algerian government encourages the organisation of a diversity of production cooperatives. In cooperatives of the type of *groupement de mise en valeur*, members retain individually cultivated holdings while carrying out joint work in improving the productivity of uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands. There are similar cooperatives, called *coopératives d'exploitation en commun*, in which each member receives incomes from his own holdings but cultivates them in accordance with decisions made jointly by all members of the cooperative. Less developed forms of cooperation may be found in service associations within which a variety of services are shared in carrying out many of the tasks associated with the cultivation of land and joint activities are undertaken in purchasing equipment and selling output. These associations thus combine the functions of marketing and supply cooperatives with those of production cooperatives.

[1] L. N. Vatolina, "Socio-Economic Consequences of Agrarian Reforms in the United Arab Republic", *Socio-Economic Effects of Agrarian Reforms in Developing Countries*, p. 135.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

An important role has also been assigned to more advanced production cooperatives called *coopératives agricoles de production collective*. In these cooperatives peasants pool their land and other means of production, engage in collective purchase and marketing activities and distribute their joint income in accordance with the number of hours that each contributes. Both persons who have received land under the terms of the reform and small landowners may join such cooperatives. The type of cooperatives that Algeria's working peasants prefer may be seen in the outcome of the initial stage of this reform during which 258 *groupements de mise en valeur* were established in the early 1970s, as well as 707 *coopératives d'exploitation en commun* and 1,349 *coopératives agricoles de production collective*.[1]

These data reflect the rapid development of more advanced cooperatives, which meet the interest of working peasants more fully.

In the socialist-oriented countries of Tropical Africa similar measures have been taken in establishing farming production cooperatives whose objective is to avoid the negative consequences of capitalist development. In particular, the government of Guinea developed a plan in August 1960 that provided for three stages in the development of village production cooperatives. The first stage provided for the establishment of collective fields that would be worked with the help of agricultural equipment belonging to individual peasants. Income from sales of the corresponding product was to be allocated to village committees for meeting collective expenses (the holding of festivities, reception of foreigners, etc.). During the second stage the size of the collective fields was to be increased and their cultivation was to be carried out with the help of agricultural equipment rented from the state. From 10 to 30 per cent of the income received from collective work were to be allocated to a joint cooperative fund, while the remainder was to be distributed among peasants according to the quantity and quality of their labour contributions. Finally, the third stage envisaged the establishment of more advanced cooperatives within which major agricultural activities would be carried out collectively and family plots would play a secondary role.[2]

[1] K. Sutton, Op. cit., p. 62.
[2] See N. I. Gavrilov, Op. cit., p. 343.

That plan also provided for substantial state assistance to members of cooperatives through centres of agricultural modernisation whose function was to disseminate advanced agricultural techniques and also assist cooperatives with equipment, credit and seeds.

In practice, however, attempts to carry out this plan met with big difficulties. These resulted primarily from the dominant role of wealthy peasants, who used the incomes of cooperatives to promote their own interests, within the villages' elected bodies—the village committees. As a result, working peasants were not interested in these arrangements. The village social structure inherited from the past thus impeded genuine cooperation in agricultural production that would serve the interests of working peasants. For in situations where poor peasants are asked to cooperate with wealthy peasants who have concentrated the major means of production within their own households, the former inevitably find themselves in a losing position irrespective of the forms that such cooperation assumes. J. Suret-Canale was therefore quite right in saying that "obviously neither collective fields nor collective plantations, even if they were to be cultivated on an entirely voluntary basis, represent a promising form of management belonging to the future. Instead they constitute a utilisation for modern objectives of structures belonging to the past."[1]

By 1964, only 550 medium-sized production cooperatives with a membership of 60,000 had been created. It is therefore not surprising that in 1965-66 the political leaders of the Republic of Guinea began to reconsider their policy relating to agricultural production cooperation. Without abandoning their objectives they chose to emphasise the political aspect of that problem. This was one of the major reasons for the creation of local revolutionary committees in villages to protect the interests of working peasants. Beginning in 1975, relatively small but highly profitable cooperatives were established in Guinea, which were named "mechanised production teams". Their members include primarily young people. Villages provide such teams with workers, a field and seeds. They also receive agricultural machines and equipment. In case

[1] J. Suret-Canale, Op. cit., p. 271.

of need, village residents may assist them in clearing bushes and in weeding and harvesting activities. The entire harvest is then distributed among village residents, whose income from the corresponding sales permits them to pay taxes and to meet the production expenses of their teams.

The impossibility of developing genuine production cooperation in the interest of working peasants without altering existing social structures is also confirmed by the experience of Mali when that country's government was following socialist-oriented path of development. There, too, collective fields were established that did not pass the test of viability. This was noted by the Mali Republic's former president Modibo Keita in 1966 in his New Year's address to the nation. He said, in particular, that a socialist reconstruction of agriculture and of millions of peasant households embracing more than 90 per cent of the population was a difficult task which inevitably encountered a certain measure of opposition from those who exploited farmers in various degrees.[1] This opposition constitutes the main obstacle to the progressive changes within the agriculture of young African states following the non-capitalist path of development.

In this connection the experience of Tanzania is both interesting and instructive. For a struggle is currently taking place in that country for carrying out the principal task defined by the Arusha Declaration, namely: "To build and maintain socialism it is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their Government and their cooperatives."[2] It is in pursuit of this objective that the plans prepared by Tanzania's leaders assign a decisive role in the transformation of agriculture to "socialist villages" called *Ujamaa*, as well as to the creation of large state farms. These *Ujamaa*, which rely on communal traditions, are intended to become the principal form of production cooperation in villages. According to TANU leaders, *Ujamaa* villages are destined to promote "the development of forms of economic activity which en-

[1] Quoted in: K. V. Vladimirova, V. V. Zhalnin, *The Republic of Mali: Socio-Economic Problems*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 44-45 (in Russian).

[2] J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism (Uhuru na Ujamaa)*, Dar es Salaam, 1969, pp. 233-34.

courage collective and cooperative efforts and avoid wide differences of wealth and income".[1]

There were nearly 2,700 *Ujamaa* in Tanzania by the middle of 1971, and they comprised 840,000 members, or 6.3 per cent of the entire population. At the same time their numbers continued to increase rapidly, and by mid-1975, Tanzania had approximately 7,000 such villages with a population of nearly 9 million peasants.

It should be noted that in fact the *Ujamaa* combine highly contradictory and occasionally opposite forms of production relations. *The African Communist* distinguishes three types of villages that have proclaimed "socialist principles". First, there are villages which are run completely on communal lines; in the second group, there are, aside from a common field, substantial private holdings; while in the third, collective forms are largely employed in the interests of "prosperous farmers". In the last of these groups farmers retain their households and work on an *Ujamaa* plot two or three days a week.[2]

An example of a genuine collective farm is provided by the village of Mbatvacha in the Tangda District. It was founded by a group of members of the TANU Youth League. The majority of its members are former workers from nearby plantations. Work activities in producing sisal and food crops are carried out jointly. Each person, moreover, is required to participate in common tasks every day. Incomes are distributed according to the quantity of labour contributed. Members of the cooperative have the right to cultivate modest family plots.

Such cooperatives can indeed serve as a model of a socialist-oriented agrarian reform. Much depends, however, on the general character of agrarian policy and on the continuation of its anti-capitalist orientation. For otherwise as the journal *The African Communist* rightly notes, these cooperatives may be reduced to the position of Israeli kibbutzim, which constitute a specific form of capitalist exploitation of farmers.

But by the mid-1970s there were still very few such production cooperatives of an advanced type in the *Ujamaa*

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[1] *The African Communist*, No. 39, 1969, p. 28.
[2] *Ibid.*, No. 25, 1971, p. 75.

villages, and in the vast majority of cases private forms of cultivation continued to play a leading role there.

It is important to recognise that agricultural production cooperatives are not a new phenomenon in Africa in general, particularly in Tanzania. For the practice of successive cultivation of plots belonging to kinsmen or neighbours in the framework of extended-family groups and communities existed even before the arrival of colonialists and has been preserved to this day, just as joint work for social needs has continued, including work in fields that are meant for creating social insurance reserves. But in the past such cooperation was always advantageous primarily to the patriarchal élite who gained most from such a sequential cultivation of plots (whether in communities or in extended families) because they possessed large holdings. Moreover, they made use of insurance reserves to serve their own interests.

It may well be asked, of course, to what extent these traditions of production cooperatives can be utilised in the process of a non-capitalistic transformation of the village. Far from denying the need to make use of such community traditions, Marxism, moreover, emphasises that need. According to Engels, "it is not only possible but inescapable that ... the countries which have just managed to make a start on capitalist production, and where tribal institutions or relics of them are still intact, will be able to use these relics of communal ownership and the corresponding popular customs as a powerful means of considerably shortening their advance to socialist society.... And this applies ... to all countries at the pre-capitalist stage of development."[1]

The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia provided a brilliant example of the utilisation of popular traditions in the socialist transformation of villages. For the viability of Russian peasant traditions relating to the communal ownership and utilisation of land facilitated its nationalisation and the prohibition of its purchase and sale. The experience of the USSR has shown how such traditions can first be freed from feudal-capitalist implications before being placed at the service of socialist development.

The traditions of communal land-holding and land use as well as of cooperative forms of production may also be

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[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1976, pp. 403-04.

examined in terms of the objectives of a non-capitalist transformation of the African village. The inherent dualism of communities noted by Marx—namely the contradiction between communal landownership and individual land use—"suggests the following alternative: either the proprietory trend will prevail over the collective one, or the latter will prevail over the former. Everything depends on the historical environment within which it finds itself."[1]

Historical experience shows that members of the wealthy rural upper crust seek to utilise communal traditions in pursuit of their own objectives as they adapt to new organisational forms. Many researchers have stressed that extended-family relations constitute an important obstacle to the development of the present-day cooperative movement: when a cooperative is based on an extended family this merely strengthens the latter, they say. According to X. Flores, "the hierarchization of family ties which lasts long after attaining adulthood ... often conflicts with the principle of voluntary membership. This situation of subjection, not only of sons to father but also of the young to the old, also hampers acceptance of the principle of 'one man, one vote'... This dependence of the young on the old, which in general is the dependence of the entire family on its head, also affects the degree to which the community is involved in cooperative activities. Sometimes only the head of clan or extended family joins the cooperative, and because of the community's labour and crop distribution system, the benefits of the cooperative with which the family is connected through its head are largely appropriated by the latter."[2]

Production cooperatives that are formed on the basis of extended families strengthen traditional patriarchal relations, since the heads of such families control not only marketing and credit, but also the production activities of cooperative members on the communal field, and in this way they enjoy additional possibilities for making them work to their own advantage. In such cases extended-family relations that hinder genuine cooperation are reproduced in cooperative forms.

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[1] Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 19, Berlin, 1962, S. 404.

[2] X. Flores, *A Review of Rural Cooperation in Developing Areas. Institutional Problems in Modernization of African Agriculture*. p. 229.

The theories of socialist transformation of the village that are proposed by party and state leaders in socialist-oriented countries are not Marxist. Above all they express the interests of broad segments of the working peasantry exploited by international monopoly capital. The programmes that they propose are marked by a deep-rooted anti-capitalist orientation that is associated with a search for an alternative to the capitalist solution of the agrarian question.

The leaders of young states pursuing a non-capitalist approach to development not only assert but also show in their deeds their determination to orient themselves towards socialism, and also their ability to carry out policies that facilitate socialist-oriented reforms. Yet, while the agrarian programmes that they propose retain an essentially peasant character they do go beyond the usual petty-bourgeois framework, since their objective, which they view as a central element in the development of socialism in the village, is to socialise means of production and to organise production cooperatives among peasants. As revolutionary transformations in the villages are becoming more comprehensive such programmes, in effect, assist in the establishment of conditions that serve first to isolate and then separate the exploiting rural élite from the community.

The struggle for non-capitalist solutions to the agrarian question is a lengthy and complex process. As revolutionary transformations develop in the villages and as foreign and feudal landownership is eliminated, increasing attention is being focussed on the fate of wealthy peasants and especially of those among them, who rely on patriarchal-feudal and usury methods combined with the exploitation of hired labour. It is impossible to immediately expropriate the farms of these peasants at the present stage of agrarian reforms (in the late 1970s and early 1980s), because there are neither political nor social or technical prerequisites for this. Yet, as feudal-state forms of land-holding and the bulk of landed estates are abolished, it is precisely wealthy farmers who become one of the chief social forces that impede the non-capitalist-oriented reforms. Further progress along the socialist-oriented path thus begins to depend increasingly on neutralisation of that social layer. This is also the conclusion at which a growing number of progressively-minded Africans arrive. Referring to Tanzania, *The African Communist* observes that "the hope for Ujamaa may lie

in cementing alliances between the poor farmers and the dispossessed peasantry, against the 'kulaks'. To wait for the formation of a large agricultural proletariat, however, would be to surrender power, totally, to the rural capitalists, who are already well entrenched. The development of socialism in the rural areas becomes then the only way in which capitalism can be arrested and the rural capitalists in Tanzania eventually expropriated."[1]

A successful non-capitalist transformation of African villages largely depends on the political solidarity of working peasants, on the establishment of constraints on exorbitant rents and their gradual elimination and on the development of production cooperatives that serve the working layers of society rather than the exploiting elements. For the first time in history this course was borne out by the agrarian reconstruction in the USSR. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium, said at the July 1978 CPSU Central Committee Plenum that the Soviet Union "began the liberation of the peasants, the largest toiling class of the world, from oppression, political inequality, and ignorance".[2] Of special interest is the passage to socialism bypassing capitalism of the Soviet Republics of Central Asia.

[1] *The African Communist*, No. 45, 1971, p. 84.
[2] *Pravda*, July 4, 1978, p. 1.

Chapter V

THE TRANSITION FROM PRE-CAPITALIST TO SOCIALIST RELATIONS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN EXPERIENCE

It has already been noted that unique processes are taking place in African socialist-oriented countries. These are largely explained by the concrete historical situation within which they occur. Yet these processes also express certain general trends which are characteristic of a transition to socialism by Eastern countries bypassing, on the whole, the stage of capitalist development. The theoretical as well as the practical possibility of such a transition was noted by Lenin in his report to the Second Congress of the Comintern. He emphasised that "if the victorious revolutionary proletariat conducts systematic propaganda among them (among backward peoples—*Y.I.*), and the Soviet governments come to their aid with all the means at their disposal—in that event it will be mistaken to assume that the backward peoples must inevitably go through the capitalist stage of development".[1]

The peoples of the Soviet East (in particular the peoples of Central Asia), were first to take advantage of that possibility. Within the lifetime of a single generation they were able to effect a transition to socialism bypassing the stage of capitalist development. It is true, of course, that this transition had a number of special and possibly unique characteristics as it took place within the context of dictatorship of the proletariat and direct working-class support by economically developed regions within a single state. Nevertheless, that experience cannot fail to embody some general laws governing the transition of peoples who have thrown off the colonialist yoke from primarily pre-capitalist relations to socialist ones.

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 244.

The very fact that such a transition was successfully carried out by all the peoples of Soviet Central Asia, each of them possessing their own national traits attributable to particular characteristics of their historical development, is evidence that their experience is not limited to a national framework and may also be relevant to other countries that have liberated themselves from colonial oppression.

Specific Characteristics of Pre-Revolutionary Economies

Before the Great October Socialist Revolution a part of the territory of Central Asia belonged to the Russian Empire under the name of the Turkestan Territory, while the other belonged to the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva. While they were formally sovereign states, in fact they were fully dependent on Russian tsarism. The basic population of those regions consisted of Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kirghiz and Tajiks.

Russian tsarism exploited Central Asia as a source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods. With this end in view railways and enterprises processing agricultural produce were built, and the mining industry made some progress, too.

At the same time tsarism systematically hindered the development of industries that were not associated with the primary processing of raw materials, since this could have caused a decline in the profits received by capitalists within Russia itself. The economy of pre-revolutionary Central Asia was therefore largely agrarian in character: 80 per cent of Turkestan's population, nearly 82 per cent of that in the Emirate of Bukhara and approximately 95 per cent of that in the Khanate of Khiva were engaged in agriculture.[1] The relative share of the urban population in the overall population of Central Asia was approximately 10 per cent.[2] The development of industry had not proceeded

[1] *From Medieval Times to the Peaks of Modern Progress.* Concerning the Historical Experience of the Development of the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan from Pre-Capitalist Relations to Socialism, Moscow, 1965, p. 137 (in Russian).

[2] A. M. Aminov, *The Economic Development of Central Asia (The Colonial Period).* From the Second Half of the 19th Century to the First World War, Tashkent, 1959, p. 158 (in Russian).

beyond its very earliest stages. Thus in 1916, on the eve of the Revolution, there were 706 industrial enterprises in the Turkestan Territory employing only 60,000 persons, or less than one per cent of the population.[1] These were chiefly engaged in the primary processing of cotton, which was the main item of export to Central Russia's industrial regions.

Russian capital played a dominant role in industry and controlled the ginning as well as the oil-manufacturing industries. But the peoples of Central Asia were also exploited by British, French and German monopolies operating primarily in the mining and oil industries. Capitalists were merciless in exploiting the cheap labour provided by the local population, and incurred almost no expenses for equipment and the mechanisation of production. The length of the working day was 10 to 12 hours. The miserly wages were continuously being reduced under all kinds of pretexts. Workers of local nationalities were only given unskilled jobs. Many of them were peasants who had left their villages temporarily in search of work.[2]

Craft industries played an important role in Central Asia's pre-revolutionary economy and accounted for nearly one third of its industrial output. Craftsmen sold their wares on markets or else to middlemen who were often also active as usurers. Such traders took advantage of the craftsmen's constant need for money and purchased their products at very low prices.

Craft industries were engaged in complete production cycles, manufacturing ready products for use in the economy or in the household. There was virtually no division of labour within the framework of individual industries. Accordingly, neither centralised nor decentralised (involving domestic production) forms of manufacture developed. The growing need for urban products was met by imports from Russia rather than by further developing local production. This in turn undermined and displaced craft industries by Russian capital and led to a growing exploitation of craftsmen by usury traders.

On the whole, the economy of Central Asia remained primarily agrarian. As in the case of Africa, following the

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[2] *The History of the Uzbek SSR*, Tashkent, 1957, p. 29 (in Russian).

establishment of colonial rule the Central Asian agriculture began to specialise in a single crop, which in this case was cotton. It was purchased by Russian monopolies at low prices. Its role was similar to that of cocoa in Ghana, of ground nuts in Senegal, and of cotton and coffee in Uganda.

At the same time possibilities for expanding the areas under cotton through the cultivation of new lands were extremely limited. Because of the dry desert climate agriculture was concentrated primarily on irrigated lands, which before the Revolution accounted for only 2 per cent of the territory.[1] As a result, increases in the production of cotton were accompanied by reductions in the areas under food crops. Peasants had to purchase food on the market and this created an additional market for products originating in European Russia.

The tsarist policy of exploiting the peoples of Central Asia also expressed itself in a growing expropriation of lands belonging to the native population for the benefit of Russian settlers. Land distributed to settlers was obtained through flagrant violation of the local population's right to land. Migration of settlers from Russia was to have secured forcible Russification of outlying territories. Members of the local population were deprived of the right to manage water resources, and this interfered with the irrigation of fields and the grazing of cattle. Even Turkestan's Governor General Kuropatkin recognised, in a report to the tsar, that "during the last thirty years and especially during the last 12 years the Kirghiz have been pushed in all directions. Since 1904 in the Semirechie Region alone, they have been deprived of several million desyatins[2] of land, frequently in disregard that these lands might be vitally necessary to the Kirghiz themselves."[3] Russian peasants from the country's central regions were settled on most of the lands that the tsar's administrators had appropriated from the local population, and by the beginning of the twentieth century they already numbered more than 100,000. Most of them did not know local conditions and soon experienced ruin, losing their land and

[1] A. M. Aminov, Op. cit., p. 144.

[2] 1 desyatin = 1.0925 hectares.

[3] Quoted in V. A. Kozachkovsky, *From Feudalism to the Victory of Socialism*, Dushanbe, 1966, p. 40 (in Russian).

shifting to work as hired labourers for Russian kulaks.

Capitalist farms, in the strict sense of that word, where agricultural machines were used and where both Russian settlers and local peasants were employed, were established primarily in steppe regions. They specialised in grain production and their technology was essentially similar to that employed in Russia. As for cotton-growing regions, the attempts of Russian capitalists to develop an unfamiliar, plantation type of farming relying on hired labour and traditional equipment usually ended in failure. As in Africa, the low productivity of labour frequently made it impossible to meet the needs of hired workers on a commercial basis.

Because of the reduction of areas under food crops and of the growing demands deriving from the development of markets, the average Central Asian peasant was increasingly in need of money. Money was needed for purchasing food, fodder for cattle, and such household items as matches, soap and kerosene. But since available money was never sufficient it was necessary to turn to creditors. The latter, as in the case of most colonies, could act in various capacities—an agent of a Russian firm advancing money for the future harvest, a bank representative offering loans, a local usurer mercilessly exploiting his fellow villagers, or an owner of a cart and horses making money by hiring them out. All these forms of credit generally carried exorbitant interest rates.[1]

There existed, in short, a highly ramified and diversified system of money-lending in Central Asia that resulted in debt servitude for peasants. It mainly consisted of capitalist commercial firms and banks that operated through a large number of local middlemen. Being well familiar with local conditions, they exploited the difficult situation of the peasants, lending money at interest rates that at best ranged from 40 to 60 per cent per year.[2] Not infrequently the middleman-usurer demanded a 100 or even 200 per cent annual interest. In most cases the security for these loans consisted of a share of future harvests. In this way middlemen pur-

[1] See R. Kh. Aminova, *The Agrarian Policy of Soviet Power in Uzbekistan, 1917-20*, Tashkent, 1963 (in Russian).

[2] See V. A. Kozachkovsky, Op. cit., p. 27.

chased harvests in advance and on extremely favourable terms. In addition, they frequently cheated peasants in measuring, weighing, and counting money.

Once the peasant became the debtor to such a money-lending trader, he usually could not free himself from that debt. The more he worked the greater the amount of money he paid his creditors. When ruined by enormous interest rates and cheating he could not repay his debt, his land was confiscated together with all equipment. This type of indebtedness to commercial money-lending traders brought poverty and ruin which one journal of that time described as follows: "We are witnessing in Turkestan an outrageous picture of agrarian labour which is decomposing alive and within which parasitic usurers are swarming, gnawing and growing in numbers. Their very existence is possible only through impoverishment and expropriation of the population."[1]

The most fertile and best irrigated lands belonged to the exploiting classes. In the Emirate of Bukhara, for example, more than 85 per cent of the cultivated land belonged to the Emir, his administrators, and the *bais*,[2] who represented the upper exploiting layer in the village. Only 5.3 per cent of the irrigated lands in the Khanate of Khiva belonged to working peasants, even though they constituted 90 per cent of the population. A generally similar situation also existed in the of Turkestan. Territory

The feudal lords controlled water as well as land. They established a strict hierarchy specifying who would be first to get water, who would be second, etc. The people reinterpreted these rules in a simple observation: "Irrigation canals pass through the fields of the rich while roads pass through the farm of the poor." Working peasants experienced a continuing shortage of water, which was first made available to *bais*. Its distribution was often accompanied by fights and homicide.

The overwhelming majority of the agrarian population consisted of poor farmers. In Turkestan on the eve of the October Revolution 64.5 per cent of non-nomadic households

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[1] Quoted in: A. M. Aminov, Op. cit., p. 171.

[2] The word *bai* means lord. The upper layers of *bais* were large landowners, while the lower ones were made up of the wealthy village upper class who exploited peasants largely through feudal methods combined with trading and money-lending.

were in the category of poor, 22.4 per cent were in the middle stratum, 13 per cent belonged to wealthy farmers, and 0.1 per cent were large landed estates. A substantial number of non-nomadic farmers (35.5 per cent) did not possess any draught animals, while 14.8 per cent had no sown areas.[1] Having no draught animals and equipment many poor farmers were unable to work their own land. They rented it to wealthy farmers while working as share-croppers and as seasonal workers.

Share-cropping constituted the dominant form of exploitation of peasants. If the landowner advanced not only land to a peasant but also water, draught animals, equipment, a monetary loan, seeds and fodder, the peasant was required to surrender 75 per cent of his crop and also return the equipment and money that was borrowed. When the share-cropper employed only the owner's land, water and equipment, he was required to surrender 40 per cent of his crop. And when he used only land and water the owner received 12 to 25 per cent of the crop.

In addition to share-cropping the indenturing of labour services in return for livelihood was also widely practised, as was the use of hired labour, but to a lesser extent. As in Africa, since quite often most members of villages were relatives, relations of exploitation frequently developed within the framework of kinship ties. Extended-family production relations of the type that were described in the context of African practices were thus a common phenomenon in the case of Central Asia as well.

Apart from their payments to landowners for renting land and for the use of equipment, working peasants also paid taxes to the state. The variety of taxes and duties included taxes on land, on cattle, quit-rent and community taxes. Peasants were also responsible for a variety of labour duties in constructing and repairing canals and irrigation facilities, bridges, dams, etc. Duties were also charged for the use of bridges, ferries, orchards, gardens, camels, horses, mules and water. It was often remarked that "only the air isn't taxed".

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[1] T. U. Usubaliev, *The Republics of the Soviet East as an Example of Lenin's Theory of Transition of Formerly Backward Peoples to Socialism Bypassing the Capitalist Stage of Development*, Frunze, 1971, p. 5 (in Russian).

Nomadic cattle-raisers, whose economies were of a self-sufficient householding type formed an important part of Central Asia's population. Among them 11.2 per cent did not possess any cattle, and 70 per cent possessed but small herds, a poor source of subsistence under the conditions of extensive nomadic cattle-raising. The feudal upper class of *bais* (3.2 per cent of the households) controlled 34-40 per cent of the cattle, and for all practical purposes they also controlled enormous grazing lands, even though land was formally viewed as social property.[1] There still existed tribes headed by chiefs, and members of nomadic communities were usually linked by kinship ties. The widely practised forms of exploitation included those described earlier, in which a poor member of the community received cattle in return for an obligation to feed it and to carry out certain types of work for a *bai*. As in the case of Africa, the caring for cattle was in fact a form of labour obligation that gave the feudal lord access to a cheap source of labour power.

In many ways the agrarian structure of pre-revolutionary Central Asia was similar to that which developed in African countries during the colonial period. Commercial and usury rather than industrial capital had acquired a dominant position. Feudal methods of exploitation combined with usury were widely practised both in large landed estates and in wealthy peasant economies. Generally the village poor had not yet been transformed into wage-workers, their pauperisation proceeding much more rapidly than the development of the proletarian element.[2]

Russian landowners and capitalists joined local exploiters in seeking to inhibit the development of education and culture among the local population. As a result its general cultural level was very low. Many of the local peo-

[1] T. U. Usubaliev, *Leninism—a Powerful Source of Friendship and Brotherhood Among Peoples*, Moscow, 1974, p. 36 (in Russian).

[2] According to some estimates the average number of landless persons in villages of Turkestan who lived through the sale of their labour power alone fluctuated between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent, while settled farmers possessing neither draught animals nor sown areas formed 14.8 per cent of the rural population. This does not include poor peasants, who represented more than 50 per cent of the rural population.—R. Kh. Aminova, Op. cit., p. 64; T. U. Usubaliev, *The Republics of the Soviet East as an Example of Lenin's Theory of Transition of Formerly Backward Peoples to Socialism Bypassing the Capitalist Stage of Development*, p. 5.

ples had no written language of their own. The population was almost entirely illiterate: only 0.5 to 2 per cent could read and write.

In short, pre-revolutionary Central Asia possessed many common features with the socio-economic structure of African countries during the colonial period. In some respects, moreover, particularly with regard to its level of industrial development and literacy, it lagged substantially behind many of today's African states. Nevertheless, it is the peoples of this very region who, through socialist construction, succeeded in attaining the level of developed states in the course of a single generation. Their experience displays the basic laws of transition to socialism bypassing capitalism.

Revolutionary-Democratic Transformations in the Village

As has already been emphasised, the agriculture of Central Asia developing under the conditions of exploitation by Russian capital had traits that were largely similar to those of developing countries in Africa, while differing from those observed in Europe. In many ways this fact determined the nature of the subsequent agrarian transformations and posed a series of new theoretical as well as practical problems. In identifying possibilities for constructing socialism in such a setting it was therefore necessary to take local historical conditions into account as well as the general laws that were made apparent by the practice of the revolutionary struggle in European countries. "All nations will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable," Lenin wrote, "but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life."[1]

The practice of agrarian transformations in the Soviet East has demonstrated conclusively that in the presence of pre-capitalist production relations, socialist development must be preceded by revolutionary-democratic measures which free the peasantry from feudal and pre-feudal forms

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 69-70.

of exploitation. A comparison of the processes of social transformations in the villages of Central Asia with those of the European part of Russia, however, shows differences in the intensity and methods of anti-feudal and socialist transformations and in the relative duration of the democratic and the socialist stages of revolution in village life. These differences between revolutionary processes in Europe and in Eastern countries were first noted by V. I. Lenin: "Russia stands on the border-line between the civilised countries and the countries which this war has for the first time definitely brought into the orbit of civilisation—all the Oriental, non-European countries—she could and was, indeed, bound to reveal certain distinguishing features; although these, of course, are in keeping with the general line of world development, they distinguish her revolution from those which took place in the West-European countries and introduce certain partial innovations as the revolution moves on to the countries of the East."[1]

Such "partial innovations" in the case of Eastern countries are clearly evident in a comparison of the agrarian transformations that were carried out in Central Asia with those of European Russia.

In European Russia the anti-feudal democratic stage of the Revolution took only several months. This relative ease and speed with which the Revolution brought the feudal structures to an end may be explained by the fact that the latter were based exclusively on the ownership of large estates while wealthy peasants represented agricultural bourgeoisie. The active participation of the peasantry in dismantling the large estates whose lands they appropriated also marked the abolition of feudal forms of exploitation. Thus the democratic stage of the revolution within the villages of the European part of Russia did not require a preliminary class struggle within the peasantry itself. Lenin noted that "the peasantry as a whole had already turned against the landowners, and supported the working class, because it saw they were fulfilling the wishes of the peasant masses, that they were real working-class fighters, and not those who, in league with the landowners, had betrayed the peasantry. But we know perfectly well that a struggle was only just beginning within the peasantry."[2]

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 477.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 133.

A different situation developed in Central Asia, where wealthy peasants as well as large landowners widely relied on feudal methods of exploitation. There the democratic stage of the revolution in village life resulted in a political differentiation within the peasantry that divided it into struggling social groups. The process of democratic transformation proceeded much more slowly. Even under the dictatorship of the proletariat aimed at ending feudal and capitalist exploitation it took more than ten years to liquidate pre-capitalist relations. During that time the principle that is asserted by the peasantry of Africa today, namely, that "land belongs to those who work it", was systematically applied.[1]

Formally, a systematic implementation of that principle would meet bourgeois-democratic expectations since private forms of commodity farming would not be fully terminated. Yet that principle was directed not only against large landowners, but also against wealthy farmers and therefore signified more than the solution of purely bourgeois-democratic tasks, producing the immediate prerequisites for a socialist transformation of the rural community. As a result of the systematic application of the principle that "land belongs to those who work it" the proportion of exploiting classes in many districts of Central Asia inhabited by sedentary population by 1929 declined from 13 per cent to 1.5 per cent.[2] This also represented a major blow to capitalism since village exploiters relying on feudal methods also employed wage-workers on their farms.

Various forms of cooperation developed in the Soviet Central Asian republics already during the period of liqui-

[1] The reader may infer the extent of the difficulties that were encountered in the democratic stage of the revolution in the villages by the dictatorship of the proletariat from the fact that three years after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, in defining the tasks of Turkestan's Communists, V. I. Lenin wrote that the general task was to be "not communism, but the overthrow of feudalism".—V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, p. 198.
[2] See R. Kh. Aminova, "The Land and Water Resources Reform in Uzbekistan (Basic Stages and Specific Features)". Papers of the Seminar "The Experience of Agrarian Transformations in the Republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and Its Significance for Liberated Countries", Frunze, 1971, p. 3 (in Russian).

dation of pre-capitalist production relations. This cooperation included the spheres of crediting, marketing, supplies and, to a lesser extent, production in which, however, it ensured the best combination of private and social interest. At the same time state enterprises were also established. Above all these were large capitalist enterprises that had been nationalised. Similar trends may be observed in the agrarian policy of those African countries that are following a socialist orientation.

Lenin's decree on the nationalisation of land provided a basis for agrarian transformations throughout the USSR. Its main principles as applied to the conditions of Central Asia provided for a termination of control over land by persons who did not work it as well as for a redistribution of expropriated lands on an egalitarian basis. That redistribution was guided by the rule that confiscated lands would be transferred first to share-croppers and agrarian workers, and then to peasants possessing insufficient land. Thus from the very beginning of the Revolution the land legislation went beyond the usual bourgeois-democratic framework, meeting the interests of wide masses of working people. This feature of revolutionary-democratic transformations is largely being repeated today in a number of countries following a non-capitalist way of development.

It should be stressed that in Soviet Central Asia the effective nationalisation of land met with greater difficulties than it did in European Russia, for in Central Asia it was directly aimed at nearly all exploiting sections of village society. The opposition to democratic transformations that this produced on the part of both feudal lords and wealthy peasants was therefore more intense. At the same time, given the general political, social and cultural backwardness, continuing patriarchal-feudal relations and the influence of the clergy, working peasants found it far more difficult than their Russian counterparts to raise themselves to the level of a conscious struggle in carrying out anti-feudal measures. In the case of the republics of Central Asia it was far more difficult to pursue the democratic stage of the revolution to its logical end. It did, however, serve as a basis for a direct transition to a socialist reorganisation of village life bypassing the capitalist stage of development. Because of these difficulties the democratic stage of the revolution in village life was carried out in separate phases

as the forms of class antagonism became more mature. This, in turn, required a prolonged period of time to complete democratic transformations. A similar division of overall transformations into phases may be observed in African countries that have taken the road to socialism.

In the republics of Central Asia the democratic stage of the agrarian reform may be divided into three phases. The first (1918-1920) terminated state-feudal and other forms of large-scale landownership. The second (1921-1922) created a greater equality in the forms of land use available to Russian peasants and to local peasants. This concluded the first round of the democratic stage of the agrarian reform. The following two years were devoted to a preparation of the second round of the democratic stage of the agrarian reform, which was also its third phase (1925-1929). It was concerned with carrying out the land and water resources reform aimed against wealthy farmers practising feudal methods of exploitation as well as against large-scale landowners. These revolutionary-democratic transformations created the prerequisites for initiating the socialist stage of the agrarian reform that began in 1930.

During the first phase (1918-1920) state-feudal landholding was terminated and lands belonging to the largest feudal lords, members of the tsar's administration and to local and Russian capitalists were expropriated. Approximately 100,000 hectares of land were thus confiscated in Turkestan.[1] Farms of the plantation type were nationalised, while unsettled lands and those that had been rented out to peasants were transferred to the poorest native population. The irrigation facilities of the feudal lords were nationalised to be used primarily in irrigating land belonging to the poor and middle peasants.

It was at that phase of the agrarian reform in 1919 that agrarian workers formed an association named Koshchi. Its objective was to unite poor and middle peasantry in fighting the *bais*, and to assist needy agrarian workers providing them with credits and agricultural implements. Initially, however, Koshchi was still too weak to appreciably influence the course of the agrarian reform. Early attempts to confiscate the farms of individual *bais* and to redistribute

[1] See R. Kh. Aminova, *The Agrarian Policy of Soviet Power in Uzbekistan, 1917-20*, p. 263.

them among the poorest peasants often met with failure, even though share-croppers were given documents endowing them with the right to utilise a specified holding, livestock and implements belonging to the *bais*. In fact everything remained as before. The peasants did not make use of the right they had received. They continued to view themselves as share-croppers and to fulfil traditional obligations to the *bais*. Impoverished and enmeshed in patriarchal ties, they were unable to effect a sudden break with traditions that had developed over centuries. At that time they were not yet ready to struggle against the wealthy upper crust of village society.

The revolutionary process was even slower in the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva. It was only in 1920 that the power of feudal lords was overthrown and the Republics of Bukhara and Khoresm were established.[1] The lands belonging to the Emir and to the Khan were immediately confiscated along with lands belonging to their close associates and large landowners. This brought an end to the system of feudal-state taxes in kind that had sometimes deprived peasants of more than half of their income.

During the second phase of revolutionary-democratic agrarian transformations (1921-1922) an equalisation of land use by the Russian and the local working peasantry was carried out. The tasks of that phase of the reform were formulated by the Communist Party as follows: to combine the efforts of the local population with those of the mass of Russian working settlers to free them from the yoke of the Russian kulaks, and to provide the working people with land to ensure their subsistence.

Working peasants participated widely in implementing the agrarian reform, and this largely explained its success. Regional meetings of landless farm-hands and poor peasants discussed the proposed reform, and leaders for carrying it out were trained at special courses. Tens of thousands of agrarian workers participated in the work of newly established land commissions.

According to the law on land reform a family could retain only that area of land that it could work itself. Similarly it could retain only the livestock and implements that this required.

[1] In 1924 the Bukhara and the Khoresm Republics joined the peoples of Turkestan in entering the USSR.

Surpluses of land, livestock and implements were confiscated and distributed among the poorest local peasants. Russian kulaks whose lands had been confiscated addressed petitions to official bodies of the Russian Federation (Turkestan was then its autonomous member) calling for a restoration of their former privileges. They were officially informed, however, that the agrarian policy would not be reconsidered. As the reform proceeded land was also given to nomads as well as to settled farmers. They received holdings corresponding to the normal needs of cattle-raising farms. In addition the nomadic part of the population was given routes for moving their herds. A total of 726,000 hectares of land confiscated largely from wealthy Russian farmers were redistributed among 16,000 farms.[1]

These first democratic agrarian transformations of 1918-22 were directed against Russian large landowners and capitalists and against the largest local feudal-state landowners. Just as in the case of African countries of a socialist orientation, however, these reforms were unable to fully terminate feudal and capitalist relations on farms belonging to wealthy peasants, and on those small-scale and medium-scale feudal estates that continued to exist. Most agrarian workers either were left landless or else owned but small plots. Poor peasants continued to be heavily indebted to the rich and remained in hire as share-croppers, time-workers or landless wage-earners. Exploitation by usury was widely practised. On the eve of the reform in many districts nearly 70 per cent of the farms had to rely on loans from usurers.

Radical improvements in the position of the overwhelming majority of agrarian workers could be achieved only through further revolutionary-democratic transformations on the principle of giving land to those who work it. But in a situation in which the *bais* were frequently relatives of the poor peasants whom they exploited the latter found it difficult to attain the level of a conscious class struggle that that principle implied.

[1] T. U. Usubaliev, *Leninism—a Powerful Source of Friendship and Brotherhood Among Peoples*, p. 45.

The extent to which peasants were oppressed and backward could be seen in the fact that not infrequently far from opposing their exploiters they trusted them and elected *bais* to local Soviets. This was especially true in the case of the most backward part of the rural population, namely, the nomadic cattle-raisers. In districts of nomadic farming rural Soviets often continued to be controlled by clan elders, while in some nomadic villages there were no Soviets at all and local rule was in the hands of the rich.[1]

In order to successfully implement the principle of distributing land to those who work it, it was first necessary under such conditions to liberate the working peasantry from the influence of the *bais*. The Communist Party relied on the Koshchi association of rural workers in developing an intensive campaign for political education of poor and middle peasants. By that time, as a result of the further development of the agrarian reform Koshchi had increased its influence among peasants. Representatives of the association worked as members of all land commissions that drew up lists of peasants needing land, established land reserves, and listed farms belonging to *bais*. In order to increase the influence of that mass organisation still further and to develop a close linkage with the Communist Party organisations and local Soviets the practice of mutual representation was adopted at meetings of Koshchi and of leading bodies of the Party and the state.

Representatives of Party and state organisations addressed meetings of peasants and explained to them the Soviet government's policies. The fact that new elections to the Soviets sometimes took place as often as several times a year contributed to the political education of agrarian workers. For such frequent elections served to engage large numbers of the rural population in political activities, teaching them to distinguish between their friends and foes and to struggle against the established influence of the wealthy in the community. As a result of re-elections hostile elements were purged from the state administration and the links between the people and bodies of power strengthened. Reports to the population by the local Soviets, executive committees served the same purpose. Activities of deputies were frequently discussed at workers' meetings and complaints concerning individual administrators were publicly examined.

Ethnic discords that frequently escalated into conflicts were remaining as one of the vestiges of the colonial past. Rivalries among clans, communities and religious sects within a single nationality were often equally intense. Following the Revolution these rivalries expressed themselves in attempts to place representatives of particular groups within bodies of state power or to limit the rights of national minorities and individual ethnic groups. The resulting situation favoured nepotism, corruption and special privileges. In such a context the Communist Party placed great emphasis on selecting personnel in accordance with practical qualifications and was highly sensitive to complaints regarding violations of the rights of national minorities and ethnic groups. In particular, Party and state organisations acted decisively in opposing situations where local leaders declared their own clans to be "Communist" and rival ones to be "non-Communist". Tribal antagonism was exposed with the slogan "Down with all tribal hostilities". In order to apply this principle the judicial bodies were urged to consider not only violations of law by individuals but also issues relating to confrontations among clans and tribes.

Later on, the delineation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics on the basis of individual nationalities played an important role in overcoming national hostilities. This resulted in the establishment of the sovereign Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia (1924), the Tajik Republic (1929) and the Kazakh and Kirghiz Republics (1936) within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

These measures taken at various levels and in various spheres prepared the political ground for a third phase in the agrarian transformation, namely, the land and water reform of 1925-29. This first took place in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. In Kirghizia the reform was carried out in 1927-29, while in the greater part of Tajikistan that task was solved only in the 1930s in the course of socialist reconstruction of agriculture. These differences in rates of progress are explained by the unequal political and social

[1] See B. B. Baibulatov, *From Nomadic Life to Socialism (Events in the History of the Settlement of the Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Population of Kirghizia in 1917-37)*, Frunze, 1969 (in Russian).

awareness and differences in psychology of peasants, which, in turn, was associated with differences in the economic and social development of individual regions and the specific features of the class struggle there.

In accordance with provisions of the land and water reform, the farms where owners (or families of owners) were themselves not engaged in agriculture were confiscated. This generally referred to large landowners, urban traders and former officials whose land holdings had survived the second phase of the agrarian reform. Together with the livestock and implements the confiscated lands were transferred to a state reserve and then redistributed among poor peasants, in the first place among share-croppers and peasants possessing insufficient land.

Under the land and water reform legislation, farmers directly engaged in agriculture, but at the same time possessing excess land had to give it up. The sizes of land holdings, livestock and farm implements were established for each region. They corresponded to the needs of farming without any sub-letting of land to share-croppers. Land exceeding these norms was confiscated and excess livestock and implements were subjected to mandatory sale to the government.

In order to redistribute land on an egalitarian basis a census of farms was carried out in those districts in which land reform was to be carried out. As a result of that study three norms, depending on the local conditions, were established for each lowest administrative unit: the size of farms subject to complete confiscation, the size of holdings beyond which excess land was confiscated, and, finally, the norm of land to be made available through redistribution.

The sizes of land holdings were established with an eye to the interests of owners of medium-sized farms—so as to avoid reduction of their land holdings. This was an extremely important factor in gaining the support for the land and water reform by wide sections of the peasantry and in strengthening the alliance among working people of village society in the struggle against rural exploiters.

The reform met with a violent opposition on the part of exploiter elements. They terrorised the population and sought to hide excessive holdings by transferring them to relatives dependent on them. There were cases when *bais*

sold implements to share-croppers, expecting subsequently to get them back. Some of them rather than waiting for the enaction of the reform distributed their lands among share-croppers on condition that they later be returned to them. In order to expose these ruses, land commissions were created that included representatives of Party, state and land administration bodies. In each village they were assisted by local commissions of working peasants' representatives.

Such a direct contact between the land commissions and the working peasants that relied on the Koshchi associations made it possible to correct errors committed by administrative bodies and to identify additional areas of land that had been hidden by exploiters. Thus, in three regions of Uzbekistan it was initially expected that 208 large estates would be confiscated, with an area of 12.4 thousand hectares. With the assistance of poor peasantry, however, 481 such farms were identified, a total area of 35.6 thousand hectares.[1]

A special resolution adopted during the implementation of the reform of 1925-29 provided for a prison sentence of up to three years and a confiscation of property for persons hiding land or providing false information on the amount and quality of stocks or else misappropriating property that land commissions put on their records. That resolution enabled state bodies to apply legal sanctions against persons seeking to undermine the implementation of the reform laws.

As a result of the land and water reform in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia alone more than 256 thousand hectares of land were expropriated from exploiters. This was distributed on an egalitarian basis among approximately 115 thousand poor and landless families. The holdings they received provided them with sufficient subsistence without additional earnings outside their own farms. Most newly established farms also received livestock, farm implements, seeds and monetary loans on favourable terms. The owners of confiscated farms were given the opportunity of engaging in socially useful labour in any sector of the economy on an equal basis with all other citizens.

The land and water reform of 1925-29 in the course of its implementation in fact put an end to the long-standing

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[1] T. U. Usubaliev, *Leninism—a Powerful Source of Friendship and Brotherhood Among Peoples*, p. 47.

custom according to which the peasants could not own land and water before marriage was terminated. At the same time, many peasants had not been able to get married for the lack of money to buy the bride. Such peasants had been expected to work for a richer farmer within his own village or else to leave his village in search for external sources of income. Now, having received land they were able to establish their own farms.

The reform also contributed to overcoming the economic dependence and labour servitude of women; many thousands of women received land holdings and became independent farmers. Women received the right to vote at village meetings on all questions associated with the irrigation of land holdings, and access to pastures. State organisations gave all possible assistance to farms operated by women in terms of seeds, working stocks, etc., and helped them to form cooperatives.

As old irrigation systems were reorganised in the course of the land and water reform, and new irrigated lands were brought under cultivation, traditional separatism of clans and tribes was disrupted. Various clans and tribes settled together and jointly tackled problems of village life. This helped in overcoming the earlier rivalries.

As a result of the third phase of the agrarian reform, that is the land and water reform of 1925-29, the material position of working peasants improved substantially. In 1924 only 16 per cent of all farms in Turkestan were in the medium-size category. By 1928 their proportion had increased to 52 per cent, while the number of households relying on the rental of land declined from 42.5 per cent to 5.6 per cent. The reform freed working persons from paying rents amounting to 48 million rubles to large landowners and wealthy peasants.[1] Working peasants could now spend this money on the further development of their farms.

An analysis of the progress and class orientation of the agrarian reform shows that two stages may be discerned during the three phases that have been considered. The first represented a drive against large Russian landowners and local feudal lords, while in the second the drive was

[1] "The Experience of Socialist Transformations in the USSR and Its International Significance", *International Scientific Conference in Tashkent, 16-19 October, 1972*, Moscow, 1974, pp.290-91 (in Russian).

directed against wealthy peasants as well. Historically the first stage prepared the ground for the second. One grew from the other and no "Chinese wall" exists between them. And during the second stage it was also necessary to complete the extermination of feudal land holding, which had not yet been fully achieved during the first stage because the mass of backward peasants had not been quite prepared for such a development. There are, nevertheless, substantial qualitative differences between them as well. While the transformations during the first stage were largely bourgeois-democratic in character, in the sense that only large-scale feudal and colonial land holding was liquidated, the second stage prepared the ground for a socialist reorganisation of rural society, since the efforts directed not only against the feudal lords but also against the wealthy villagers undermined the system of exploitation of the village poor.

The number of phases in the revolutionary-democratic transformation of village life in countries with comparable agrarian structures need not always be three. All depends on concrete historical situations. In Central Asia, for example, a civil war, in progress at the time, was an important factor in carrying out the first stage of the agrarian reform (1917-22) in two phases. But such a situation may not necessarily take shape everywhere. Many African countries of a socialist orientation have reached a level corresponding to the first stage of revolutionary-democratic transformations, while some of them are quite closely approaching the second. A transition from the first stage to the second, that is, to placing restrictions on the wealthy farmer's landownership and curbing his economic and political domination, is facilitated by the fact that in countries with a similar agrarian structure that transition may have little influence on the level of agricultural production. For in such countries large-scale landownership (feudal lords and wealthy farmers) exists against the background of small-scale, fragmented farming (tenants, share-croppers).

The experience of agrarian transformations in Central Asia indicates that such a transition is only possible as a result of a class struggle by the working peasantry against their exploiters, a struggle developing under the leadership of a revolutionary party. No truly decisive and genuinely revolutionary-democratic agrarian reform may be carried out successfully unless working peasants are able to actively

participate in its implementation, and unless they are able to overcome the ignorance and oppression that hinder their advance to the level of a conscious struggle for their rights. In such conditions, and independently of subjective wishes, the advocacy of "p ace among classes" in the villages in fact contributes to a conservation of all types of patriarchal relations on which the exploiting upper layers of rural society rely in maintaining their own social and political influence over workers. The experience of Central Asia has shown that the working peasantry cannot become aware of its class interests and cannot move beyond the range of influence of their exploiters unless it possesses its own political organisations. Such organisations, which provide for a wide participation of rural workers in the activities of state organisations and in the process of cooperation, contribute to the political isolation of the exploiters and thus create conditions for completing the revolutionary-democratic transformations.

The experience of Central Asia is instructive not only with regard to the basic laws governing non-capitalist development, but also in finding optimal methods of carrying out agrarian reforms.[1] In particular, it shows that agrarian reforms can be carried out successfully only when administrative bodies have been purged of reactionary feudal elements and their associates, and only when they rely on the support and active participation of the working peasants and their mass organisations.

Land demarcation played a major role in implementing the radical democratic transformations on the principle that "land should be given to those who work it". This principle has become central in the revolutionary demands of peasants in developing countries. However, the extreme confusion in land and water tenure in African countries combined with the illiteracy of the direct producers permits exploiting classes to conceal land holdings beyond the norms set by law. For this reason the success of agrarian reforms is highly dependent on the preliminary measures to specify rights

[1] This question is examined in more detail in the study of the Soviet agriculturalist, G. G. Kotovsky, entitled "The Liquidation of Vestiges of Colonialism and Feudalism in Landownership". See Papers of the Seminar "The Experience of Agrarian Transformations in the Republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and Its Significance for Liberated Countries" (in Russian).

to land and water, which should be carried out with broad participation of working peasants.

The political and social awareness and the general psychology of the peasantry also played an important role in the implementation of agrarian transformations in the republics of Central Asia. These factors were not the same in various regions due to the differences in economic and social development and specific features of class struggle. In the final analysis, all combined they determined differences in the scope and intensity of agrarian reforms.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union relied on the support of the working peasantry in carrying out its policies. Aside from providing help in organising the peasantry politically the Party also assisted it in an economic sense. As a result of revolutionary-democratic transformations the working peasantry received land, cattle and farm implements, not to mention the fact that it was also freed from rental payments amounting to tens of millions of rubles. Between 1927 and 1929 alone, for example, the availability of means of production to former hired labourers in Central Asia increased by two and a half times. In Uzbekistan the increase in arable land available to them constituted 250 per cent. It was 31.3 per cent in the case of poor farmers. In Kirghizia the corresponding figures were 66.7 and 29.4 per cent, while in Turkmenia they were 50 and 28.6 per cent.[1] Major measures to improve the position of working masses in the villages included reduction of taxes, contracting for agricultural production and simple forms of cooperation contributing to the displacement of commercial and usury capital from the sphere of circulation. They also included increases in the price of cotton (the primary agricultural commodity), legislated reductions in prices of items of personal consumption (including bread), the stabilisation of seasonal fluctuations in food prices, etc. Such a policy of comprehensive help to working peasants constituted a basis on which during the years of revolutionary-democratic transformations the working class established a firm alliance not only with the village poor but also with

[1] See N. A. Ivnitsky, "Forms and Methods of Suppressing the Resistance of Local Exploiting Classes", Papers of the Seminar "The Experience of Agrarian Transformations in the Republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and Its Significance for Liberated Countries", p. 4.

middle peasants. This made it possible to initiate a socialist reorganisation of agriculture almost as soon as the revolutionary-democratic stage was completed.

The Socialist Reorganisation of Agriculture

The revolutionary-democratic stage in the transformation of rural society could not be expected to bring about a full liquidation of those farms that exploited hired labour and share-croppers. The agrarian reform could not fundamentally alter the situation of working masses because many peasants had not received a sufficient quantity of land. It may be expected that a similar situation will inevitably emerge in many of the developing countries that are following a non-capitalist road. In a context in which private forms of farming and commercial relations continue to exist no economic policy on the part of the state can long prevent the ruin of owners of small farms and their increasing exploitation by the wealthy villagers. In order to achieve a fundamental change in the condition of working masses and to provide for a growth in agricultural production on the basis of modern achievements of science and technology it was necessary to involve many millions of peasants in large-scale socialist production. That, in turn, could be achieved only through a voluntary association of peasants in production cooperatives in the manner envisaged by Lenin's cooperative plan.

A major role in this regard belonged to industrialisation. The development of modern industries producing means of production, important in itself, also ensured the growth of agriculture. At the same time the wide introduction of industrial machinery in agriculture established a material and technical basis for socialism. As V. I. Lenin observed, "a large-scale machine industry capable of reorganising agriculture is the only material basis that is possible for socialism".[1] Only a machine-based industry can provide the material basis for social production.[2]

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 459.

[2] A detailed examination of the problems of industrialisation as well as the cultural revolution that played an immense role in the development of socialist society lies beyond the scope of the problem under consideration. But it is important to emphasise that the industrial development of Central Asia began with the production of agricultural implements and machinery, the development of light industries engaged in processing agricultural raw materials, and the development of mineral resources. In this way a local market for the output of heavy industry was created. Later, the structure of industrial production gradually changed as new industrial sectors appeared. Similar elements in industrial development may be found in the economies of many African states.

A major factor that contributed to the development of agricultural production cooperatives in Central Asia was the basic defeat of exploiting classes at the end of the second stage of the agrarian reform. The intensive growth of lower forms of peasant cooperation in the course of the revolutionary-democratic transformations also contributed to this development. This refers to the organisation of peasant marketing associations, associations for joint cultivation of land and also the first more advanced production cooperatives, namely, collective farms.

At the same time a number of specific difficulties continued to hinder cooperation. They were associated with the need to overcome both patriarchal-feudal vestiges and elements of capitalism. In addition, in many agricultural districts commodity turnover was poorly developed. These and other factors were responsible for a more prolonged period required for collectivisation in these regions as compared with other parts of the Soviet Union.

The experience of Central Asia has shown that socialist cooperation in production develops more quickly in situations where patriarchal patterns have already been weakened by market relations and where its appearance has already been substantially prepared by lower forms of cooperation in such areas as supply, marketing and credit. It is precisely these lower forms that set the stage for intensive development of peasant cooperatives already during the democratic stage of the revolution in agricultural areas. Even in its lowest forms cooperation served to liberate rural workers from exploitation by the rich. An important prerequisite for the successful development of the cooperative movement was the participation of peasant masses, that is, essentially, of the village poor. In order to stimulate this participation, the poor peasants joining cooperatives were given a variety of privileges.

Initially cooperatives developed largely as supply and marketing associations. Before such cooperatives appeared

farmers had been compelled to sell their output to a private trader who supplied them with industrial goods. Because such traders dealt with individual rural workers who were constantly in need of money they usually offered credits at high rates of interest, the annual rate sometimes as high as 100 per cent. Having become indebted the peasant was forced to agree to any price proposed by the trader who, in addition, cheated him in measuring and weighing. By joining a supply and marketing cooperative the peasant could get rid of his bonds with the private middleman and market his output at reasonable prices regulated by the government. He was also able to purchase industrial products through the cooperative and borrow money as well as seeds and fertilisers on favourable terms. He could also use the implements belonging to the cooperative. In this way supply and marketing cooperatives not only strengthened peasant farms but also served to merge the economic interests of individual farmers.

Contracting played an important role in introducing elements of planning in the supply and marketing cooperatives. Under the contracts, cooperative organisations undertook to produce and deliver specified quantities of agricultural output to government agencies. The terms of the contracts specified the time and volume of such deliveries, their prices and other conditions. The contracting state organisations were to purchase the output at prices specified in the contract independently of market fluctuations, and to make advance payments not only in money but also in quality seeds, farm implements and agronomic services.

Such a system combining sales, deliveries and agrotechnical services provided for a planned development of industries processing agricultural produce and of agricultural production as a whole. At the same time discussions of the terms of contractual agreements at meetings of poor peasants and the advances and supplies associated with such commitments served to improve the position of the working rural population. In 1928 such contractual arrangements encompassed 100 per cent of government purchases of raw cotton and cocoons, 82 per cent of astrakhan furs, 70 per cent of the wool and approximately 60 per cent of dried fruits.[1]

[1] See "The Experience of Socialist Transformations in the USSR and Its International Significance...", p. 293.

The supply and marketing cooperatives prepared the ground for production associations which already had socialised means of production (though individual economies continued to exist within them) and collective forms of production activities. The simplest types were production associations for the use of machines and irrigation systems. Members of such associations pooled their resources for acquiring machines that they then used in cultivating their own farms. They also worked jointly in irrigating lands.

In irrigation cooperatives farmers pooled their efforts in supplying water to their fields. Their financial resources were made up from loans received from the government in the form of long-term credits over a period of 3-5 years, and also from the membership contributions (shares). In the irrigation associations and in other cooperatives alike the terms of crediting and the size of membership contributions depended on the class affiliation of the members. The membership contribution of poor peasants was one-twelfth that of exploiter farmers. Poor farmers received loans that covered all their social irrigation work while *bais* were required to carry out all work at their own expense.[1] Applying such class principle in the matters concerning water use the irrigation associations played a substantial role in freeing poor farmers from indenture to the *bais*.

Associations for the joint cultivation of land (TOZ) represented a more advanced form of cooperation in production. Within such associations up to one half of the land was socialised, and was cultivated with the help of jointly owned equipment. The revenues from such fields were largely distributed in accordance with the contribution of equipment and draft animals to common economy. For this reason such farms did not benefit the poorest peasants, for their revenue remained low even though their labour commitments were considerable. At the same time TOZ propertied members received larger incomes.

Similarly, state machine-renting centres, tractor caravans, and the repair shops on the basis of which machine and tractor stations (MTS) subsequently developed played a large role in strengthening cooperatives. Each rental centre possessed horse-drawn plows, harrows, seeding machines, cultivators and hillers as well as horses. In order to

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 294.

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stimulate the use of tractors in cultivating lands and also to free the poorer peasants from the need to rent draft animals from rich peasants, rates of payment for tractor services were deliberately reduced to less than one half their actual costs.

For the peasant masses, the most promising form of production cooperation was the collective farm (kolkhoz). The first collective farms were organised by poor peasants. Both poor and middle peasants could join collective farms on an equal basis. Incomes were distributed according to the quantity and quality of labour contributed by members to the joint economy. Upon entry into a kolkhoz both the land and part of the cattle and the draft animals belonging to the new member were socialised. Each member of the kolkhoz could own a personal plot of 0.5 hectares to have his own private economy.

The Soviet government encouraged the transition of farmers to collective methods of farming in every possible way. In 1929, when growing numbers of peasants were setting up collective farms, the government adopted a special decree, "Privileges for Collective Farms". The decree exempted both collective farms and collective farmers from taxes on all draft animals and young cattle for a period of two years. Taxes on personal plots were reduced by 50 per cent while all past credits owed and also all unpaid taxes and earlier fines of farmers who joined collective farms were annulled. The government rendered the kolkhozes all possible assistance through credits, agronomic services and priorities with regard to the services of machine and tractor stations.

A transition to collective farms in situations involving irrigated agriculture required fundamental transformations in existing forms of irrigation traditionally adapted to small-scale individual farms. For in fact the ditches that branched water sources along which mulberry trees had been planted had served as boundaries between small plots that farmers cultivated. This made the integration of scattered plots into socialised fields more difficult.

The establishment of collective farms led to a wide development of irrigation system. The construction of canals assumed major proportions. The Soviet government assigned large funds for this purpose but initially construction proceeded in difficult conditions: there was almost no equipment, and the principal means of labour was hacks and picks. A government decision in the 1920s rendered mandatory the participation of the entire rural population in large-scale irrigation construction. In the 1920s and 1930s all the great canals of the time were built in this way.

The development of socialist forms of farming called for the replacement of ancient methods of irrigation based on the noria-type water-wheel. Because the pumps to replace the wheels were initially unavailable, inclined canals were built, even though this method of irrigation required much labour and resources and did not permit rapid irrigation services. In 1927 the total capacity of pumping stations in Central Asia was insignificant. It was only later, in the course of industrial development, that combustion engine and later electric pumping facilities came to be widely installed. The development of irrigation and the technical re-equipment of agriculture impelled by the growth of industrial output in the country provided the material basis for the socialist transformation of villages.

In encouraging production cooperation among farmers the Communist Party and the Soviet Government followed the principles of Lenin's cooperative plan in postulating that this process must be based entirely on voluntary participation and that any coercion could only hinder the socialist transformation of villages and generate hostility towards it on the part of rural workers. V. I. Lenin had noted that "while encouraging co-operatives of all kinds as well as agricultural communes of middle peasants, representatives of Soviet power must not allow the slightest coercion to be used in setting them up. Associations are only worth while when they have been set up by the peasants themselves, on their own initiative, and the benefits of them have been verified in practice."[1]

A certain length of time was needed in order to convince the working peasants through their own experience of the advantages of production cooperation. In the Central Asian cropping areas mass collectivisation began in 1930. In the cattle-raising regions of Kirghizia and Turkmenia and also in the mountain areas of Tajikistan development of production cooperation among the nomads was a considerably longer process.

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 218.

In the latter case cooperation had its own specific features. The cattle-raising nomads, living in the areas distant from economic and cultural centres, were primarily engaged in subsistence economy. They were severely exploited by local wealthy *bais* who relied on traditions of kinship. These factors substantially hindered the policy of collectivisation. As one of Central Asia's Communist leaders observed in 1925, "in many places the power of the clan chief is ten times greater than that of the Soviet government. The chief of a clan—the manap—passes judgement over everyone, rules despotically and exploits poor peasants."[1] It was therefore necessary to create an alternative source of power, namely that of the Soviets. This, in turn, required that the Soviets themselves be adapted to the needs of nomadic life. Nomadic Soviets on pastures were accordingly established. They distributed to working farmers both cattle and pasture land confiscated from the rich, fought the oppressive influence of the clan leaders, set up cultural, educational and medical facilities, developed government trade on pastures and established consumer cooperatives to supply nomads with industrial goods directly, bypassing the commercial middleman. To adjust to the nomadic way of life many of these institutions and agencies, especially those engaged in trade, were mobile. Mobile stores also played an important role in the procurement of agricultural raw materials, gradually attracting nomadic families into small-scale commodity production associated with the sale of animal husbandry products.

But only a shift of the majority of nomads to sedentary life and development of production cooperatives could solve the basic problems of the nomadic population and radically improve their standard of living. The conditions of nomadic life, a continuous search for new pastures, left no possibility of developing quality breeds of cattle and increasing the extremely low material and cultural level of the population. Only settled life could make it possible to establish reliable sources of fodder, develop quality breeds and mechanise production processes. The new settlers received assistance in credits, machines, construction materials, etc. For the poorest nomads a transition to sedentary way of life, associated with the acquisition of land, repre-

[1] Quoted in: B. B. Baibulatov, *From Nomadic Life to Socialism*, p. 47.

sented a liberation from exploitation by the upper layers of clan society who had acquired control over the best pasture lands. A transition to crop production provided them with a new source of livelihood, independent of the *bais* possessing large quantities of cattle. For their part, the clan helmsmen were interested in preserving the nomadic life to which their traditional methods of exploitation were adapted. The struggle for a transition to sedentary forms of life was thus linked closely to a struggle against the *bais*.

A major role in the settlement of nomads belonged to the state farms. The establishment of state farms, which were also engaged in the cultivation of land, provided an impulse to the transition of a considerable number of nomadic and semi-nomadic households to sedentary life. The state farms enlisted the poor and unpropertied who, getting a job at the farm, left the pastures. By thus reducing the surplus labour available to nomadic households they indirectly encouraged the transition of many of them to sedentary life. The Soviet government assisted the organisation of such state farms by providing a wide variety of equipment. This, among other things, served to attract nomads in production cooperatives.[1]

In their drive for settlement and cooperation, Party and state bodies achieved a major goal of getting the cattle-raising cooperatives to establish their permanent basic settlements. These served as concentration points for the main farm implements and residential areas for the bulk of the peasants. They accommodated the offices of Party organisations, municipal bodies and various social organisations. Houses, schools, clubs, libraries, medical clinics, public baths and so forth were constructed in such centres. The large resources that this required were provided by the government. Part of the draft animals and other cattle were concentrated at such central settlements, while the rest, not associated with agricultural production, was sent to seasonal pastures. The principle was: it's the cattle, not the economy, that roves.

Reserves of fodder accumulated in the central settlements were sufficient to meet both the needs of draft animals and of cattle that normally grazed on pastures.

[1] See T. U. Usubaliev, *Leninism—a Powerful Source of Friendship and Brotherhood Among Peoples*, p. 232.

The transition to sedentary forms of life that took place during the period of mass collectivisation was largely based on the organisation of associations for joint cultivation of land, mowing, and the herding of cattle. The individual family household retained for its own use up to 100 sheep, 8-9 heads of cattle, 3-5 camels, and 8-10 horses.[1]

The *bais* hindered the transition to sedentary life and development of production cooperatives, for this deprived them of their revenues in return for the use of cattle, land and water. They argued that settlement represented a rejection of "noble" traditions of ancestors, who had viewed agricultural workers with contempt. Additional obstacles, however, were sometimes created by local government bodies who, lacking experience, were on occasion carried away with a passion for giant projects in constructing settlements, or displayed poor judgement in selecting a site for their location, or juxtaposed the cultivation of land to the raising of animals, and so forth. This was, of course, not surprising, since it was the first time that millions of nomads were settling on land within such a short period.

As a result of the implementation of Lenin's cooperative plan by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37) some 90 to 97 per cent of the peasant households of Central Asia had joined collective farms and state farms. The collective farm became the mainstay in the rural areas. The expropriation of farms belonging to the *bais* was completed, their property was transferred to the collective farms, while the *bais* themselves were given an opportunity to work. Those among them who actively opposed the growth of socialism, seeking to stage rebellions and killing community organisers, were subjected to punishment in accordance with Soviet laws.

Today, towards the end of the 1970s collective and state farms, the main agricultural producer in Central Asia, represent large-scale industrial economies possessing tractors, cotton-picking combines and other machinery as well as public buildings and production installations. All this constitutes the non-transferable social funds of collective farms which are increased through allocations from the farms' yearly revenues. Collective farmers receive guaranteed monthly monetary payments while a final payment is made at the end of the agricultural season. Each person, if so desires, can receive part of his payment in kind, in lieu of cash. Members of collective farms also have incomes from their private plots and from the cattle and fowl they own. Like all other citizens, they receive free medical services, sickness and disability benefits and old-age pensions.

A general meeting of all members constitutes a collective farm's highest body, which decides all financial and other questions. It elects the farm's board and its Chairman. Collective farms enter into contractual agreements with the government for deliveries of agricultural output. These are called contractual plans, and their terms specify types of output, quantities, and delivery dates. The government for its part supplies additional means of production, whenever needed, and consumer goods, and also provides assistance in the form of credits and agrotechnical services.

The transition of the Republics of Central Asia to socialism bypassing capitalism could not have been possible without the comprehensive support that was provided by all peoples of the Soviet Union. In this endeavour, the Party leadership and the Soviet Government maintained that the interests of the Union as a whole and of each Republic were identical and that the overcoming of the economic and cultural inequality of various nationalities and ethnic groups was a historical necessity. Machines and equipment were sent to Central Asia from the economically developed regions of the Soviet Union to meet that objective and entire enterprises were relocated there. At the same time skilled personnel was assigned to these regions while tens of thousands of young men and women drawn from native Central Asian nationalities were given an opportunity to study at universities and institutes located in Moscow, Leningrad and other major cultural centres. All this was accompanied by very impressive financial assistance. In 1932, for example, 62.2 per cent of the investments in the economy of Central Asia came from the Union budget. This represented a consistent application of Lenin's principle of proletarian internationalism, which provided one of the major prerequisites for a transition of economically lagging peoples to socialism.

The high level of agricultural development in Central Asian Republics towards the mid-1970s made it possible for the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet

[1] See B. B. Baibulatov, Op. cit., p. 98.

Union to define new major goals for these Republics in the field of agriculture.

In Kirghizia the Guidelines for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1976-80 approved by the Congress envisage an average yearly increase of 12-15 per cent in the gross output of agriculture, a more rapid development of fine-fleece and semi-fine-fleece sheep husbandry, further increases in the productivity of pastures, and the additional irrigation of some 35 thousand hectares of arable land and 500 thousand hectares of pastures.

In the Tajik Republic an average yearly increase in gross agricultural output of 15-18 per cent is envisaged together with the production of 900 thousand tons of raw cotton by 1980 and an increase in the production of grapes and other fruit. Additional 60 thousand hectares of irrigated lands are to become available and 100 thousand hectares of pastureland are to be irrigated. The yield of grain crops on irrigated land will increase and a programme to irrigate the Dangara Steppe will begin.

In the case of the Turkmen Republic the Guidelines provide for an average yearly increase in gross agricultural product of 14-17 per cent, a level of production of raw cotton reaching 1.2 million tons by 1980, the addition of 85 thousand hectares of irrigated land and of 5 million hectares of irrigated pastureland as well as improved effectiveness of current irrigation services, the construction of the Kara Kum Canal and the development of lands located in its vicinity.[1]

Problems related to a further rise of agricultural production in the Soviet Union were discussed by the July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Speaking at the Plenum, CC CPSU General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium Leonid Brezhnev stressed that "a further rise of agriculture is an inseparable part of the whole country's general economic progress".[2] The Plenum summed up the results of the Communist Party's agrarian policy in the period since 1965 and charted the ways of raising agricultural production, particularly cotton-growing. "Thanks to the efforts of Party and Government and the dedicated labour of cotton-growers and land-improvers,"

[1] See *Documents and Resolutions, XXVth Congress of the CPSU*, pp. 254-55.

[2] *Pravda*, July 4, 1978, p. 3.

Leonid Brezhnev said in his report, "the country now has a reliable basis for steadily raising cotton output. The central task is to improve quality and increase the output of fine-fibred cotton."[1]

The very fact that these tasks were set shows that the Soviet Central Asian Republics' way to socialism has been fruitful. And fulfilment of the decisions of the July 1978 CC CPSU Plenum will raise agriculture in the Central Asian Republics to a new, still higher level.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Sixty years have passed since the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. During that period the peoples of Central Asia, once economically backward and poor, have attained the level of economically developed countries.

At the present time the industries of Central Asian Republics include more than 100 sectors adapted to the needs of modern technological progress that range from factories producing toys to atomic power stations. Their output is exported to more than 100 countries, including developed capitalist countries. Their agriculture employs large stocks of tractors, grain and cotton harvesters and trucks. Mechanisation and electrification of agriculture as well as the wide use of chemicals and high quality seeds developed by local scientists provide for abundant harvests. During the years of Soviet power the yield of cotton in Tajikistan has grown from 1,200 to 3,000 kilograms per hectare. The level of mechanisation in growing and harvesting cotton is more than 80 per cent throughout all of Central Asia. All this contributes to a growing welfare of agricultural workers.

Important successes have been recorded in animal husbandry. A wide programme of preventive measures carried out by well-equipped veterinary services (vaccinations and monitoring the animals' health) has brought an end to the massive cattle epidemics that occurred in the past. Following the settlement of nomadic population animal husbandry and the cultivation of land have become closer linked. Large supplies of fodder are made on lands assigned to the grazing of cattle, and irrigated lands for the production of fodders are being developed. Tens of thousands of wells, many equipped with wind-driven pumps, are built on seasonal pastures. Scientific cattle-breeding centres have been organised, they collaborate with universities and agricultural institutes. Effective methods of animal husbandry and the findings of research centres concerning the breeding of cattle are publicised at specialised exhibitions.

Large water reservoirs, irrigation canals, collectors and water junctures are being constructed and millions of hectares of arid steppes and desert lands are being brought under cultivation. The irrigation of the Golodnaya Steppe and the Karshi Steppe in Uzbekistan, the development of the Yavan Virgin Land in Tajikistan and the commissioning of the Kara Kum Canal in Turkmenia have made it possible to create hundreds of new, highly mechanised collective and state farms and to increase the agricultural output.

Shabby *yurtas* and mud huts have vanished forever, as working families now live in large well-lit houses equipped with gas and electricity. Radio and television have become an established part of the way of life of Central Asian families, who are able to receive daily radio and television broadcasts in all parts of these Republics. All peoples of Central Asian Republics have become fully literate, and each year tens of millions of volumes of books are published by local publishing houses.

All these achievements are the result of the victory of socialism and were made possible by struggle and sacrifices. The Republics of Central Asia were the first to verify through their own practice the basic laws that govern the transition to socialism by peoples who have freed themselves from colonial oppression and who have on the whole bypassed the stage of capitalist development. This experience discredits the conception that capitalism is inevitable for peoples of the East and that they are unable to carry out socialist transformations immediately.

The struggle for social transformations has now reached even the most distant and isolated parts of the world and hundreds of millions of persons of all races and nationalities are participating in it. The course of history has fully confirmed Lenin's expectation that "the socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country ... it will be a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism".[1]

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 159.

One of the ways in which this expresses itself is the emergence of new states that are following a socialist orientation. The experience of Central Asian Republics in effecting a transition to socialism may play an important positive role in their struggle for socialist development. This does not mean, of course, that developing countries taking a non-capitalist way will be repeating the experience of Soviet Central Asian Republics in every detail.

During the years that have followed the Great October Socialist Revolution the balance of forces in the world has been altered radically in favour of peace, democracy and socialism. The powerful blows of national liberation forces have brought about a collapse of imperialism's colonial system. The CPSU's 25th Congress stressed that "the victories of the national liberation movement are opening up new horizons for countries that have won independence".[1]

Three powerful streams of today's world revolutionary process are combining into a single front in the struggle against imperialism, their common enemy. They are the world socialist system, the working-class movement of developed capitalist countries, and the liberation struggle of oppressed peoples. This facilitates the struggle of young nations for socialist development. There is no doubt that those developing countries that have chosen a socialist orientation will be able to apply fruitfully the rich experience of the Soviet Republics of Central Asia.

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[1] *Documents and Resolutions, XXVth Congress of the CPSU*, p. 32.

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